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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: maceng2 who wrote (50619)	10/9/2002 4:32:32 PM
From: Elsewhere	Respond to of 281500

For example, "an eye for an eye" type of reaction goes back thousands of years. Has it been proven ineffective? Well, it certainly coincides with what Axelrod and Hamilton found to be the most effective strategy in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), a popular game theory model (to elaborate on zonder's theme of the day): Tit for tat brembs.net Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) used a computer tournament to detect strategies that would favour cooperation among individuals engaged in the IPD. In a first round, 14 more or less sophisticated strategies and one totally random strategy competed against each other for the highest average scores in an IPD of 200 moves. Unexpectedly, a very simple strategy did outstandingly well: cooperate on the first move and then copy your opponent's last move for all subsequent moves. This strategy was called 'Tit for tat' (TFT) and became the founder of an ever growing amount of successful strategies. In a similar competition with 62 contestants, TFT won again. It has three characteristics that account for its impressive performance: it is nice (cooperates on the first move), retaliatory (punishes defection in the prior move with defection) and forgiving (immediate return to cooperation after one C of the adversary). Part of: Chaos, cheating and cooperation: potential solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma brembs.net