Anothere view of the Euro's criticism of us. From NRO
Europe?s Multilateral Utopia
Our rift grows.
The Europeans' near-hysteria on Iraq is but one more symptom of a growing rift between America and its allies. That gap stems from increasingly divergent perceptions of the nature of the international framework, of security threats, and of desired outcomes. Even as the U.S. lays plans to make the world safe from Saddam's menace, European analysts, academics, and diplomats are voicing shrill criticism of American values and President Bush's policies.
Europe's leftist elites, and some not-so-lefties as well, have articulated a number of guidelines for future European foreign-policy engagements which, if attempted, may put the future of Euro-Atlantic partnership in jeopardy. This strain of European thinking might be labeled "multilateral utopianism."
It boils down to differing perceptions of the foreign-policy tools necessary and permissible for dealing with security threats, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Put broadly, the U.S. and Europe hold different views on the role of a nation state in the international system, and the necessity of using force for defense.
Most Europeans and some Canadians I encountered in a number of policy conferences last month have assailed President Bush's strategy of regime change in Iraq. Their attack was four-pronged: First, they claim that it's wrong to use force to change a regime, whatever its nature. This position was articulated both by a senior German policy planner working for the Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and by a Green member of the European parliament.
Second, multilateralists insist that it is plain wrong to take unilateral action. They are saying, in effect: "You cannot maintain peace (in Iraq and Afghanistan) on your own. So you cannot decide on regime change on your own? We demand the right of co-determination for the Middle East, because it is closer to us than to you."
Critics also claim that the timing of U.S. action is wrong: Saddam has been there for decades, after all, and he's tried to develop WMD for years ? why take him out now? German representatives further claimed that economic sanctions and containment work to defeat Saddam (they don't).
Fourth, the reasons for the U.S. action on Iraq are alleged to be sinister: According to a Brussels-based think-tank chief, U.S. policy is dictated by "a combination of old Zionists, new Conservatives, and special interest groups," or "the Jewish Lobby." Former German defense minister Rudolf Scharping and a Canadian political-science professor voiced similar sentiments.
America was also criticized for "disregarding" the political and economic roots of 9/11. The attack came ? it was said ? because of what America does, not because of what it is. The critics used Zbigniew Brzezinski's op-eds and interviews articulating this point to bolster their case. "A strong civic society is the answer to terrorism," one German participant claimed, suggesting the futility of any military action: "Al Qaeda are martyrs. We cannot stop martyrs."
Europeans have also recommended policy prescriptions to "improve" U.S. foreign and defense policy. They demand to be allowed to subject the U.S. to multilateral foreign and defense policy, on the grounds that nobody should be in the position of establishing world order unilaterally. Some Europeans equate the threat from al Qaeda (which is generally not perceived as a threat to Europe) with the threat from the United States. A senior Italian analyst quoted industrialists in his country who had said, "It is not our war." Others added that Afghanistan (and Iraq) "is not about fighting al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. It is about establishing the U.S. as a 'hyper-power' in a U.S.-dominated mono-polar world."
Germans diplomats are especially fond of characterizing the "multilateralization" of foreign policy as an unstoppable historic process ? from the adoption of the U.N. Charter and Bretton Woods, to GATT, to the WTO, to the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). They hail NATO as a "denationalization of defense." They criticize the narrow-mindedness of those who don't think about changing the international system in accordance with such issues as globalization and environmentalism.
But, in open contradiction of the multilateral approach, these diplomats and politicians also insisted that under no circumstances will Germany use force against Saddam, even if regime change is authorized by the U.N. They likewise rejected criticism of "war-by-committee" in the Balkans. "E.U. policy in the Balkans was a success," they insisted.
Moreover, Europeans are demanding that economic sanctions and diplomacy, not force, be used to pressure parties to conflicts. Some claim that, since ethnic conflicts erupted as a result of the dissolution of various empires (British, Soviet, etc.), the E.U. must now assume the role of peacemaker in their stead. Most aggressive multilateralists also recommend building zones of European influence along Europe's periphery ? an area to include the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the Middle East, and North Africa ? on the basis of multilateralism, cooperation, and the rule of law.
European advocates of multilateralism also tend to be anti-Israel. "Israel is wrong because it uses force," they claim. They would impose a settlement which will return Israel to 1967 borders, dividing Jerusalem, and would "address" the issue of Palestinian refugees in order to appease Arab criticism of the West. They boldly advocate pressuring Israel in spite of the ongoing terrorist violence; in spite of the pro-terrorist indoctrination being carried out in the mosques, the schools, and the Palestinian media; and in spite of the continued commitment of large segments of the Palestinian polity to the outright destruction of the Jewish state.
Fortunately, not everyone is buying this line. At least anecdotally, many of Europe non-elites are more sympathetic with Americans than are the Euro-pundits, academics, and diplomats. A detailed public-opinion survey may go a long way to clarify the segmentation of attitudes toward the U.S. and its policy.
To counter these corrosive trends, Europeans need to be more exposed to the mainstream U.S. views on these subjects. A broader range of contacts and media activities is necessary to define our differences and find areas for future cooperation ? if the Euro-Atlantic partnership is to survive.
Since the end of the Cold War, a wide gap has developed between the U.S. and its Europeans allies on issues as basic as the right of a nation state to act unilaterally to protect itself. Indeed, we are now involved in a war of ideas not just with our radical Islamist foes, but also with our "enlightened" European allies.
? Ariel Cohen is a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. |
