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To: Lucretius who wrote (204004)	11/11/2002 8:42:32 PM
From: marginmike	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 436258

this sounds bullish-g- Saudi might join up with Al Qaeda aq Resolution: Crunch Time for Riyadh Summary Following the U.N. Security Council vote on a resolution against Iraq, Saudi Arabia is isolated in opposition to a U.S. military campaign against Baghdad. What Riyadh does next, however, hinges heavily on the question: What is the source of its almost terrified opposition to an attack against Iraq? Analysis Despite fierce lobbying by Riyadh, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously Nov. 8 to support the U.S.- and British-drafted resolution on Iraqi arms inspections. The final shift in favor of the resolution by Russia, France and even Syria has left Saudi Arabia isolated in its opposition to a U.S. campaign that ultimately and overtly seeks regime change in Iraq. Riyadh now faces a crucial decision: Does it capitulate and throw its support behind the campaign against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, or does it redouble its efforts to thwart Washington's plans? The underlying question is: What is the reason behind Riyadh's almost terrified opposition to an attack on Iraq? There are two sources of Saudi concern. First, the regime is worried that a U.S. attack on Iraq could trigger popular unrest or uprisings within Saudi Arabia. The government's decision to invite U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia in 1990, and to reject Osama bin Laden's offer to raise an Islamic army to defend Saudi territory, drove a crucial wedge between bin Laden and the House of Saud that eventually evolved into al Qaeda's jihad. Al Qaeda has been seeking a trigger to mobilize the Saudi population and military against the House of Saud, and the organization might see its chance in the Iraq campaign. In fact, sources close to al Qaeda have reported the group plans a campaign of attacks to coincide with U.S. movement against Iraq, to demonstrate that only al Qaeda fights for Arab and Islamic interests. However, sources say Riyadh does not yet believe the forces are in place to seriously challenge Saudi rule, and Saudi security and intelligence forces have demonstrated a tremendous capacity to keep a lid on dissent. Riyadh's second concern is that if Washington does succeed in installing a pro-U.S. regime in Baghdad, whether through military action or a palace coup, then Saudi Arabia immediately would lose its privileged relationship with Washington, its domination of global oil supplies and its influence in the region. Moreover, the kingdom could find itself in the U.S. crosshairs as Washington returns its focus to the primary mission of eradicating al Qaeda. Iraq's proven oil reserves are roughly half those of Saudi Arabia, but because exploration in Iraq has been nearly dormant since 1979, application of new exploration technologies potentially could reveal massive new reserves. If U.S. companies are allowed to participate in upstream exploration and production in Iraq, then Saudi Arabia's ability to manipulate oil prices through production levels would diminish significantly. This would impact not only Riyadh's relationship with Washington but also its influence over other regional oil producers, many of whom would be delighted to kick Saudi Arabia while it was down. Moreover, if the United States enjoys a strong oil supply relationship with a post-Hussein Iraq and has access to Iraqi military bases for its own troops, then it no longer has any need to go easy on Riyadh in the war against al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia has provided core support for al Qaeda in the form of financing, recruiting and ideology. Support for al Qaeda runs deep, even within the royal family. Even if Riyadh cooperated on the Iraq campaign, it could not afford to cooperate with U.S. efforts to root out support for al Qaeda inside the kingdom. While the Saudi public might not revolt over an invasion of Iraq, it would revolt over deep U.S. sweeps inside Saudi Arabia. Washington is moving inexorably toward confronting the issue of Saudi support for al Qaeda. For Riyadh, delaying such a confrontation is always the first option, and the regime first tried to divert U.S. attention by raising the prominence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Later, Riyadh tried to drag out the U.N. debate concerning Iraq. But with complete capitulation to the U.S. anti-terrorism war simply impossible to consider, the Saudi regime is running out of options. The kingdom's two concerns argue for different strategies. If Riyadh's primary fear is that a U.S. attack on Iraq will spawn a popular uprising in Saudi Arabia, then Riyadh's next step would be to lend its hand to efforts to bring about a peaceful regime change within Baghdad, perhaps going so far as to offer sanctuary for Hussein and his family. It would not be the first time Riyadh sheltered an exile -- Uganda's Idi Amin Dada took advantage of Saudi hospitality, as has Pakistan's Nawaz Sharif, Qatar's Emir Khalifa and various dissident Egyptian clerics. An offer to Hussein could be conveyed through Saudi businessmen, who recently resumed visits to Iraq. However, it appears that the primary fear is that a U.S. foothold in Iraq will eliminate Saudi Arabia's privileged position with Washington, the regional influence that that relationship generates and immunity from the anti-al Qaeda campaign. Therefore, Riyadh cannot allow a pro-U.S. regime change in Baghdad, whether through violent or peaceful means. Yet it is difficult to see how Riyadh can stave off such a change at this time. Tactically, the Saudis could try to erode support for the war by opening the oil taps and driving down crude prices. This could work, but only for a short time since Saudi Arabia cannot survive low oil prices for long -- and even then the negative impact would fall primarily on the Gulf states; Turkey and Jordan would welcome cheap oil. If Riyadh is to attempt this gambit, it must act quickly: A U.S. attack on Iraq appears likely in less than three months. The Saudi regime also could reheat the war in Israel, though it is not clear that this would be enough to thwart a U.S. war plan that is already well-advanced. Officials also could attempt to convince Hussein to comply fully with weapons inspections, thus depriving Washington of any grounds for attack. This would be difficult and would not preclude U.S. support for a palace coup. Riyadh still might have some hope for support against the war -- massive U.S. investment in the Iraqi oil sector would hurt oil- producing Russia, and an entrenched U.S. military presence in Iraq would challenge Iranian security. But both countries have expressed at least tacit support for toppling Hussein. That leaves only one potential ally for Riyadh: al Qaeda. It is a radical prospect -- but short of submitting fully to the U.S. war on al Qaeda and hoping support from Washington is sufficient to prop up what is left of the Saudi regime against the inevitable backlash, Riyadh's options soon could dwindle to hostile resistance. ___________________________________________________________________ <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< SEND THIS TO A FRIEND! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Did you like this analysis? Then forward it to a friend! Got this from a friend? Get your own by becoming a member! stratfor.com