Not OT~ From the 1999 report, re: US Food and Aid to North Korea... (these are not my words, Karen....~~~And BTW, looks like the EU and others have declined food for several years because of the lack of controls...)
house.gov
A. Does U.S. assistance directly or indirectly sustain the North Korean government?
U.S. assistance helps to sustain the North Korean government, and current accounting systems are not capable
of tracking aid to ensure its proper use.
KEY FINDINGS
North Korea is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in Northeast Asia. American assistance feeds one-third of all North Koreans and KEDO, largely funded by the United States, provides 45% of its heavy fuel oil needs.
Current food aid monitoring programs by the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and the Private Voluntary Organization Consortium (PVOC) face a difficult environment and cannot ensure that U.S. assistance reaches those in need. There are continuing and credible reports of diversion of food aid to the military, closed regions, and unintended recipients. Food aid has been distributed in areas closed to international monitors in contravention of stated administration policy.
A number of other donors and international relief organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) have cut back or ended their programs in North Korea due to diversions and the DPRK's refusal to permit them to monitor assistance programs.
The fuel monitoring system suffers from inherent limits, including dependence upon the North Korean electric power system. Flow meters and other monitoring equipment are routinely inoperable. Furthermore, KEDO has no arrangements with North Korea for monitoring the large quantities of heavy fuel oil in storage or in transit to the plants consuming the heavy fuel oil.
During a power outage which left the monitoring system inoperable from January- April 1999, the North Koreans consumed record amounts of unmonitored fuel. This case represents an example of diversion.
The State Department admitted to the General Accounting Office (GAO) that "insignificant" amounts of fuel have been diverted since this program started. When asked what would be a "significant" diversion, a State Department representative told GAO "you could drive a truck through our definition of a 'significant diversion.'" State Department representatives later admitted that North Korea has probably diverted at least $11 million worth of U.S. supplied fuel.
Food Aid
There are reports that the North Korean government diverts both international food and fuel aid from their intended recipients. Initial reports came from North Koreans who fled to China. They relate personal accounts of food aid being distributed to the communist cadre or to the military.(110) A U.S. House of Representatives staff delegation that visited North Korea in 1998 also saw donated food in the possession of the KPA.(111)
Cans of food from a private aid organization were found on a North Korean submarine that ran aground off South Korea in 1997. In a more recent case, the Seattle-based aid group, World Concern, suspended its relief work in North Korea after discovering that 689 boxes of food, intended for hospitals and orphanages, had vanished.(112)
Since 1995, the United States has donated over $360 million worth of food to North Korea.(113) Most food aid is channeled through the WFP, where the United States accounts for 87% of all donations. In addition, the United States also established a bilateral food aid program run by the PVOC, led by CARE. The combined programs attempt to feed one-third of North Korea's population, approximately 6.5 million people out of a population of 23 million, whose lives are placed at risk by food shortages.(114) A nutritional study conducted by U.N. agencies, the European Union, and Save the Children Fund/UK in September-October of 1998 showed acute life-threatening malnutrition affecting 18 percent, with 62 percent of children having stunted growth.(115) While there are reports that the food situation in North Korea is improving, there is clearly a need for continued food aid, provided that delivery systems can ensure that the people in need are served.
U.S. policy is that food aid will not be provided to North Korea if it cannot be monitored.(116) WFP has a total of 46 people employed in North Korea, including 19 full-time food monitors.(117) The PVOC also has a staff of five. In contrast to most other recipient nations, international monitors in North Korea must schedule their visits in advance and must be escorted at all times. They are denied access to 48 of the DPRK's 211 counties. All paperwork and account statements are handled by North Korean authorities.(118) The North Koreans do not permit any spot checks or unrestricted access to warehouses.
Members of the PVOC reported to GAO that "because of North Korean restrictions on access, there is no way anyone can verify that food was distributed as planned."(119) WFP estimates that 90 percent of the North Korean institutions receiving food aid have not received monitoring visits, and WFP officials have rarely been allowed to observe the actual distribution of food to beneficiaries.(120) In 1997, a PVOC team reported the following:
Some areas of the country that received food aid had never been visited;
Donors, such as WFP, had only marginal control over distribution;
Monitoring for all donors was restricted to prearranged visits to a limited number of sites and could not be conducted independently; and
DPRK government-assigned translators "covered up" things that they felt the PVOC team did not need to see or understand, and worked to restrict the movement of the team.(121)
In 1997, a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) team reported that food distributions appeared "staged." The EU, which was originally a major donor of food to the DPRK, scaled back their efforts and reported last year that conditions did not warrant aid, and monitoring had to be "more vigorously pursued" with food going to areas where access had not been granted.(122) In March, European Commission officials complained about the lack of access, inflated numbers of people served, and lack of verifiable records.(123)
In September of 1998, MSF ended its nutritional programs and withdrew from North Korea because North Korea: (1) did not allow MSF to evaluate their programs; (2) inflated their registers with "fake malnourished children;" and (3) covered up or denied the existence of the most malnourished children. MSF was convinced that a large portion of international food aid is not actually reaching the needy.(124)
WFP has reported that on several occasions, food has been distributed to places where monitors were not permitted. In the most glaring incident, WFP distributed 14,738 metric tons (mt) of food to counties where access was denied. In May 1998, food was distributed to 18 counties where monitors were denied access. Finally in October 1998, the North Koreans distributed aid to 26 counties where monitors were then denied access. WFP's Executive Director, Catherine Bertini, responded firmly by scaling back WFP operations by 55,000 mt and withholding fuel payment subsidies.(125)
Recently, the PVOC formally notified North Korea that it had violated the Memorandum of Understanding regarding food aid distributions. On September 22, 1999, a "Phase V" monitoring team reported on "apparent food diversions - a full 1,200 mt of wheat - which we believe has serious implications."(126) One experienced food aid monitor reported on October 1, 1999:
While I still have confidence that much of the food is going to needy people, I also have great concerns that large amounts of food could well be going to unknown people and places. I am very convinced that the amount of workers that actually work on FFW (food-for-work) projects is in all cases substantially less than reported. I have learned recently that in almost all cases, food is distributed to recipients prior to their doing any work. Actual work assignments are made later and many times are not on the FFW project. I have learned from painful experience that even the most trusted Korean friends need to lie and deceive when necessary to protect the scam. Unfortunately, I have learned that a negotiated agreement cannot be trusted as they do what they wish regardless.(127)
Reports indicate that absent international food aid donations, the government's public distribution system (PDS) would have collapsed long ago. According to one highly respected study, only six percent of North Koreans depend on the government system for food.(128) Over sixty percent of North Koreans now depend on the country's 300-plus illegal farmers' markets for food.(129) International monitors are prevented from seeing food aid distributions or visiting farmers' markets, leaving them unable to see how most North Koreans get their food.
With the monitoring system operating as poorly as it does, food aid could be diverted in massive amounts to the military and Communist Party. Food shortages have had their impact on even these favored groups, with one prominent defector, Hwang Jong Yop, estimating that of the 500,000 starvation deaths in 1995, 50,000 were party cadre.(130) One of the best reports on the food shortage indicates that "beginning in 1994, the central authorities appear to have triaged the northeast region of the country by shutting down the public distribution system. In 1996, they appear to have begun selective food distributions to people in the capital city, workers in critical industries, and party cadres, leaving the rest of the population to fend for itself in the private markets."(131) Given this body of evidence and the poor monitoring systems currently in place, it is reasonable to question if food donations are sustaining the regime as well as saving lives. |
