To: Dayuhan who wrote (57389 ) 11/16/2002 2:25:46 AM From: Nadine Carroll Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 Are we fighting a war on terrorism or a war on Bad People? ...We took one solid swing at enemy A, leaving him with a bloody nose but still fully capable of attacking us, and devoted our resources to preparation and justification for a massive attack on enemy B. I’m not convinced that this is smart. If I thought as you do that we had stopped pursuing AQ, I would be upset too. I don't think we have. What visible campaign do you expect to see? AQ has been rousted from the one open base they had; it is a shadow war now, dependent on arm-twisting governments of countries that support AQ, and getting police cooperation from all other government. And no matter how big a threat enemy A is, it doesn't mean that enemy B is not a threat, or doesn't need to be dealt with. Enemy B is getting back up as containment fails, if he gets nukes the balance of power will shift radically.No matter what we do, people all over the Arab world, and in many other places as well, are going to conclude that Saddam has nothing to do with this. Problem is that perceptions in the Arab world have rather less to do with what we actually do, than with what the Arab world needs to believe. You've read Rubin, can you deny his arguments? The Arab governments all know that Saddam is an awful threat to them, but their politics forbids them to say this in public. Anyone who does has broken solidarity and is a running dog for the imperiliasts, or Crusaders as the case may be. In private they say, why don't you just invade? Arab politics is wallowing in self-pity and paranoia, and have steadily used anti-Americanism to shore up their own illegitimate regimes.You take the Rubin position, it seems: that if radical Arab states are going to whip up support for terrorism and hate for the US, we can only accept that support and that hate as a given. I don’t think that’s true at all. One of the greatest potential vulnerabilities the radical states have is the relationship between their leaders and their repressed and unsatisfied populations. They are trying to whip up hate for us to keep their people from hating them, which, given the way their people live, is a quite natural thing for them to do. One of our most critical tasks is to exploit this vulnerability and put the hate back where it belongs, and the posture we take toward the Arab world is an important part of this. Personally, I think the best test case for regime change will be not Iraq but Iran, where the population’s restiveness is rapidly reaching the boiling point. If the Iranians themselves can dump their theocracy and put a better government in its place, we will have a really positive example – an example that does not depend on American military occupation - to display to the rest of the Arab world. So you like regime change in Iran but not Iraq? I think it would be great too. So does Barry Rubin, positive examples on the ground are part of his scheme. But (a big but) there is zero chance of an overthrow of Saddam without extreme military pressure, he has run too efficient a police state. Iran's possibly happy ending has no chance in Iraq without external regime change. So when you say we should "put the hate back where it belongs, and the posture we take toward the Arab world" is important, what posture do you mean? Falling back to deterrence won't do it. Stepping lightly and looking "balanced" on Israel/Pal sure hasn't done it; that's been tried. Our perceived weakness has encouraged anti-Americanism, and made it a cost-free option. Our new approach needs both the carrot (postive examples on the ground) and the stick (treat enemies like enemies). There will be no regime change in Iraq without US action. So do you want it or don't you?Vigorous military action has been the reflexive Israeli response to terrorism ever since Israel was threatened by terrorists, and the terrorists have not exactly dried up and blown away Hardly the only one. There was this little episode called "Oslo" you may remember, where Israel tried to give the terrorists a promised state. Compare 1993 to today. Terrorism was not a big problem for Israel in 1993, and Israel was in a much stronger position generally. Had Israel been allowed to talk with Palestinians in Palestine only, they might have even managed a peace, but no, the Arab League had annointed Yasser Arafat as the sole "legitimate" representative. So Simon Peres et al made a deal with Arafat. Israel (and Palestinian) casualties shot up post 1993, and never went down to pre-1993 figures again, not to mention the casualties of the last two years. The Israelis took a risk for peace in 1979, and won. They took another risk in 1993 and lost. Military responses to terrorism should not be "reflexive" but it is possible to have enemies against whom it is the only possible response, besides surrender.