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To: Les H who wrote (965)10/3/2002 4:02:10 PM
From: Don Green  Respond to of 48770
 
Crippled bank system stifling private demand
INTERVIEW/Masaru Yoshitomi:
The Asahi Shimbun

Over the long period of Japan's economic stagnation following the frothy days of the asset-inflated economy in the late 1980s, the government has spent a dazzling amount of money on public investment to return the economy to solid growth.

But the aggressive fiscal expansion has failed to rekindle the nation's growth engine and has left the government with a crippling debt load. Why has this Keynesian-style pump-priming failed in Japan?

Masaru Yoshitomi, former director-general of the Coordination Bureau at the Economic Planning Agency, blames the dysfunctional banking sector for the devastating failure of Japan's fiscal policy during the so-called lost decade.

Q: Why has the government's spending binge, which was aimed at bolstering the economy since the collapse of the asset-inflated economy, only increased public deficits?

A: When I was working for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the mid-1980s, I proposed a medium-term fiscal policy to limit the budget deficit within a certain range to avoid negative macroeconomic effects. Under the policy, the government had to run a public deficit due to both cyclical and structural factors-such as short-term measures to stimulate demand during a recession or increases in social security expenditures-within a certain target as a share of gross domestic product, for instance, over a five- to six-year period.

Since Japan's power to generate economic growth was bound to decline because of its aging society, I thought a traditional Keynesian-style fiscal stimulus to create demand with government spending would lose the effect of producing high growth, which would wipe out budget deficits.

Q: Why was your proposal not adopted in Japan?

A: About the time the first fiscal stimulus package was put into action in summer 1992, many people still believed Japan was going through an ordinary cyclical downturn. Even I did not foresee that the government would have to put together as many as a dozen such stimulus packages in the coming years.

The budget was in surplus and Japan's huge trade surplus was provoking calls for steps to expand domestic demand, so few people in Japan supported my idea.

Moreover, the Economic Planning Agency (now part of the Cabinet Office) was a bastion of Keynesians, while the Finance Ministry was obsessed with balancing the books.

Q: Was it so difficult for the government to change its traditional fiscal policy?

A: In 1992, we knew banking problems were contributing to the economic malaise. But we did not know that even big banks were choking on massive bad loans. It wasn't until around 1995 or 1996 that we finally realized public spending does not generate demand in the private sector. Then we argued recovery could not be sustained unless fiscal stimulus was combined with steps to deal with the bad debt.

But the Keynesians contended-and still contend-that the banking problem would disappear when the economy picked up. They say the economy failed to take off into sustained growth only because the government did not continue fiscal expansion for long enough.

Q: Does the Keynesian fiscal policy still work?

A: Japan's deflation would have been even more serious if the government had not adopted the Keynesian policy. On the other hand, we must admit the massive rounds of public investment have kept alive many construction companies that are bleeding red ink like a bucket with a huge hole amid tumbling land prices. This has also allowed banks to drag their feet on efforts to clean up the bad-debt mess and reform their operations.

Meantime, the stimulating effects of public spending continued to dwindle. The pump-priming approach is based on the assumption that a fiscal shot in the arm will eventually revive civilian demands. Japan's ``lost decade'' really means that during that period, fiscal tonic failed to bolster private demand, causing a loss in growth that should have materialized after an upturn fueled by government spending.

Insufficient deregulation in growth areas, such as telecommunications, and a financial system unable to perform its core functions due to the delay in the disposal of bad loans hindered fiscal stimulus from stoking growth.

New technology is a powerful growth engine, but it needs fuel, which must be provided by the financial system. The bank woes left the economy without the financial grease to keep its wheel turning, while tight regulations kept the growth engine from running, so new private demands could not emerge.

Q: When, as now, there is deflation, do you think it is time to turn to public spending to fuel growth?

A: Fiscal expansion is nothing but pump priming. Unless private-sector demand emerges after that, a boom will fail to materialize-as transpired during the ``lost decade''-and we will have no chance of restoring fiscal health: We will get only a larger public deficit. Under these circumstances, public spending will only raise concern about Japan's fiscal bankruptcy.

The government must implement structural reform measures to kick-start the growth engine based on new technology and ensure that the banking system will provide necessary fuel for the engine.

If the government tries to goose up the economy through fiscal expansion without taking these measures, it will make the same mistake again.

The problem is that the government's efforts to pump up the economy are not responding to the needs of the times, such as an end to Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp.'s monopoly on telephone markets and an overhaul of the financial system based on a serious bank cleanup.(IHT/Asahi: October 3,2002)

(10/03



To: Les H who wrote (965)10/6/2002 12:03:14 PM
From: Les H  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 48770
 
India courts another debt crisis
By Scott B MacDonald

atimes.com

While international analysts usually focus on external debt as a key factor of a country's creditworthiness, domestic debt must also be considered. This is an issue for Brazil, Latin America's largest debtor.

Increasingly it is an issue for one of the Asia's largest economies - India. Public sector debt (domestic debt) to GDP is currently at its highest ever level of 70.5 percent of GDP in FY2002. This is from a recent low of 56.5 percent in FY1997. There is a good chance that the debt level could climb even higher, to around 75 percent by FY end 2003. What is alarming about the rise in domestic debt in India is that both state and central governments do not appear to be unduly concerned about the trend, and there is little sign of any relief in the medium term.

