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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Neeka who wrote (47242)	9/26/2002 1:47:17 PM
From: JohnM	Respond to of 281500

Apologies if this has already been posted. This thread is difficult to keep up with on a moment by moment basis. Several of us have been waiting for this book. So thanks for the heads up.

To: Neeka who wrote (47242)	9/26/2002 1:51:59 PM
From: JohnM	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

You should have noted the article is by Stanley Kurtz, which reduces it's credibility more than a little. However, Pollack had a piece in the New York Times today that I intend to post sometime today if no one else does that reflects a careful consideration of the issues. Not a lot of evidence but good argument. And a short piece in the Times does not leave space for much evidence.

To: Neeka who wrote (47242)	9/26/2002 1:57:27 PM
From: Karen Lawrence	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

No doubt a replay...Pollack's intriguing article from Foreign Affairs. Next Stop Baghdad? by Kenneth M. Pollack From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002 Kenneth M. Pollack is Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1999 to 2001 he served as Director for Gulf Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT As the conflict in Afghanistan winds down, the question of what the United States should do about Iraq has risen to the forefront of American foreign policy. Hawks argue that toppling Saddam Hussein should be "phase two" in the war on terrorism. They see Iraq's development of unconventional weapons as a critical threat to U.S. national interests and want to parlay the success of the Afghan campaign into a similar operation further west. Those who pass for doves in the mainstream debate point to the difficulty of such an undertaking and the lack of any evidence tying Saddam to the recent attacks on the United States. They argue that the goal of America's Iraq policy should be to revive U.N. weapons inspections and re-energize containment. Both camps have it partly right -- and partly wrong. Thanks to Washington's own missed opportunities and others' shameful cynicism, there are no longer any good policy options toward Iraq. The hawks are wrong to think the problem is desperately urgent or connected to terrorism, but they are right to see the prospect of a nuclear-armed Saddam as so worrisome that it requires drastic action. The doves, meanwhile, are right about Iraq's not being a good candidate for a replay of Operation Enduring Freedom, but they are wrong to think that inspections and deterrence are adequate responses to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. After the more immediate danger posed by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network has been dealt with, the Bush administration should indeed turn its attention to Baghdad. What it should do at that point, however, is pursue the one strategy that offers a way out of the impasse. The United States should invade Iraq, eliminate the present regime, and pave the way for a successor prepared to abide by its international commitments and live in peace with its neighbors. THE TROUBLE WITH CONTAINMENT The reasons for contemplating such dramatic action have little to do with the events of September 11 and the subsequent crisis and much to do with the course of U.S. policy toward Iraq since 1991. After Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War, the first Bush administration hoped Saddam would fall from power. It had no clear strategy for how to make that happen, however, and so settled for keeping him isolated and defanged until the lucky day eventually arrived. For lack of a better alternative the Clinton administration continued the same policy, as has the current administration. The central goal of containment over the past decade has been to prevent Saddam -- a serial aggressor -- from rebuilding Iraq's military power, including its weapons of mass destruction. The United States and its allies did not want to have to deter, repel, or reverse another Iraqi invasion; they wanted to deny Saddam the wherewithal to mount a threat to his neighbors in the first place. So they put in place, under U.N. auspices, a combination of economic, military, and diplomatic constraints that prevented Saddam from once again destabilizing one of the world's most strategically important regions, while simultaneously allowing humanitarian exemptions so Iraq could meet the nonmilitary needs of its population. Despite the criticism it often received, this policy was a sensible approach to a situation in which there were few attractive options. It served its purposes well, and far longer than most thought possible. Over the last few years, however, containment has started to unravel. Serious inspections of Saddam's WMD programs stopped long ago. Fewer and fewer nations respect the U.N.-mandated constraints, and more and more are tired of constantly battling with Saddam to force him to comply. Ludicrous Iraqi propaganda about how the economic sanctions are responsible for the deaths of more than a million people since 1991 is now accepted at face value the world over. A dozen or more nations have flown commercial airliners into Iraq to flout the ban on air travel to and from the country -- a ban they now claim never existed, but one that was a well-respected fact just a few years ago. Smuggled Iraqi oil flows via Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf states at a rate more than double what it was in 1998. Iraq is increasingly able to get its hands on prohibited items such as spare parts for its tanks and planes and equipment for its crippled logistical system. Most stunning of all, the Chinese were recently caught building a nationwide fiber-optic communications network for Saddam's regime; the key nodes of this system were destroyed by U.S. airstrikes in January 2001. If respect for the sanctions has already eroded to the point where the Chinese are willing to sell Iraq such critical technology, how long will it be before someone proves willing to sell tanks? Or missiles? Or fissile material? Repeated calls to resuscitate the anti-Saddam coalition and strengthen containment are correct about the problem but na•ve in thinking it can be solved easily. Comprehensive sanctions of the type imposed on Iraq are of necessity a multilateral effort, and at this point there are simply too many important countries willing to subvert them for the scheme to be effective. The current administration's unhappy experience in trying to sell "smart sanctions" to the international community shows just how bad the situation is. The administration's proposed reforms would lift most of the economic constraints on Iraq in return for tighter controls over what comes into the country -- a perfectly reasonable idea for anyone actually interested in helping the Iraqi people while keeping Saddam's military in check. But France, Russia, China, and others have opposed the plan because Baghdad fears, correctly, that if it were accepted some form of international military and financial controls might be prolonged. (continued) foreignaffairs.org

