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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: LindyBill who wrote (48002)	9/29/2002 4:04:54 PM
From: Nadine Carroll	Respond to of 281500

Ze'ev Schiff summarizes the two-year mark of the Al Aqsa Intifada, or the Oslo War, however you call it: Analysis / Looking back after two years By Ze'ev Schiff What would have happened if Ariel Sharon, then opposition leader, had not climbed the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000 on a visit that infuriated Palestinians and Israeli Arabs? Would the military conflict between Israel and the Palestinians have erupted in any case, precipitated by some some other event? Had it not been for the Temple Mount visit, would there have been another genuine opportunity for negotiation between the sides after the failed Camp David summit? There is one other, non-hypothetical, question about the riots on September 29, which partly involved Israeli Arabs, and ended with many casualties. Why didn't Arafat order an end to the armed conflict after a short time? He delivered such an order in 1996 after the opening of the Western Wall Tunnel in Jerusalem sparked violent riots, and many people were killed. There is no doubt that Arafat controlled the Palestinian street in autumn 2000 - and yet despite his control, the military conflict erupted to claim many victims on both sides. Why didn't Arafat put an end to the military conflict at a point when it would have been relatively easy for him to start up a second round of negotiations? Why did he prolong the violent stand-off? Did he really think he could defeat Israel? No doubt, Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount was a critical blunder. But no matter how provocative it was in Muslim eyes, the visit was not what precipitated the current, armed conflict. The visit caused a series of demonstrations, not widescale, violent conflict. At the time, Prime Minister Ehud Barak viewed Sharon's plan to visit the Temple Mount as a security matter, and nothing else. For Barak, it was clear that Sharon wanted to demonstrate to the Israeli public that he is more loyal to the Temple Mount than any other Israeli leader. The Shin Bet security service advised Barak in writing that the visit would go ahead without incident so long as Sharon refrained from entering mosques on the Mount. In reality, the visit inflamed tempers. Tension did run high, but Israel's intelligence community was right when it maintained, some time before the Temple Mount visit, that the Palestinian Authority under Arafat's command had decided it would turn to violent confrontation should it fail to attain its goals in negotiations. This intelligence assessment jibes with the answer to the question of why Arafat chose not to put an end to the violence during its early stages. He anticipated that major gains would be secured from the fighting. In the early phases, the Palestinians sustained a number of casualties, partly due to frenzied attacks by masses on IDF posts. Arafat could not afford to order an end to the conflict without having a victory of some kind in hand. I asked a Palestinian figure to sum up the Palestinians' achievements in the armed confrontation up to this point. He replied - while it's true that the Palestinians have their backs to the wall, they nonetheless have notched two major accomplishments. In the beginning, there was one dead Israeli for every 11 dead Palestinians, whereas today the ratio is 3 dead Palestinians for each killed Israeli. The second gain is Israel's abysmal status in world opinion. Yet when viewed in purely strategic terms, Palestinian gains must be seen in an entirely different light. Arafat's strategic goal was to use force to compel Israel to make concessions. Since Israel did not initiate the conflict, its objectives must be viewed largely in terms of stopping the Palestinians from attaining their strategic goal. Israel's primary decision has been not to embrace concessions pressured by the use of terror against it. Though a majority of the Israeli public believes that a Palestinian state should arise alongside Israel, most also believe that such statehood should arise as a result of negotiation and agreements. Clearly, the armed conflict has not brought the Palestinians closer to attaining their dream of an independent state whose capital is East Jerusalem. This realization of this dream has been deferred on account of the military conflict which the Palestinians initiated. It is also clear that any future negotiations will be tougher going for the Palestinians. Israelis will justifiably be far more suspicious. After two years of fighting, the war has not ended. More ups and downs can be expected. Rumors about current negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are specious. There is no major diplomatic initiative on the horizon. It is possible that such an initiative could come about after a war waged by the Americans in Iraq, but this diplomatic effort might not be sponsored by Israel or the Palestinians. haaretzdaily.com

To: LindyBill who wrote (48002)	9/29/2002 6:44:17 PM
From: JohnM	Respond to of 281500

However, I am not willing to accept his POV that it was legitimate to not escalate because the Chinese might come in. Boldness in War is crucial, and Blockade and mass B-52 bombing might have brought them to their knees. It almost did for Nixon much later. In any case, it is "water over the bridge." I may change my mind, not done with the book yet. Water over the bridge is a good way to put it. As we both suspect, we are on opposite ends on Vietnam, looks, in fact, as if we might be at extreme opposite ends. On the book, I finally decided it was a pretty straightforward argument, made unevenly. Some parts were well done; some not so much so. And I think I said I thought it was two different books not too well patched together. I'm curious what you have to say once you've finished it. Then you have to start Pollock. I'm much more curious about your view of it.