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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: GST who wrote (53686)10/23/2002 12:15:15 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
The Illusory Prague Connection

Lead Editorial
The New York Times
October 23, 2002

Most Americans — two-thirds, according to a Pew Research poll this month — believe that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq had a hand in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Trouble is, no hard evidence of such a link has been made public. In its campaign for military action against Iraq, the Bush administration frequently asserts that it has proof of extensive ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda. What it has disclosed, however, is unconvincing. This is no way to justify a war — either the potential one against Iraq or the existing one against Islamic extremists.

James Risen of The Times reported Monday that an often-cited meeting between Mohamed Atta, the chief hijacker, and an Iraqi spy in Prague almost certainly never took place. The Czech president, Vaclav Havel, has told the White House that a report from Czech domestic intelligence of such a meeting in April 2001 could not be substantiated.

For an administration that has prided itself on a disciplined approach to public pronouncements, the Bush team has offered confused and scattered assertions about Iraq. After months of declaring that a regime change in Baghdad was the core goal of American policy, President Bush seemed to change course on Monday. He said the United States was trying to disarm Mr. Hussein "peacefully" and suggested that if Iraq complied with all United Nations resolutions, it would "signal the regime has changed." This may have been aimed at mollifying nervous allies, but it added to the impression that Mr. Bush isn't sure what his goals are in Iraq.

The Times report of the Prague meeting was not the first time that it or a supposed earlier meeting has been questioned. Now it seems Mr. Atta may indeed have been in Prague in June 2000 — but with the intent of picking up a cheap flight to Newark rather than meeting an Iraqi spymaster.

This does not mean that Al Qaeda and Iraq have not had contacts or even collaborated over the past 5 or 10 years. Both hate America. And despite the fact that their ideologies are mutually antagonistic — Mr. Hussein's regime is based on notions of secular Arab nationalism that Osama bin Laden detests — they have much in common and are clearly capable of putting aside their differences for tactical ends.

American officials say they have evidence that Iraqi leaders visited Mr. bin Laden in Sudan in the early 1990's and that some Qaeda leaders have taken refuge in Iraq. They also speak of a credible claim that Iraq provided training to Mr. bin Laden's followers in the use of explosives and chemical weapons. These sound like important findings, but when asked for details the administration becomes hazy, saying it has sources to protect.

If the United States is to go to war, it had better not do so under false pretenses. The administration needs to lay out its case clearly and unambiguously. If there really is, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said last month, "bulletproof" evidence of links between Al Qaeda and Baghdad, this seems like a moment to present the evidence. A way can surely be found to do so while protecting the identity of sensitive intelligence sources.

nytimes.com



To: GST who wrote (53686)10/25/2002 1:09:50 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
Dead Parrot Society

By PAUL KRUGMAN
Columnist
The New York Times
10/25/02

A few days ago The Washington Post's Dana Milbank wrote an article explaining that for George W. Bush, "facts are malleable." Documenting "dubious, if not wrong" statements on a variety of subjects, from Iraq's military capability to the federal budget, the White House correspondent declared that Mr. Bush's "rhetoric has taken some flights of fancy."

Also in the last few days, The Wall Street Journal reported that "senior officials have referred repeatedly to intelligence . . . that remains largely unverified." The C.I.A.'s former head of counterterrorism was blunter: "Basically, cooked information is working its way into high-level pronouncements." USA Today reports that "pressure has been building on the intelligence agencies to deliberately slant estimates to fit a political agenda."

Reading all these euphemisms, I was reminded of Monty Python's parrot: he's pushing up the daisies, his metabolic processes are history, he's joined the choir invisible. That is, he's dead. And the Bush administration lies a lot.

Let me hasten to say that I don't blame reporters for not quite putting it that way. Mr. Milbank is a brave man, and is paying the usual price for his courage: he is now the target of a White House smear campaign.

That standard response may help you understand how Mr. Bush retains a public image as a plain-spoken man, when in fact he is as slippery and evasive as any politician in memory. Did you notice his recent declaration that allowing Saddam Hussein to remain in power wouldn't mean backing down on "regime change," because if the Iraqi despot meets U.N. conditions, "that itself will signal that the regime has changed"?

The recent spate of articles about administration dishonesty mainly reflects the campaign to sell war with Iraq. But the habit itself goes all the way back to the 2000 campaign, and is manifest on a wide range of issues. High points would include the plan for partial privatization of Social Security, with its 2-1=4 arithmetic; the claim that a tax cut that delivers 40 percent or more of its benefits to the richest 1 percent was aimed at the middle class; the claim that there were 60 lines of stem cells available for research; the promise to include limits on carbon dioxide in an environmental plan.

More generally, Mr. Bush ran as a moderate, a "uniter, not a divider." The Economist endorsed him back in 2000 because it saw him as the candidate better able to transcend partisanship; now the magazine describes him as the "partisan-in-chief."

It's tempting to view all of this merely as a question of character, but it's more than that. There's method in this administration's mendacity.

For the Bush administration is an extremely elitist clique trying to maintain a populist facade. Its domestic policies are designed to benefit a very small number of people — basically those who earn at least $300,000 a year, and really don't care about either the environment or their less fortunate compatriots. True, this base is augmented by some powerful special-interest groups, notably the Christian right and the gun lobby. But while this coalition can raise vast sums, and can mobilize operatives to stage bourgeois riots when needed, the policies themselves are inherently unpopular. Hence the need to reshape those malleable facts.

What remains puzzling is the long-term strategy. Despite Mr. Bush's control of the bully pulpit, he has had little success in changing the public's fundamental views. Before Sept. 11 the nation was growing increasingly dismayed over the administration's hard right turn. Terrorism brought Mr. Bush immense personal popularity, as the public rallied around the flag; but the helium has been steadily leaking out of that balloon.

Right now the administration is playing the war card, inventing facts as necessary, and trying to use the remnants of Mr. Bush's post-Sept. 11 popularity to gain control of all three branches of government. But then what? There is, after all, no indication that Mr. Bush ever intends to move to the center.

So the administration's inner circle must think that full control of the government can be used to lock in a permanent political advantage, even though the more the public learns about their policies, the less it likes them. The big question is whether the press, which is beginning to find its voice, will lose it again in the face of one-party government.

nytimes.com