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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (48365)	9/30/2002 10:57:23 PM
From: Bilow	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi Nadine Carroll; Re: "debka also reports that Iran has decided to cooperate with the US. Better to be on the train than left behind. Anybody from the 'we can't invade, we have no allies' chorus of two months ago ready to admit their mistake?" If you listen to debka, it's clear that the war already started, LOL. -- Carl

To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (48365)	10/5/2002 5:19:10 PM
From: BigBull	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Anybody from the 'we can't invade, we have no allies' chorus of two months ago ready to admit their mistake? Indeed! More from Pollacks book that may interest thread denizens: The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq by Kenneth M. Pollack amazon.com. Chapter 6 The Regional Perspective (pp 187-191)-- Saudi Arabia: Page 187: "The Saudi government would love to be rid of Saddam Hussein. The events of August 1990 and since have proven to it that Saddam is an extremely dangerous character who directly threatens it's interests. Now, after more than a decade of containment in which Saudi Arabia was clearly the linchpin - both politically and militarily - the Saudis know that given the opportunity, Saddam will seek revenge against them. In addition, the Saudi's know that one of Saddam's own conclusions about the Gulf War was not that he should not have invaded Kuwait but that he should have waited until he had a nuclear weapon before doing so and should have continued on into Saudi Arabia rather than stopping in Kuwait. Contrary to some claims, the Saudis urged the United States to support the Shi'ite and Kurdish rebels during the 1991 intifadah...." Four to five paragraphs go on to explain Saudi disenchantment with US "half measures" to remove Saddam. The text then picks up on page 189: "...As Saudi officials explain strenuously in private, they will support a U.S. effort to topple Saddam if it is done properly, but if the United States is not willing to do it 'properly,' they want no part of it and will eventually move to reaching an accommodation with Baghdad...." Pollack then goes on to discuss Pal/Israeli peace "linkage" as an important factor in Saudi decisions wrt any Saddam "regime change," but stresses a complete solution to this problem is not necessary for Saudi cooperation. "... But what does handling regime change "properly" mean to the Saudis? It means an invasion and nothing less. Countless Saudi princes, officials, and businessmen have asked me, 'Why don't you just invade?' Their points are that Saddam's security is so formidable and Iraq's armed forces are still strong enough that only the U.S. military has a high likelihood of bringing him down. The Saudis know that supporting a major American operation to topple Saddam will be highly unpopular among their people. What they have told us is that they are willing to handle popular discontent and believe they can do so, but they are willing to do so for the minimum time required, not one day longer. What they stress is that they are not willing to launch an open ended military campaign or a military campaign that tries to topple Saddam on the cheap. They dismiss the notion of trying to overthrow the regime through a combination of air power and support to Iraqi opposition groups because they believe that it is unlikely to work and will take too long even if it does work. As one GCC official put it, 'When you are ready to use all of your forces, we will be there for you, but we are not interested in letting you try out theories about air power.' For them, an invasion is the only option that makes sense because it virtually guarantees that Saddam's regime will be overthrown, it promises to do so quickly (as fast as U.S forces can drive on Baghdad), and it is the most likely way to minimize Saddam's ability to strike back at them......"