Thanks, Lindy, for linking that discussion. David Albright seems to be one of the pre-eminent North Korean experts. Here's something he wrote back in February. Seems like Bush was correct when he noted that N. Korea was unlikely to live up to the Agreed Framework in March '01--but did he have to say it so bluntly?
thebulletin.org
>>North Korea: It’s taking too long
By David Albright & Holly Higgins
After the September 11 attack on the United States, President George W. Bush embraced a wide range of multilateral initiatives to shore up the international coalition against global terrorism. But the Bush administration has remained surprisingly hardline where North Korea is concerned. For instance, in an Oval Office interview with Asian news editors on October 16, 2001, Bush said he was “disappointed” in North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Il, adding that Kim should lead his people into the modern era and “assume the responsibility of a good leader.”
North Korea’s response to this comment was predictable. A few days later, the Korean Central News Agency issued a statement rejecting U.S. calls for renewed diplomatic talks, adding that Bush would “pay dearly.”
The current stalemate in the two countries’ relationship is particularly unfortunate. If that stalemate could somehow be overcome, it might be possible to speed up nuclear inspections in North Korea—an essential element in the 1994 U.S.–North Korean Agreed Framework, designed to ensure that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons.
In the 1990s, the U.S.–North Korean relationship seemed to lurch from crisis to crisis, even as both sought solutions to the security issues plaguing the Korean peninsula. Despite those difficulties, progress was made, starting with the U.S. decision in 1991 to unilaterally withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea. The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula soon followed. A broad set of initiatives between North Korea and the United States and its allies grew dramatically and covered almost every security issue facing the Koreas.
Yet the Bush administration is right to emphasize the importance of early progress on nuclear inspections in North Korea—the current schedule is too long. The inspection schedule, set in the Agreed Framework, was tied to progress in the construction of the first of two light-water reactors to be built at Kumho, now much delayed.
Conducting inspections before they are called for by the construction schedule could require offering North Korea some incentives. Those incentives could take many forms, including the supply of electricity by South Korea, as many nuclear and policy experts on Northeast Asia have suggested.
Getting off on the wrong foot
When President Bush met South Korean President Kim Dae Jung at the White House last March, few could have expected that Bush’s remarks and demeanor during their joint press conference would be so damaging. Bush said he doubted that North Korea would live up to its international agreements, which many interpreted as a criticism of Kim’s sunshine policy—the South Korean policy of engagement with the North aimed at resolving their outstanding political, security, and economic issues. Kim Dae Jung won the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize, largely for his efforts to implement the policy and for his historic summit meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in June of that year.
Although Bush did not claim that North Korea was violating the Agreed Framework, his comment was interpreted as criticizing that agreement as well. Certainly, the Bush administration is much more critical of the agreement than the Clinton administration was.
Several senior Bush officials maintain that North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons and is committed to hiding that fact. They believe North Korea wants to delay the “day of reckoning” that inspections would cause. A few senior military officials in the region also believe that North Korea still intends to reunite the Korean peninsula by force.
These officials rarely offer new information to support their claims, and their views may or may not reflect any new information. They may simply represent the most hawkish U.S. intelligence agency assessments. But because of the uncertainty of available information, it is prudent to assume that North Korea could have one or two nuclear weapons. Conducting inspections would be the best way to find the truth.
Last June 6, after a four-month policy review, Bush announced that he had directed his national security team to “undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda”: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities, verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile programs, a ban on its missile exports, and its adoption of a less threatening conventional military posture.
North Korea, which was not consulted before this public announcement, felt slighted that the United States had unilaterally set the agenda. On June 20, North Korea issued a statement accusing the United States of attempting to put “conditions” on the resumption of negotiations by adding the question of conventional forces to the agenda: “The U.S. side, while proposing to resume negotiations without preconditions, unilaterally set out and opened to the public topics of discussion . . . before both sides sat together. [North Korea] cannot but interpret the U.S. administration’s proposal for resuming dialogue as unilateral and conditional in its nature and hostile in its intention.”
Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Seoul in late July. While conventional forces would be on the U.S. agenda, he said, the United States was prepared to meet North Korea “anywhere, anytime, and without preconditions.” But this statement did not lead to the resumption of talks.
At an impasse, each country has expressed frustration that the other appears to be ignoring its political constraints. Privately, U.S. officials wonder what it would take for North Korea to believe the United States is sincere. The Bush administration has consistently said that it does not want to merely restate the Clinton policy. Officials wonder whether North Korea secretly wants to derail the process by de-legitimizing their administration. On the other hand, North Korea has questioned whether the United States will ever establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang or whether it intends to follow through on its commitments under the Agreed Framework.
