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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: stockman_scott who wrote (57473)	11/17/2002 12:03:58 AM
From: Karen Lawrence	Respond to of 281500

"I am convinced that we need to deal with Saddam down the road, but I think that the time is difficult because of the conditions in the region and all the other events that are going on. There are far too many issues Bush has failed to address (Economic downturn, education, etc). There are too many areas where he has failed or has yet to succeed (Afghanistan, Isreal). He wants to drill for more oil in Alaska, then why not do that instead of looking to dominate a country (for its oil, IMO) where it "is senseless to go against a people who even if conquered could not be controlled, and failure there would leave us much worse off then we were before we made an attempt" Thucydides from History of the Peloponnesian War as referenced in "The Road to Babylon", Searching for targets in Iraq by Lewis Lapham, Oct Harper's Magazine. Also from that article, "The Road to Babylon", the US is "drawn to despots whom we hire to represent our freedom-loving commercial interests (Diem, The Shah of Iran, Somoza, Thieu, Marco, Jonas Savimbi, Noriega, Saddam Hussein, King Fahd, Arafat, Mobutu Sese Skeo, Ariel Sharon)we pretend that our new ally stands as a pillar of democracy in one or another of the world's poorer latitudes, and for however many years the arrangement lasts, we send F-16's and messages of humanitarian concern..."

To: stockman_scott who wrote (57473)	11/17/2002 12:12:12 AM
From: Karen Lawrence	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

The French Solution: Is there a French way to avoid war? By Amir Taheri, Arab News Staff www.arabnews.com Isthere a way to solve the Iraqi problem without war? Jacques Chirac believes there is: the French way. The view in Paris is that the French way has triumphed and the threat of war against Saddam Hussein has receded. A recent headline in the Parisian newspaper Le Monde read “Chirac forces George Bush to retreat”. Chirac’s Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin describes the Security Council resolution 1448, under which weapons inspectors are expected to return to Iraq, as a triumph for the French way. De Villepin, an amateur poet, waxes lyrical about France’s success to deny Washington “an automatic mechanism” to use force against Saddam Hussein. Even if Saddam violates the new resolution, de Villepin says, the Americans will still have to return to the Security Council and ask what is to be done. How will the French way work? All starts with a bit of semantic jugglery to delight the deconstructionists. The phrase “change of regime” is interpreted to mean “change within the regime.” The Baathist clique, headed by Saddam Hussein, is treated like a theatrical troupe that could play both Macbeth and Hamlet. All that is needed is to change the script and the costumes. The French way is based on what is known in Paris as “France’s Arab policy” (La politique Arabe de la France). Devised by the late Gen. de Gaulle in the early 1960s, this is based on three assumptions. The first is that it is natural for Arabs to be ruled by a “strongman”. The second is that the Arab “strongman” has no particular principles apart from a keen desire to stay alive and in power. The third is that, if handled intelligently, the Arab “strongman” could be useful to the West. The “strongman” could take decisions that no normal government, subject to the pressure of elections, would be able to take. French policy-makers believe that it is easier to deal with a state run by a single man than one subjected to the complications of collective decision-making and consensus building. For example, President Anwar Sadat decided to reverse Egypt’s alliances in 1971, thus altering the balance of power in the Middle East. Other examples include Jaafar Al-Numeiri of Sudan, Muhammad Siad Barre of Somalia and Ibrahim Al-Hamdi of Yemen. Yet another example is Yasser Arafat whose dramatic changes of position have exasperated more than one interested party. Another example: Iran was much less of a loose cannon under the late Ayatollah Khomeini than his squabbling successors who cannot agree on who should play “strongman”. Khomeini was able to sign secret deals with the United States, which it called “The Great Satan”, and was able to instantly end the war with Iraq because he could decide alone. His successors cannot even agree on an anodyne dialogue with Washington. Another example of a “strongman” playing a positive part is the late Syrian President Hafez Assad. He gave his word to President Richard Nixon in 1974 that no shot would be fired from Syrian territory against Israel. His pledge has been honored until today. Iraq’s “strongman” Saddam Hussein must be regarded as another example. In 1975 he put aside the pact that he had signed with the Soviet Union to make a secret deal with the Shah of Iran, and to bring in the French on a massive scale. In 1980 Saddam invaded Iran in the name of protecting Western interests in the region against Khomeinism. The French admit that Saddam went too far in 1990 when he tried to annex Kuwait. But they blame “faulty signals” from Washington for that. The old chestnut is that the Iraqi dictator misinterpreted remarks by the US ambassador in Baghdad during a meeting in the summer of 1980 to mean that Washington would regard an invasion of Kuwait as “an internal Arab problem.” The core of the French way consists of a belief that Saddam could, once again, be recruited by the West to do its bidding. Chirac believes that Washington’s sloganeering about the spread of democracy in the Arab world, and black Africa, is naïve to say the least. Imposed democratization in such countries could only lead to tribalization, Chirac says. If the French way is to be applied to Iraq it would be necessary for George W. Bush to go beyond the three to four months period of probation allowed to Saddam Hussein by Resolution 1448. Saddam Hussein should be given assurances that he is no longer targeted for a change of regime, and that “changes in his regime” would be deemed sufficient. He could be persuaded to appoint a prime minister, broaden the base of his power, bring down his regime’s level of violence, renew his offer to recognize Israel, initially made in 1998, and, above all, give the weapons inspectors enough toys to break as to make their mission look credible. Under the French way, Saddam Hussein should remain in power until a suitable successor is found within his system. This has always been the method of change in Iraq since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958. Abdel-Salam Aref emerged from within the group of officers led by Abdelkarim Qassem. When Abdel-Salam died in a helicopter crash his brother Abdel-Rahman, another army officer, became “strongman”. His successor, Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr, another army officer, emerged from within the same clique. Finally, Saddam Hussein, a nephew of Al-Bakr, who died in mysterious circumstances, emerged as “strongman”. The French view is that a complete change of system in Iraq could destabilize the whole region. A “traditional style” change, however, could preserve stability while ensuring that Iraq will not become a threat to its neighbors and beyond. The real debate about Iraq is whether we want “regime change” or “change of regime”. Anything else would be posturing. Arab News Opinion 17 November 2002