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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Dayuhan who wrote (56661)	11/12/2002 11:29:04 AM
From: gamesmistress	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi Steven, I have a couple of questions about your analyis of the Rubin article. When an enemy’s strength is growing, an aggressive stance is called for. When the enemy’s strength is waning, especially when they are threatened with internal dissent, biding time and adopting a conciliatory posture are more effective strategies. Aggressive maneuvers will be counterproductive; they only make it easier for the opposing leaders to push that “external threat” button. How would you define "conciliatory posture"? Would this only apply when the enemy is an actual state or government? An enemy like Al-Queda would I think view any conciliatory posture, whether to themselves or to a government that supports it, as a victory and a reason to continue the battle. Rubin believes that radical Muslim governments and terrorist groups are sustaining themselves by convincing their people that the US is a real and present threat to them. In this environment, we have to consider that a threatening posture might end up reinforcing this argument. It is easier to convince people that the US is a threat to Muslims when diplomacy is being conducted with cruise missiles and armored divisions. Well, the US IS a military threat (theoretically) to any country or entity it opposes. It stands alone in that respect and that won't change anytime soon, unless some entity I'm not presently aware of plans to invest the money to compete with it. And the US is a threat to radical Islam, considering the damage it did and wants to do. I don't see radical Islam adopting "live and let live" or "win-win" philosophies, so it must be destroyed or neutralized. convince Muslims that the US does not threaten them and that their own leaders do. The US can much more easily demonstrate that it supports the non-radical Muslims and the advantages that brings than to convince Muslims in general that the US doesn't threaten them. Both are necessary, as are "selling the product" as you said, but I believe the short-term threat is too strong for the US to limit itself to strategies that are either reactive or will take decades to have a noticeable effect.

To: Dayuhan who wrote (56661)	11/12/2002 11:34:29 AM
From: tekboy	Read Replies (3) \| Respond to of 281500

interesting analysis. one way to square your and Rubin's different conclusions could be by thinking of different time-frames of action (and scales of action). Rubin, that is, argues that minor US actions in the short term are not going to have much effect, while you argue that major US actions over the long term might. Those two positions are not entirely contradictory, and if one did agree with both, the question might come down to "how important is this issue and is it worth major long-term changes in US policies?" Btw, apparently the Doran article in the next issue comes to your kind of conclusion rather than Rubin's, on some similar points. Also, you were the one who didn't like the Donnelly review of the Boot book a while back, right? Because he presented a distored view of the conflict in the Philippines a century ago? If so, what did you think of the "response" to that review by Gregory Bankoff, who made a number of the same points? tb@curious.com

To: Dayuhan who wrote (56661)	11/12/2002 8:31:37 PM
From: Brumar89	Read Replies (4) \| Respond to of 281500

I posted the Rubin article. I'd agree he does a great job of arguing his thesis re. the source of anti-American sentiment. And the weak part of his piece is the last two short paragraphs at the end which address the "what to do" issue. Describing problems accurately is one thing. I guess devising effective responses is another tougher thing. Still seeing the problem accurately is vital. I'd agree with your point that PR efforts are not synonomous with appeasement. And good PR certainly sounds like a great idea. But deciding to forswear military responses to rely on our supposed genius at PR would amount to appeasement IMO. Forswearing military responses is what we've generally been doing for decades. 9/11 was preceded by a couple decades of attacks against America and Americans. And we didn't respond to most of those attacks with "cruise missiles and armored divisions" and so on. I don't know if it's accurate to say a concern for PR in the Arab world is the only reason for that. But I think it's been part of it. Our advertising industry is great at selling products and services. But our foreign relations are run by the government. Hard to see anything run by the government being as effective. Maybe we need to recruit more foreign service and government officials from Madison Avenue(?). That is our challenge in the Middle East, in the long run: sell the product. We have to convince people that we are not the enemy, and that the radicals are, and that if they move in our direction they will have more of what they want. The nicest thing about this proposition, of course, is that it's true. In the long run, our most effective weapons in this war will be television sets, not cruise missiles. If we can make them fear us, we may gain temporary peace. If we can make them want to shop at the Gap and listen to Britney Spears, we win. While thinking about this, I recalled some things. OBL was a billionaires son, had vacationed England and Sweden in his youth, and partied in Lebanon as a young man. Zawahiri was an affluent Egyptian doctor. M. Atta had an advanced degree from a German university. The 911 hijackers had lived in America for a long period before the attack, partying at strip clubs, taking trips to Las Vegas and the Phillipines, etc. prior to their attack. These folks had long had at their fingers every thing the west has to offer and chose to give up their lives just to mount a symbolic attack against America. I also recall reading a WSJ article shortly after 911 about the reaction of Egyptian upper-class teenagers to 911. The article described them as seemingly pretty westernized - the article noted they hung out at the local McDonalds and listened to pop CD's - and those kids thought the 911 attack was a great thing and thought OBL was a hero. I'm not so sure selling western products is the same thing as winning hearts and minds. Eating McDonalds and buying modern electrical and communications gear doesn't mean one buys into western ideas like equality of the sexes, cultural freedom, religious tolerance, equality under the law, free speech, free markets, democracy, and secular rationalism. How do we sell those things? I don't think they put them in the bag with the Big Macs.