North-South relations
On September 2, North Korea suddenly announced that it would renew its dialogue with South Korea, which had become a casualty of the U.S.– North Korean stalemate. At a fifth round of inter-Korean ministerial talks in mid-September, the Koreas agreed to restart the inter-Korean family reunions that had been a major accomplishment of the 2000 summit.
Soon after, however, North Korea canceled the family reunions as well as the next round of talks. After a lengthy public dispute about venue, North and South Korean negotiators met for a sixth round in mid-November, but accomplished little.
In particular, North Korea offered no insight into when Kim Jong Il would visit South Korea—although Chairman Kim had promised to make a reciprocal visit after President Kim and he held their June 2000 summit in Pyongyang.
The South’s President Kim desperately needs the North Korean leader’s visit to bolster support for his sunshine policy and for his government as well. Since last spring Kim’s political fortunes have waned. Prohibited from seeking reelection in 2002 and reeling from North Korea’s refusal to make significant concessions, Kim has faced a number of political crises in recent months.
In September, the National Assembly passed a no-confidence motion against Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, Kim’s top adviser, widely considered the architect of the sunshine policy. Then Kim’s entire Cabinet resigned, forcing him to appoint a new government. This crisis brought to the surface South Korea’s deep misgivings about whether it was receiving enough in return for its concessions and assistance to North Korea. Nonetheless, Kim remains steadfast in his desire to implement the sunshine policy. Quoted in Chosun Ilbo on October 31, he called it “an historic mission,” and said there were no alternatives.
Fighting terrorism
North Korea’s lukewarm reaction after the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center also generated suspicion—particularly because North Korea remains on the U.S. government’s list of countries that sponsor terrorism. North Korea condemned the terrorist attacks as “very regrettable and tragic,” but critics said this gesture was not enough. As reported by the Associated Press on October 31, Thomas Hubbard, U.S. ambassador to South Korea, urged North Korea to join in international anti-terrorism efforts: “North Korea has stated their opposition to terrorism and criticized the September 11 attacks. But they haven’t supported the international coalition that is trying to fight terrorism. The North Koreans are missing an opportunity to play a responsible role by not joining us.”
On November 12, perhaps in response to such criticism, North Korea signed two anti-terrorist treaties— the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. It could be an important step to the removal of North Korea from the list of states sponsoring terrorism—its listing has prohibited it from receiving a wide range of international aid and loans for development. In mid-November, North Korea issued a statement saying it would cooperate with the international community, “firmly adhering to the principled position on terrorism in the future.”
Still, North Korea severely criticized South Korea for putting its armed forces on a higher state of alert after the September 11 attack, even though the South repeatedly said the action was not taken to threaten the North. The complaint was seen by U.S. officials as another reason to remain skeptical of North Korea’s commitment to the war on terrorism.
On the other hand, critics of the current U.S. policy believe the administration should be more accommodating. Leon Sigal, a North Korean specialist at the Social Science Research Council in New York, believes the United States should be holding senior-level consultations with North Korea: “If the Bush administration can cooperate with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt on terrorism, why not North Korea as well?”
KEDO rolls on, but what about inspections?
Meanwhile, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is now making steady progress as it prepares to build two light-water reactors in North Korea. After several years of activity, it has built roads, a harbor, and support facilities. North Korea and KEDO members have had productive discussions on nuclear safety. In September, North Korea issued a construction permit, and major construction on the reactor complex has finally started.
One senior KEDO official estimates that KEDO will have completed a “significant portion of the [light-water reactor] project” by the first half of 2005, and will then be ready to receive key nuclear components. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea must come into compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement before those components are delivered.
The original schedule envisioned conducting the inspections in the late 1990s and finishing both reactors by 2003—and the completion date could slip again. KEDO still faces tough negotiations with North Korea over several issues, including liability and the possible need to refurbish North Korea’s electrical grid, which is in extremely poor condition.
Although North Korea is expected to comply with its safeguards agreement, no one knows for sure whether it will do so. It has failed to cooperate with the IAEA on a range of verification issues, raising concerns that it may not be completely cooperative when the inspection process resumes. In addition to inspecting North Korea’s known nuclear infrastructure, the IAEA will also have to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear sites or activities.
As recently as October 17, the IAEA said it had not made any significant progress in verifying that North Korea had come into compliance with its safeguards agreement or that North Korea had not produced more plutonium than it declared in the early 1990s. IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei said in an October 17 Reuters interview: “We are still where we had been a year ago. We continue to verify the freeze of the existing facilities but we haven’t really made any progress with regard to verification of the past program.”
In early November, however, North Korea said it would allow IAEA inspectors to visit the Isotope Production Laboratory at Yongbyon, a facility suspected of being involved in plutonium separation. Whether North Korea will allow the inspectors to investigate past activities at the facility remains unclear.
