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To: Les H who wrote (198780)10/20/2002 10:57:31 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 436258
 
Deregulation pioneer Kahn still favors it but sees its warts
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By Jay Hancock
The Baltimore Sun
published Oct 20, 2002
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WHENEVER THERE was a plane crash in the 1980s, or an airline bankruptcy or a report on airport chaos, people would often call Alfred E. Kahn in upstate New York and ask, "How do you like deregulation NOW?"

More than anybody else, economist Kahn was responsible in the late 1970s for dismantling the price and route controls that had made airlines expensive but stable public utilities. With each new gust of post-regulatory turbulence, journalists and policymakers wanted to know whether he had changed his mind.

He hadn't. Low fares, more flights and the transformation of air travel from an exclusive, luxury-liner privilege to a boon for the masses outweighed the problems, he argued.

Deregulation, of course, has continued its advance, conquering swaths of territory that would have amazed Carter administration officials who thought they were being radical by weakening the Civil Aeronautics Board and freeing up truck-freight rates.

Millions of consumers can shop for the best deals, not only in air travel, but in electrical power, natural gas and local and long-distance phone service. Banks sell stocks, underwrite securities offerings and do business across state lines. The economy is possibly less regulated than at any time since the early part of the 20th century.

As a result, the dislocations, bankruptcies and other damage that many associate with deregulation are perhaps greater and more painful than ever.

The evidence: Enron, Global Crossing, US Airways, PSINet, Pacific Gas and Electric, Covad, Winstar, Dynegy, TXU, WorldCom, Lucent etc. And an electricity bill of billions for California taxpayers. And an incident involving deregulated airlines on Sept. 11, 2001.

So how about it, Dr. Kahn? Any regrets about deregulation NOW?

"On airlines, no," he said on the phone last week. "I am less confident about how telecommunications and electric power are working."

Well, he's not alone. But among deregulation skeptics, he is perhaps most worth listening to. For three decades, he has been an intellectual light for economywide deregulation - not just airlines - and his continuing critiques of it are sharp, informed and sobering.

He plans to work until Thanksgiving on a paper tentatively titled "The Role of Regulation and Deregulation in Three Financial Meltdowns." Those would be the meltdowns in energy, telecom and the Internet.

"I think deregulation deserves a good deal of the blame for the telecommunications problems," Kahn says. In electricity, he says, "you can't totally deregulate because you have to have a regulated transmission network which plays a crucial role in balancing demand, in getting prices right, in ensuring system reliability."

Balance of demand, rational prices and system reliability are pretty much what California lacked last year, when deregulation led to blackouts, price-gouging and a huge government bill. The bubbles in the Internet sector and the wider stock market, Kahn says, might also be seen as the result of too little government.

"Obviously, you really should have had more effective regulation against lying and thievery," he says.

A Cornell University economist who grasps the economy of tarmac and power generators as firmly as that of algebra and Greek letters, Kahn, who turned 85 Thursday, was chairman of New York's Public Service Commission in the mid-1970s and became head of the Civil Aeronautics Board under Carter in 1977.

A self-described liberal Democrat, Kahn is respected from both sides of the political fence, as welcome at the libertarian Cato Institute as he is at the moderate-liberal Brookings Institution. He has not given up on deregulation - far from it.

"I think that where an industry is potentially effectively competitive, then competition is a far better protection of the public and insurer of technology progress than regulation," he says. And, he stresses, "don't regulate new, innovative services. Stay the hell away."

But he seems to find much of the deregulation of the past decade to have been maladroit, counterproductive and perhaps excessive. He favors forcing local phone companies to open their lines to competitors - but not how the government did it. Like many, he thinks California's policy of capping retail but not wholesale electricity prices was economically crazy.

Kahn is hunkered down in his Cornell office, doing autopsies on the blowups, trying to identify what worked, what didn't and why.

"It is proving so difficult, but I haven't seen anybody else do it," he says. "I'll have a much better grasp on it in four or five weeks. Either that or I'll retire."

