Belated recognation from an important source..by Frank Anderson, the former chief of the Central Intelligence
Agency's Near East Division. (Evil it is or may be but the right kind of evil for USA..''The Taliban, to the extent
that they were set up by any foreign element, were not the creatures of ISI, but rather of Harvard alumna Benazir Bhutto, her civilian police chief and financial backers in the Pakistani trucking industry, who used the Taliban
to secure shipping across Afghanistan.
One reason for ISI's negative image is, perhaps, their own
reluctance to engage the world press and present their "side of the story." As a result, journalists and even U.S. and other diplomats get their"information" on ISI from sources who are frequently hostile to ISI and always lack direct knowledge about the organization and its activities. Whatever the cause, it is important for continued success in the war on terrorism and for the development of democracy in Pakistan that a more accurate picture of ISI emerge.ISI is one of the most competent and least corrupt institutions in South Asia. We have to work effectively with it. That will be difficult if ISI's current image isn't corrected and improved.''
This statement from a very credible source may be a shock for many, but for me who has been watchng events from sideline a vindication of position that i ahve always expressed that ISI is a close ally with CIA..Ike)
ISI: Valued helping Hand in Terror War, The Washington Times
12/1/02.
Valued helping hand in terror war
Frank Anderson
Mir Amal Kasi died more than a week ago in a Virginia execution
chamber, rather than surviving to gloat over his murder of CIA officers
outside the Agency's headquarters compound. Ramzi Yusuf, the
mastermind of the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center,
lives
in the Metropolitan Corrections Center in New York City, rather than
being
free to plot more mayhem. Senior al Qaeda leaders Abu
Zubaydah and Ramzi bin Al-Shibh and hundreds of their subordinates are
in U.S. custody, rather than planning for more terror. The government in Afghanistan is friendly to the United States and does not harbor terrorist organizations dedicated to our destruction. More strategically important, the Soviet Union no longer
exists as a threat to our very existence.
These are all unquestionably welcome developments that share a common characteristic. None of them would now be true were it not for the
efforts of a little-known and less appreciated foreign intelligence organization,Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Directorate, "ISI."
We can't fight the war on terrorism by ourselves. Countering terrorism requires forces in practically every nation in the world. These forces must have intimate knowledge of local society and the
kind of
deep penetration of
population that only local police and intelligence organizations can
develop. So, it is no surprise that all the successes in the first year
of
our worldwide struggle against terrorism have involved the effective
and
often courageous operations of the intelligence and
security services of other nations.
It is also no surprise that our cooperation with these services
has
aroused controversy.
We Americans have a deep suspicion of "secret services" anywhere.
International cooperation, inevitably, involves engagement with states
that
are the rivals or enemies of other nations that are also friendly to
us.
Greek-Americans or Armenian-Americans are disturbed when we work
closely
with Turkey. Supporters of Israel are uneasy about close ties between
U.S.intelligence and the intelligence services of any Arab states.
American friends of India are made uncomfortable by our cooperation
with
Pakistan.
There is no relationship in the war on terror that is more
representative of these uncomfortable realities than that between the
ISI
and U.S. intelligence and military services. ISI is an intelligence
service
that is not subject to the kind of open oversight that the we have
come to
expect over the CIA in the United States. ISI has supported violence
against India, as have the Indian intelligence services supported
violence
in Pakistan.
Pakistan and India have been at war (sometimes declared,
sometimes
undeclared, but always war) since the two nations were formed more
than 50
years ago. Some directors of ISI have had distinctly negative
attitudes
about the U.S. It is certainly the case that ISI has never succeeded
in
winning friends in the international journalist community. Yet, it is
hard
to identify an organization anywhere in the world that has more
positively contributed to U.S. aims in both the Cold War against Soviet
communism and, now, the war on terrorism.
ISI did the heavy lifting in our program to support the Afghans
in
their long war to expel the Red Army from their country. That greatly
accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its evil empire.
ISI played crucial roles in the apprehension of Mir Amal Kasi
and
Ramzi Yusuf. ISI provided critical support in the effort against Osama
bin
Laden
and, after September 11, in the destruction of the Taliban regime. ISI
is
now vitally important to the ongoing fight against al Qaeda and
Pakistani
extremists who support or shelter them.
Nevertheless, ISI is widely described as having favored
extremists
among the Afghan fighters during the war against the Soviets, as being
"rogue state within a state" that supports extreme elements in
Pakistan, as having been the "creator of the Taliban."
None of these negative charges is, in fact, true. ISI, working
with
and closely monitored by the U.S. during the war against the
Soviets,distributed arms and other support to Afghan groups on a
roughly per
capita
basis. Afghan groups received support in proportion to their size, not
their
ideology. ISI, rather than being a "state within a state", is and
always was
led by officers who came from and returned to the regular Pakistani
military, whose orders ISI always followed. The Taliban, to the extent
that
they were set up by any foreign element, were not the creatures of ISI,
but
rather of Harvard alumna Benazir Bhutto, her civilian police chief and
financial backers in the Pakistani trucking industry, who used the
Taliban
to secure shipping across Afghanistan.
One reason for ISI's negative image is, perhaps, their own
reluctance
to engage the world press and present their "side of the story." As a
result, journalists and even U.S. and other diplomats get
their"information"
on ISI from sources who are frequently hostile to ISI and
always lack direct knowledge about the organization and its activities.
Whatever the cause, it is important for continued success in the
war
on terrorism and for the development of democracy in Pakistan that a
more
accurate picture of ISI emerge.
ISI is one of the most competent and least corrupt institutions
in
South Asia. We have to work effectively with it. That will be difficult
if
ISI's current image isn't corrected and improved. |