The ongoing threat of war with Pakistan, the interrelated security concern with terrorism, the ongoing turmoil in Kashmir, and the larger game of geopolitical maneuvering vis-a-vis China all appear to be overriding considerations to trimming the budget and bringing public debt under control. Although it is too early to proclaim that India is heading into another debt crisis, it does not take a great leap of the imagination to see that if current trends continue, the South Asian country will have substantial debt management problems.

India's has had problems with its debt burden before. In the late 1980s domestic debt rose substantially, This proved to be a major problem when the international environment turned highly negative in 1991, ultimately causing a balance of payments crisis. In the aftermath of the 1991 crisis, the Indian government worked hard to reduce the onerous debt burden. Public sector spending was controlled and new economic reforms helped bolster growth, which brought in greater revenues. Despite security concerns, Indian finances improved through the first half of the 1990s. However, there was considerable policy erosion in the late 1990s as coalition governments led by the Hindu nationalist-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were forced to strike deals with regional parties to maintain parliamentary majorities. Having a coalition of two dozen parties did not help the policy process. In particular, it weakened debt management.

While central government finances worsened, state governments were allowed to spend in a relatively unconstrained fashion. The end result was that internal debt rose to an all-time high of 70.5 percent of GDP in FY2002. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has remained in office for two terms, but his government is paying the price. Consequently, three key trends mark India's finances - the consolidated fiscal deficit is on the rise, state finances are eroding at a faster pace than before, and off-balance-sheets liabilities are climbing. According to Standard & Poor's, India's budget deficit is expected to reach 6 percent of GDP in the current fiscal year (ending March 31, 2003). Counting state finances it could be higher, closer to 10 percent of GDP.

Standard & Poor's is forecasting that the consolidated debt of the central and state governments could exceed 80 percent of GDP this year, while the public-sector borrowing requirement, including all levels of government and the enterprises they control, may exceed 12 percent of GDP. Interest payments alone are likely to consume nearly half the central government's revenue. S&P also noted, "Its largely unreformed public sector, whose inefficient operations constrain prospects for economic growth and pose a contingent liability to the sovereign. For example, the cost of bailing out government-owned financial institutions (including the Unit Trust of India, the country's largest mutual fund, which had been bailed out once before in 1998 but not restructured) may exceed 1.5 percent of GDP. At the state level, the annual losses of electricity boards exceed 1 percent of GDP, weakening already-poor state finances."

India is not sitting on the brink of another debt crisis - so far. However, the trends are worrying. Unlike in the late 1980s and early 1990s, India has seen strong inflows of foreign exchange over the past few years, with reserves reaching US$29.4 billion (5.1 percent of GDP). In the balance of payments, India's growing flow of "invisibles", ie, remittances, software exports and tourism, has helped to reduce pressure. In FY2002, invisibles accounted for close to $36 billion, equal to 5 percent of GDP. At the same time, interest rates have declined - always a help for large-scale debtors.

Yet, prospects for resolving the looming debt crisis are mixed at best. The political situation remains complicated, security concerns command the attention of policy makers and the ability of the government to forge ahead with privatization sales that could help reduce fiscal pressure are bogged down in nationalist and coalition politics.

In its most recent Article IV report on the Indian economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) clearly stated its concerns, that "recent trends - large primary deficits, growing debt, and the sharp narrowing of the growth rate-interest rate differential - are creating conditions for potentially unsustainable debt dynamics. The weak fiscal situation leaves little room for maneuver in macroeconomic policies and could entrench the cycle of decelerating growth and deteriorating fiscal balances."

The IMF is not alone in these sentiments. On September 8, Moody's Investors Service commented, "The government's rising debt service burden is consuming an overwhelming share of its limited financial resources, leaving the authorities with little fiscal room to redress the country's infrastructure and social problems, much less business cycle slowdowns. The fiscal dilemma also constrains monetary policy, dampening longer-term investment and growth prospects. Even with growth at 5 percent to 6 percent, average living standards are stagnating. The dependence upon non-resident capital to finance the current account gap is also not sustainable, particularly in view of the volatile political scene."

Reflecting many of the same concerns, S&P downgraded India's ratings on September 18. Maintaining a negative outlook, the rating agency stated, "Continued large fiscal deficits, along with a languid pace of economic reform, would lead to a further ratings downgrade."

Although the government is aware of the issue, there are so many other major issues clamoring for attention. Consequently, the domestic debt problem represents a slow-moving, yet still very real, potential crisis for the government. Unable to push reforms at a faster pace, its privatization program off track, and increasing problems with its power sector (slowing prospects for growth), the BJP government will eventually be forced to return to the domestic agenda.

Prospects for a new Gulf War, with the potential for another spike in oil prices, should worry New Delhi. While it is not likely to provoke another crisis as in 1991, it will push India's finances into a much tighter situation. If unchecked, India will find itself in more dire straits as the decade continues.

Dr Scott B MacDonald is Editor of the KWR International Advisor

(Posted with permission from KWR International, Inc, (KWR), a consulting firm specializing in the delivery of research, communications and advisory services.)