Because inspections are tied to construction milestones, as things stand the IAEA may not begin the verification process until about 2005. The IAEA’s director general and senior staff estimate that it will take three to four years to conduct inspections, so the inspections might not be finished until 2008 or 2009. If pressed, though, the IAEA could act more quickly and still do the inspections adequately.
Such a delay could open the way for disruptions in the Agreed Framework’s delicate balance, which could also impair the inter-Korean peace process. Mistrust of North Korea remains high in general, and from time to time the North is accused of having hidden nuclear weapons facilities (see “Under Mt. Chun-Ma,” page 58).
And what if the verification process were to fail? The IAEA can only determine whether North Korea is in compliance with its safeguards agreement if it cooperates. North Korea is still deeply suspicious of the IAEA.
Given the timeline, it would be prudent for the Bush administration to try to help jump-start IAEA inspections. In his July 26, 2001 testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Charles Pritchard, a senior State Department official, said: “Improved implementation of the Agreed Framework provisions related to North Korea’s nuclear activities was one of the administration’s top priorities. [North Korean] cooperation with the IAEA will become increasingly important. Although the date for delivering key nuclear components is still in the future, [North Korea] must begin active cooperation soon, to avoid serious delays in the KEDO project.”
A bilateral approach
Prudence alone recommends not relying solely on the IAEA to determine whether the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons. A complementary approach, based on a step-by-step process of creating North-South nuclear projects and mutual nuclear inspections, could provide valuable insurance.
The 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula calls for a joint inspection agency—the Joint Nuclear Control Commission. However, the commission has not met since 1993. North and South Korea could now reconsider mutual inspections, either formally through the commission, or informally through political and scientific channels.
Given the difficulty in implementing the Joint Declaration, a bilateral system may be best approached in an incremental way. A series of confidence-building measures could lead to a comprehensive bilateral inspection regime. Examples might be joint seminars on inspections; written assurances that North Korea intends to permit IAEA inspections anywhere, anytime; joint civil nuclear cooperation; and reciprocal visits by senior political leaders to nuclear facilities. Even if a bilateral regime were not fully realized, these steps could make significant contributions to achieving transparency and increasing cooperation.
On the other hand, a bilateral approach would risk duplication and competition with the IAEA regime. If not managed effectively, it might even provide North Korea with a pretext for delaying the fulfillment of its obligations under the Agreed Framework. And it cannot serve as a substitute for the work of the IAEA, which must still certify North Korea’s compliance with its safeguards agreement.
But a bilateral approach could increase the chance that the IAEA would achieve its inspection goals and provide an independent check on its results. Bilateral inspections might start sooner and accomplish many of the same tasks, dramatically shortening the time needed by the IAEA to verify compliance. North and South Korea might be able to resolve outstanding nuclear issues more quickly and confidently than the IAEA and North Korea could. A bilateral approach might also provide early warning if North Korea does not intend to comply with its obligations.
South Korea might also be willing to provide North Korea with economic and political incentives for early cooperation on verification issues. Although these incentives would need to be evaluated carefully, they could be justified if they resulted in new initiatives.
Getting back on track
The relationship between North Korea and the United States is again plagued by serious misunderstandings, missed opportunities, and false expectations. Both sides repeatedly call on the other to make the first move, but neither has made a significant gesture. In a November 28 interview with Reuters, President Kim said: “I hope that both sides, the United States and North Korea, will be able to sit face to face and discuss these issues.”
Many experts on North Korea believe that it would not take much to restart discussions between the United States and North Korea. But both sides have to find a way out of the current impasse. With so much attention devoted to the war on terrorism, however, the administration is stretched thin. The United States needs to make a concerted effort to launch a new round of bilateral negotiations with North Korea and to help foster inter-Korean reconciliation.
When it is frustrated by the glacial pace of U.S. engagement, North Korea often engages in provocations that raise tensions and cause further delays. On the other hand, North Korea has responded positively to positive U.S. steps.
Although the Bush administration should be commended for raising the importance of inspections, it must recognize that under the Agreed Framework, North Korea is not yet required to permit them. The United States and its allies should try offering North Korea something in return for early compliance—perhaps a supply of electricity from South Korea. Since 1998, North Korea has been asking for energy to compensate for the long delay in finishing the light-water reactors.
North Korea should be invited to rejoin the IAEA, which it quit in 1994 after the Board of Governors passed a resolution suspending civilian technical assistance. Restoring technical assistance could be an attractive incentive for North Korea, and might improve the relationship between the IAEA and North Korea as well as offer more opportunities for productive interactions between the North and South Korean nuclear establishments.
There are many ways to achieve progress on the Korean peninsula. But it will not happen unless the United States is willing to take part in initiating forward movement. If the Bush administration chooses not to do so, we may have to wait for North Korea to perturb the agenda.
David Albright is the president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). Holly Higgins is a research analyst at ISIS. Albright is the co-editor of Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (2000). |
