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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (60200)12/6/2002 1:39:50 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 281500
 
A Travelog of "With Wolfie in Turkey"

Wolfowitz Talks Turkey
ADVANCE COPY from the December 16, 2002 issue: The serious war planning is under way.
by Stephen F. Hayes
12/16/2002, Volume 008, Issue 14

ANKARA

THE INSIDE OF AN Air Force C-17 is like a warehouse. The cavernous dark green plane that shuttled Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and his delegation to England, Turkey, and NATO headquarters in Belgium last week logged more than 10,000 miles over four days, stopping for meetings with representatives of most of the U.S. allies important for the coming war in Iraq.

Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, and the other "principals," as the big-wigs are called by their handlers, traveled inside a shiny silver pod that sits in the middle of the aircraft. Known as the "Silver Bullet," this chamber looks like a 1960s-vintage trailer. The inside of the pod has leather seats, a CD player, television, VCR, and secure cable and phone lines. If you have to be on a plane for 30 hours over the course of a few days, it's not a bad way to fly.

Still, the pod is luxurious only by comparison with the spartan accommodations provided for the rest of us. There are two rows of commercial-airline-style seats, each seating five, and seats for everyone else lining the walls of the plane and facing the middle. Six bunk beds are available on a first-come, first-served basis.

Once the aircraft takes off, it buzzes with activity. Daily print journalists--there were five of them on this trip--transcribe interviews or write stories they'll file upon landing. Military support staff set up computer terminals and printers where they'll rewrite speeches, tinker with talking points, or draft debriefing memos after a visit. Air Force personnel in green one-piece suits dart about with the seriousness of purpose of a brain surgeon.

We took off Sunday night, December 1, and after a brief stop in London for a speech, mostly about Turkey, and a few hours of sleep on the ground, we flew to Ankara. The first thing you notice upon landing in the Turkish capital is an acrid smoky odor that hangs like a blanket over the entire city. After Wolfowitz makes a short, so-happy-to-be-here statement at the airport, we're whisked to a waiting motorcade--sedans for the principals and a small purple Hyundai van for the rest of us.

The drive to the ministry takes 45 minutes. Although the delegation has a police escort--three white Suburbans and a small fleet of euro-style Matchbox-sized cars--we're soon caught in chaotic midday Ankara traffic. The two lanes in each direction are clearly marked, but judging from the automotive anarchy around us, the signs have the force of mere suggestions. Our driver apparently knows only two speeds, too fast and stopped. A newspaper reporter who has been very quiet throughout the drive finally speaks up. He is Army green. "Anyone have a plastic or paper bag that you don't want back?" Thankfully, he's just being cautious and the delegation arrives without incident.

Secretary Wolfowitz is in Ankara to deliver an important message: We need to know where Turkey stands, and we need to know it soon. To that large end, the trip aims to accomplish several particular tasks: demonstrate U.S. support for Turkey's bid for admission to the European Union, reconfirm with the newly elected government a deal Wolfowitz negotiated with its predecessor back in July, giving the United States use of Turkish air bases for military intervention in Iraq, and push for permission to base U.S. ground troops on Turkish soil.

The Wolfowitz trip comes just one week before Saddam Hussein is required to give a "full, final and complete" declaration of his weapons of mass destruction, and is the first in a series of similar delegations intended to solidify support for removing the Iraqi dictator. The effort marks a dramatic shift in the Bush administration's public war planning--from discussing the Iraqi threat in general terms, to taking specific steps to eliminate it.

Wolfowitz explains that presenting Iraq with a serious threat of force is the only way to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. "It's important that he see that he is surrounded by the international community, not only in the political sense, but in a real, practical military sense. And Turkey has a very important role to play in that regard. The more support we get from Turkey, the more chance, the better our chances are, of avoiding war."

Britain, of course, has long been with us. Some other members of NATO, too, are expected to be supportive. Turkey, however, with its recent change in government and its shared border with Iraq, presents a bigger challenge. Early last month, in what many observers described as a "political earthquake," Turkey's Justice and Development party--known here as the AK party--won control of the government. The change in government wasn't itself surprising. Rival parties were tainted after years of trading accusations of corruption. Turkish voters were ready for a change. That they turned in large numbers to the new pro-Islamist AK party, though, was a bit startling.

So despite the fact that Turkey, a NATO member, granted us the use of its airbases in the Gulf War, winning the use of airbases there this time wouldn't be a slam-dunk. Putting U.S. troops on the ground would be an even greater challenge. The U.S. delegation spent all day Tuesday trying to gain assurances on both fronts.

LATE TUESDAY NIGHT, the journalists traveling with the delegation gathered in a conference room at the Ankara Hilton. We were exhausted. Most of us had gotten no more than three hours of sleep in London the night before. Eighteen hours after leaving England for Turkey we had come to interview Omer Celik, a top adviser to AK party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Celik, sometimes described as Turkey's Karl Rove, was coming to us directly from a meeting with Wolfowitz and other top U.S. officials about potential Turkish cooperation in the coming war. He explained his ruling party's view of U.S. troops on Turkish soil.