To: Neeka who wrote (47242)	9/26/2002 6:19:02 PM
From: BigBull	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

re. "The Threatening Storm" review: Yesssssssssss! It's out at last. :o}}}}}}}}}}} Just reserved my copy at the local Barnes and Noble and am headed out to pick it up. Apparently they had only a single copy left. Thanks for posting the review and the "heads up" on the arrival of the book. Bull

To: Neeka who wrote (47242)	9/26/2002 11:14:10 PM
From: KLP	Respond to of 281500

Thanks M~~ Here's an interview 3 days ago by Pollack and Iraq: aipac.org September 23, 2002 NER INTERVIEWS: Kenneth M. Pollack, The Brookings Institutions A top American Iraq expert explains the danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program and says that the United States should act soon to counter this growing threat. Q: What is the Iraqi threat to America? A: Saddam is determined to make himself the hegemon of the Persian Gulf region, gain control over its oil wealth and dominate the entire Middle East. Not only is he pursuing the most destructive weapons known to humanity, he controls a country in one of the world’s most important and delicate regions. If he were to acquire nuclear weapons, Saddam could use them as leverage to pressure the oil-rich Persian Gulf Arab countries to cede control over their oil. However, Saddam also realizes that the Gulf oil fields are a source of great vulnerability to the United States and its Western allies. If it suited his purposes, he would no doubt be willing to hold them hostage or even destroy them if he possessed the capability. That would obliterate 25 percent of the world’s oil production. Since the economies of the entire world are dependent on cheap oil, the loss of so much production would plunge the entire world into global depression. Q: How close is Saddam to acquiring nuclear weapons? A: No one besides Saddam knows the answer to that question. We know that he is determined to acquire these weapons, has made this a top priority and devoted extensive resources to it. Khidhir Hamza, the former head of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program who defected to the United States in 1994, has told us that in that year Iraq’s nuclear program was bigger than ever—and this at the height of the inspections regime. Iraq has natural uranium and everything it needs to build a bomb—it’s simply a matter of time. Once Saddam has acquired a nuclear weapon it will be too late to do anything about it. The United States, therefore, needs to err on the side of caution by moving sooner rather than later to eradicate this threat. Q: Why, in your opinion, did Saddam agree to the return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq? A: Saddam has learned a few lessons over the years. He was always willing to make a tactical concession to save his skin, but he generally waited until too late before making that concession. This time he got the timing right. By agreeing to the inspections before the administration has had the time to craft a new U.N. resolution, Saddam is seeking to lock in place the old, ineffective inspections regime. Indeed, he may have succeeded in derailing the U.S. effort to ensure that the new resolution would create a tighter, more invasive regime. Q: Can U.N. inspectors ensure Saddam’s disarmament? A. I think the inspections are a trap for the United States. They are very unlikely to ensure Iraq’s disarmament and they are equally unlikely to galvanize an international commitment for military action in case Saddam flouts the inspectors. The inspections are entirely dependent on international support, and we have learned that the world just doesn’t care anymore. By 1998 the United States stood virtually alone in wanting to penalize Iraq for failing to comply with the inspections. There is no reason to believe that this has changed. The threat of a U.S. invasion might convince some U.N. members to briefly support new inspections. But history has demonstrated that within a year or two, Saddam will be flouting the inspectors and no one except us will want to act. From 1991 to 1998 we had a pretty intrusive inspections regime, yet the inspectors were unable to prevent Saddam from maintaining his prohibited weapons programs. It’s been four years since the inspectors left, and all the evidence indicates that Saddam has made tremendous progress in restoring those programs. New inspectors would have an even tougher time finding them. A new inspections regime almost certainly would be unable to find the weapons that constitute the threat. Q: Do you accept the argument that unlike suicide bombers Saddam can be deterred, thus making military action unnecessary? A: Contrary to the evidence, many would like to believe that Saddam can be deterred even after acquiring nuclear weapons. But it’s not enough that Saddam does not seem to be suicidal. Time and again he has taken extraordinarily high-risk aggressive actions. For instance, virtually everyone around Saddam believed in 1991 that staying in Kuwait and trying to defeat the U.S.-led coalition could end in catastrophe, yet high-level Iraqi defectors have told us Saddam convinced himself that either we wouldn’t attack, or if we did his army could defeat us. More than two decades of experience with Saddam have demonstrated that while he has learned to pursue his goals in a clever fashion and even to correct tactical mistakes, he has not changed his fundamental goals. Many believe Saddam is a cold, rational calculator who would never provoke a nuclear response. However, the record of his 23 years in power shows that he is actually a cold, rational miscalculator. Dr. Pollack, director of research at Brookings’ Saban Center for Middle East Policy, is the author of The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Random House, Oct. 2002). Near East Report

