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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: JohnM who wrote (55309)	10/28/2002 9:53:16 PM
From: KLP	Respond to of 281500

Most on the thread will probably want to see this FAS/CIA link~~ It is a long link, but I decided to download the entire 39 pages to my computer. It speaks to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, WMD, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and many other things....In particular, look at the North Korea comments as well as those for Iraq... fas.org Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 8 April 2002 The Honorable Bob Graham Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed are the unclassified responses to the Questions for the Record from the Worldwide Threat Hearing on 6 February 2002. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me or have a member of your staff contact Jeff Powell of my staff at (703)482-7642. An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Shelby. Sincerely, Stanley K. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs Enclosure -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Intelligence Community's Ability to Monitor Terrorist Activity 1) What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have you learned from September 11 to address any shortcomings? Do you all believe that you have sufficient resources to light the war on terrorism? The Intelligence Community's ability to draw on existing collection capabilities and cooperation from allies around the world is among its greatest strengths in combating torrorism--particularly efforts against al-0a'ida, our greatest terrorist threat. These capabilities have resulted in the arrest of nearly 1,000 al-0a'ida operatives in over 60 countries, and have disrupted terrorist operations and potential terrorist attacks. The IC's collection and operational initiatives also supported strikes against Taliban and al-Qa'ida targets in Afghanistan. The IC's close interaction with other US Government agencies in efforts to monitor or disrupt potential terrorist activities is a key strength in countering threats to the continental United States. This includes close collaboration with the FBI, FAA, Secret Service, and other organizations regarding potential domestic threats. Such efforts have produced threat reports that identify travel plans for suspected terrorists to support immigration databases and other tracking systems that identify individuals of concern. The IC works closely with other US government agencies and allied governments in countering terrorist threats overseas. These efforts include the dissemination of threat warning reports to overseas facilities and US government agencies to support decisions on protective measures and other efforts to disrupt or mitigate the threat. The attacks on 11 September reinforced the IC's assessment that al-Qa'ida practices robust operational security that can frustrate efforts to identify the specific timing and location of some operations. This represents a continuing challenge for the Intelligence Community at a tactical level. The attacks have also reinforced the importance of close collaboration with other US Government agencies on counterterrorism matters--particularly when the threat is not well defined in terms of timing and targets. After 11 September, the CIA and FBI expanded their cooperation by producing a joint, daily terrorist threat assessment for senior officials to keep them apprised of the latest threat developments. The worldwide security crackdown since 11 September has forced al-0a'ida to operate more clandestinely. This complicates Intelligence Community and law enforcement measures to disrupt al-Qa'ida cells already in place in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. We know the group's modus operandi is to have multiple attack plans in the works simultaneously, and to have cells in place to conduct them long before any attack is to take place. The events of 11 September, therefore, reinforce the importance of maintaining robust collection capabilities while also collaborating with allies around the world in efforts to monitor and disrupt terrorism. Although the 11 September attacks and other terrorist events since then demonstrate that terrorists are developing innovative attack schemes while they also continue to use conventional weapons, we are concerned that groups are showing a growing interest in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Indeed, documents recovered from al-0a'ida facilities in Afghanistan since 11 September show that Bin Ladin was pursuing a biological weapons research program. The dual use nature of many CW and BW agents complicates our assessment of offensive programs -- which can be hidden in plants that are virtually indistinguishable from genuine commercial facilities. The Intelligence Community has made significant organizational changes to support the war against terrorism. We will address these and their associated resource issues in a classified response. "The Axis of Evil" 2) In his recent State of the Union message, the President described an "Axis of Evil" consisting of Iran, Iraq and North Korea warranting continued U.S. action. What is the basis for assessing the threat associated with these three countries? From a counterterrorism standpoint, what is more threatening about these countries than others? Iran continues to act as a potentially destabilizing element within the Middle East, primarily by pursuing the acquisition of expanded WMD and ballistic missile capabilities, working against the resumption of Middle East peace negotiations, and supporting terrorist groups. Tehran has some of the most advanced WMD and ballistic missile programs in the Middle East. Although Iran has denied that it is developing WMD programs, Iranian leaders have stated that they view ballistic missiles as vital to the security of the regime. Although Tehran has denied that it supports terrorism--including Palestinian rejectionist groups and Hizballah--Iranian armaments and ammunition constituted a large portion of the weapons discovered aboard the merchant ship recently seized by Israeli forces. Iraq continues to build and expand an infrastructure capable of producing WMD. Baghdad is expanding its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to manufacturing CW agents, and retains a significant amount of dual-use infrastructure that could support a rejuvenated nuclear weapons program. Baghdad also has a history of supporting terrorism, and has often altered its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals, including the aborted terrorist attack planned in 1993 against former President Bush. Iraq has worked to rebuild its intelligence networks abroad and maintains close ties with several Palestinian rejectionist and Iranian opposition terrorist groups, which have the infrastructure and experience to become more active against US interests should Saddam encourage them. North Korea remains a proliferator of high concern to the Intelligence Community. Its export of ballistic missiles, system components, and production capabilities--together with P'yongyang's willingness, for a price--to share its expertise on these systems contributes to the threat posed by the North's client states and undermines regional stability.<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

To: JohnM who wrote (55309)	10/29/2002 10:44:26 AM
From: carranza2	Respond to of 281500

Did you come to that conclusion from reading Pollack? Actually, I came up with that conclusion yesterday as I posted then read the part of Pollack's book last night in which he makes the same point. Great minds and all that. <vbg> Pollack has influenced--no, reinforced--my previous thinking that the Iraq invasion is absolutely necessary. However, it will be a larger enterprise than we think and potentially a lot more perilous than I had anticipated. I disagree to some extent with Pollack when he says that a post-invasion plan is absolutely necessary prior to going in, but I'm still reading that section of his book so I may have other commentary on that point. However, my intuitive feeling is that it is illogical not to invade solely because post-invasion scenarios have not been exactly calculated. I think there should be a lot of leeway in planning because we simply don't yet know what the post-invasion landscape will look like.