Whatever the conclusions, when the granddaddy of deregulation points out problems in the trend he started, we might want to pay attention.

Copyright © 2002, The Baltimore Sun

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To: Les H who wrote (198780)10/21/2002 9:48:59 AM
From: Les H  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 436258
 
If there's so much (fiat) money available, where is it?

bizjournals.com

C. Stephen Guyer

Where has all the money gone?

According to Applied Reasoning Inc., an economic-indicator research firm, there was $1.19 trillion in the U.S. money supply on Sept. 8, 2002.

If you're like many in business these days, you might ask, "OK, so where is it?" To answer that question, we must examine two basic components of the economic system: money and velocity.

Most of the time, we talk about money in terms of simple amounts. Such as, "I have $10,000 in savings," or "I need $35,000 to buy that car."

However, beneath those statements is the implied definition of "fiat" money: something that represents control over goods and services. The $10,000 in savings is meaningless unless it is connected to some item or service that we desire.

It's really not the $35,000 we want; it's the car. Money has no value if it doesn't move from one person to another. The rate at which the money moves is called velocity.

What makes an economy thrive is not just how much money there is, but rather the amount that travels between people and organizations. We've all heard the term "money is tight." That statement is more than just a catch phrase. It means: Of that $1.19 trillion, not much of it is moving around.

The money supply turns over, on average, about three times a year. When economists fail to predict the future, it's not because they don't know how much money the Federal Reserve Board has created and released through the banks. It's because they don't know what people are doing with it.

When people feel threatened, they put their money in the bank and the velocity goes down. When they feel good about life, they buy everyone a beer and the velocity goes up.

The velocity of money is affected by two sophisticated-sounding terms: "propensity to save" and "propensity to spend." Two other words that might be used are "keep" and "give."

The velocity of money is directly affected by more than one person's (or company's) willingness to give, which implies an exchange for something of value, rather than simply keep.

As this is repeated from one entity to another, it's called the "multiplier effect." That is, Person A gets $10, keeps a dollar and gives $9 away. hopefully in exchange for something useful. Person B gets $9, keeps 90 cents and gives the rest away, and so forth.

Continuing with the original keep/give ratio of 10 percent, 50 exchanges will multiply the initial $10 into almost $90 in economic activity. That's what makes the economy either thrive or throttle.

There is little doubt that today's financial climate is not encouraging. There doesn't seem to be any money. That is not quite a true statement. The basic amount of money in the system has not changed dramatically. It is simply stuck. Velocity has dropped to what some might call a snail's pace.

In order to stimulate a faster velocity of money or, in other words, motivate people to "give" rather than "keep," a variety of fiscal and monetary tools are usually employed.

The Federal Reserve Board uses interest rates as a tool to stimulate or slow the velocity of money. It is discouraging to see that recently this utensil of lowering interest rates has not had an immediate effect on the velocity of money and, hence, economic stimulation.

Fiscal and monetary policy may not be enough for today's conditions. The bottom line lies with those who are keeping the money.

A recent phenomenon in business is that many of the same services are being performed, and at the same rate, as two years ago. However, the providers of the services are not being paid.

For example, a consultant provides services to a client, and that same consultant engages an attorney to provide services to him.

The client doesn't pay the consultant and the consultant doesn't pay the attorney. The same services were rendered between the parties and the work was done, but the only thing created were accounts receivable and accounts payable. No money changed hands.

Removing the "monetizing" layer reveals that the real measure of economic activity may reside in accounts receivable/payable growth, which is directly reflective of just how much work is actually being performed. Maybe the Department of Commerce should be measuring that?

If fiscal and monetary policies are having no effect and work is still being performed, then where has all the money gone? It's stuck.

It's stuck with people and institutions for emotional reasons that have little to do with traditional financial evaluation. Interest rates could be virtually zero, but unless someone makes an intentional decision to spend based upon both intellectual and emotional confidence, the money will stay stuck.

C. Stephen Guyer is founder and president of Guyer Management Assistance Inc. in Highlands Ranch.