To: Neeka who wrote (47242)	9/26/2002 11:16:07 PM
From: KLP	Respond to of 281500

Also Pollack's Bio, if anyone wants to see it... Kenneth M. Pollack Kenneth Pollack is currently Olin Senior Fellow and Director, National Security Studies where he specializes in Middle East political and military affairs, national security and terrorism issues. He has twice served as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. From 1988 through 1995 he was a Persian Gulf military analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency where he won numerous accolades for his work on Iraqi military forces before, during, and after the Gulf War. He has also held positions as Senior Research Professor at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of National Defense University and as a Research Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His book, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, will be published by Random House in October 2002. He holds a Ph.D. from the Defense Studies Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.A. from Yale. Contact Email: kpollack@cfr.org aaupnet.org 8*************

To: Neeka who wrote (47242)	9/27/2002 4:13:27 AM
From: frankw1900	Read Replies (4) \| Respond to of 281500

Yes, Pollack has the right argument. About six months ago I posted here a series of things about Saddam Hussein. The strongest point I thought I made, and it appears Pollack makes it (and he has the intelligence background to back it up but actually it's public record if you want to pursue it), is that Hussein is a psychopath. Psychopaths do not think like ordinary people. I said it at the time and Pollack says it. It is a mistake to think Saddam will behave like an ordinary leader. He does not. He cannot. Here are some of the characteristics as I understand them from my personal encounters and reading. Psychopaths believe they are the only important thing. They have no conscience - they are amoral. They have no empathy - the suffering and death of others is a tool. Much of the time they are in a state of grandiosity - they believe they are more intelligent, more attractive, more virile, more deserving, etc, than anyone else. Obviously this leads to error. They have no normal conception of truth - they are unembarrassed at being caught in a lie. Truth, lies, are all the same. They are often violent. They are often charming. They are impulsive. They are thrill seekers. They are con artists and control freaks. They are irresponsible. None of the above means they are stupid, exactly, they often do well on IQ tests. It does mean, however, that they are not socialized humans. They cannot be "cured". Psychopathy is not a mental illness. They just are that way and always will be. In testimony before US congress intelligence and military folk talk about Hussein's "unpredictability" and "peculiarities of character." The above is why. Think on this. It's documented if you want to look for it. Hussein's first job was assassin. He's a killer and he enjoys it. He runs a police state, has access to lots of money, and is pursuing and developing weapons of mass destruction. It's a serious error to think he's too sensible not to use these weapons against the US or some other truly powerful country. When he's hitting a grandiosity plateau he's capable doing all kinds foolish things. For once, in this case, the leader of a foreign country is every bit as bad as his enemies say he is and, if they've led sheltered lives, they probably don't think he's as dangerous as he really is. Even if Dubya is thicker than a post and venal, (I don't think he is), he's on the side of the angels with this one.