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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: stockman_scott who wrote (46795)	9/25/2002 9:42:12 AM
From: GST	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

I think there are some people who think with the money from the oil wells and the ability to control the price of oil (proabably moving it into a lower price band to goose up the US economy) that we can turn a handsome profit off of "running" Iraq and any other oil-rich country that fails to make sufficient progress towards adopting our form of government.

To: stockman_scott who wrote (46795)	9/26/2002 3:05:30 AM
From: frankw1900	Read Replies (3) \| Respond to of 281500

I read Fallows' Atlantic article on a war with Iraq. theatlantic.com I made some notes. It's interesting because he's definitely concerned with the follow up. I think what is most important is the reason for invading Iraq in the first place. Making the large investment in money and lives just to remove Saddam and his weapons hardly seems "serious" - I believe this should be done but in itself appears to me me to be an over-investment, if not wasted investment, if that's the only aim. The precis at the top of the article says "Going to war with Iraq would mean shouldering all the responsibilities of an occupying power the moment victory was achieved. These would include running the economy, keeping domestic peace, and protecting Iraq's borders?and doing it all for years, or perhaps decades. Are we ready for this long-term relationship?" I think invading Iraq will have exactly these consequences. Furthermore, I believe it should have these consequences. I agree with Fallows that the quick in and out isn't possible or sensible and that a real invasion and ocupation is necessary. Fallows deals with the first days of victory and the usual logistical problems that will follow - dealing with casualties, clean water, stemming the likely revenge seekers from murdering anyone even slightly connected with the Baath party, etc. I expect the US can deal with these things. What then? he asks. And he went to interview a lot of folk with relevant experience about what the US might do and its chances of success. The majority of the people he intereviewed were opposed to a US invasion. There seems there are two kinds of objection. One is that local culture and situation is such that it would be impossible to establish, or help the Iraqis establish, a reasonable, close to democratic regime in Iraq which would enjoy the support of most citizens; that the country will fly apart in civil war; that the US doesn't have the ability to deal with the aftermath because its forces aren't up to strength for it; that it will become like Vietnam for the US; etc. The other is that we can't imagine the consequences of invading Iraq, just as folk couldn't imagine the consequences (eg) of starting WW1, or the Athenians the Sicilian invasion, the Romans the venture into the Northern parts of Germany,etc - and, if they had forseen the consequences they wouldn't have started. The second set of objections contain mostly imponderables although the likelihood of an Iraq invasion stimulating a muslim coalition against the US is probably not on. They can't hold one in the face of Israel. That it might turn Iran into an enemy is superfluous, since it's already an enemy. That it might change the relations between some ME states and the nature of some governments there is likely but how is unpredictable. This much can be said in answer to these kind of objections: modern countries usually go to war for serious reasons. A good case can be made that the ME - South Asia situation leading to 9/11 events can't be allowed to continue and that Iraq, its leadership, position, etc, must be dealt with as part of changing that situation. There will be unexpected consequences but the US will have to deal with these as they come up. The first sort of objection can be analyzed more easily as there is some objective evidence which can be examined. Is the Iraqi tribal situation intractable? Is some significant portion of the Shiite population enthusiastically party to the Iranian no singing, no dancing, no fornication program? Is the US impossibly understaffed in the categories of military and quasi-military/diplomatic personnel necessary for an occupation? Is the Vietnam parallel valid? Are the Iraqi Kurds going to work a separatist program? Is Iraqi society inimical to democracy? Most of the people Fallows interviewed answered "yes" to these questions. What he reports, though, is their opinions. He does not report in their answers examples of tribal enmity of recent times, he does not report what their relations might be after years of abuse at the hands of the present government, or what their relations are now in the parts of the country Hussein doesn't hold. Not all of this is unknowable. Similarly the number of extreme shiite fundamentalists. It's extremely unlikely that US and other intelligence services aren't operating in those parts of the country under the no fly zones and in other parts of the country contiguous.[Just read Blair's report to Parliament - they are.] US State Dept has been in the North for a year, at least. He doesn't report the US understaffed to such a degree that enough occupation personnel can't be found - it could well be stretched, though. Is Iraqi society really inimical to democracy? The Kurdish society doesn't seem so. Most ME immigrants to N America adapt happily to democracy. It's been argued on this board that Iraqi folk are more likely to fall into corruption and repression because of traditional reliance on family and clan in the face of unreliable or lawless government and the habit will be unbreakable. The assumption holding up this argument is that Iraqis are special and can't learn....except over decades. Some of them can learn to make WMDs, though. Fallows argues that in the face of the Afghan experience, so far, it's not a good idea for the US just to do in the present regime, set up a shaky caretaker and leave, that the US presence would have to be large (@50,000) and last for some years. That it's very likely the US will become quite intimate with Iraq, immigration from there will increase. Costs are high (tens of billions/yr) but not exorbitant when looking at the size of the US economy (trillions). The war reparations would need to be be forgiven but since the world isn't receiving them anyway, what the hell. The folk interviewed who are in favour of the invasion also aren't strong in the fact department although Woolsey points out that in the last hundred years democracy, not always strong democracy, has spread enormously. The trend is in favour of democracy. That's a fact. This is the realm of speculation but the Iranian mullocracy is shaky and a pro-democracy regime in Iraq will certainly make them shakier still. The US, if it makes a few good moves in Iraq, could possibly get two democracies for the price of one. Fallows does point out a possibly important thing. It may now be that US military doctrine is such that the US forces may not be as capable or willing to support an occupation presence as they may have been some years ago ("the mission is to kill people and blow things up"). I personally doubt this - the US military at every level has never been more educated or broadly intelligent than they are today. The Bush administraion hasn't said much about what it intends to do once it's in Iraq although there have been fragmneted comments from some administration members. It is notable, however, that the State department and less officially governmental institutions are extremely busy with both internal and exile Iraqi organizations. It's also clear for those who want to read the tea leaves that there has been an awful lot of covert intelligence gathering going on in Iraq the last few years. I suspect there may more than one viable plan for after the Hussein regime. Is the US ready for this long term relationship? Probably. It's done it before. The US population never got too upset about the European commitment. It was successful. Vietnam was not successful and citizens were very unhappy about that. If the move looks like a winner, they're ready for it.