"There could be two reasons for having U.S. military positioned in Turkey," he told us, speaking through a translator. "One is to show some determination to Saddam Hussein to get him to clean Iraq of all weapons of mass destruction. The second is a possible operation against Iraq. Our party's last choice is a war."

Celik, who serves as a member of the Turkish parliament in addition to his duties advising Erdogan, came to the meeting with two advisers of his own. On the right sat his translator. And on the left, Egemen Bagis, a corpulent fellow with big hair and a mustache who represents Istanbul in parliament and also advises Erdogan on foreign policy.

I was sitting directly to the left of Bagis, at one of the corners of the rectangular seating arrangement, when I noticed a piece of graph paper about the size of a 3 x 5, facing my direction. It contained notes in English.

9 Dec - TGS briefs new government on U.S. plan.

Mid to late Dec - site surveys conducted

Early January - U.S. presents results on site surveys to government, pending approval of U.S. engineering forces on Turkish soil

15 January - construction would begin

Celik was in the middle of a lengthy explanation of why Turkey favors a second U.N. resolution expressly authorizing the use of force in Iraq when I began copying the information on the piece of paper. He finished his answer before I finished writing, so to buy time, I asked him how he felt U.N. inspections were going. When he was done answering, I asked whether the U.S. delegation had provided the Turks any kind of a timeline on war planning.

As Celik gave a meandering, evasive answer that amounted to "no," Bagis slid the piece of paper with the timeline across the table so that Celik could see it. As the journalists bent over their notebooks recording the response, the Turks shared a quiet chuckle.

Government sources later confirmed that the notes did, in fact, reflect the timeline U.S. officials had proposed to Turkish leaders at their meeting two hours earlier. The contents are revealing, but require some interpretation.

"TGS" is short for the Turkish General Staff--the Turkish military. The first briefing on "the U.S. plan" will take place on December 9, one day after Saddam Hussein is required by U.N. Resolution 1441 to make that "full, final and complete" declaration of his arsenal. After the initial briefing, the U.S. military will spend a month in Turkey assessing the suitability of sites in southern Turkey for U.S. troops. The Turkish government would have to consult with both the parliament (controlled by the AK party) and the military before allowing U.S. troops to be based on their soil. But if approval were granted, construction would begin January 15.

That approval will be granted. Wolfowitz said Wednesday that his delegation "got very strong affirmations of Turkish support for the United States in this crisis with Iraq," from all levels of government. "Turkey has been with us always in the past and will be with us now. Turkey's support is assured."

Wolfowitz wouldn't comment on a timeline, but he spoke in general terms about planning.

"The immediate focus of our planning efforts needs to be to identify how much investment we've got to make in various bases if we are going to use them. We're talking potentially about tens of millions, probably several hundred million, dollars of investment in various facilities that we might use. So it's not a small step. It's a step that we want to tee up for a political decision quickly, because it's an important step to take. But I think that's an immediate military task."

ALL OF THIS, OF COURSE, assumes a false declaration by Saddam. Even if that weren't a safe assumption given his long record of deception, it's a virtual certainty based on what his government has said over the past week. Iraqi officials indicated last week that the declaration would include "dual use" materials--equipment that could be used to make chemical and biological weapons, but that also has practical, non-military applications. But those same officials continue to insist that Iraq does not possess weapons of mass destruction. That claim, President Bush said late last week, contradicts the "solid evidence" the United States has amassed.

"Clearly what [the Iraqis] do or don't declare on December 8 will be crucial," says a senior administration official. But, the official adds, "We don't have a lot of time beyond this."

How much time? Enough for inspectors to show that Saddam is lying, and perhaps enough time for a second U.N. Security Council resolution that would give several allies the political cover they could use in managing public opinion. But an increasing number of allies have indicated their willingness to support regime change in Iraq even without a second U.N. resolution. At NATO on Wednesday, nine of the nineteen member countries indicated that they were likely to support the United States no matter what. Among them: Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Spain.

The Bush administration will use the next several weeks to seek further commitments. But even as diplomacy continues, says a senior Pentagon official, reiterating a message delivered to Turkey, "we're developing military plans that have a certain momentum of their own." The military timetable Wolfowitz discussed with the Turks suggests that momentum might crest in February.

Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard.



To: tekboy who wrote (60200)12/6/2002 9:20:37 PM
From: JohnM  Respond to of 281500
 
No analogy is perfect. The Algerian one sheds more light than most, but . . .

I agree and your point is well made. But as used by Judt, it highlighted the degree to which these kinds of conflicts generate their own momentum, driving the politics of each side further to extremes, which propels the conflict to yet another stage of violence, etc. Until, in some sort of exhaustion, resolutions are reached which were on the table long before. A lot of folk die, unnecsarily, on the way to the resurrection of those resolutions.



To: tekboy who wrote (60200)12/7/2002 1:26:06 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Iraq Invasion: The Road to Folly

amconmag.com

Ignorant of Iraq, void of strategic vision, and viewing the Mideast through the neoconservative prism, Bush steers America toward a quagmire.

by Eric S. Margolis

Maj. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller, Britain’s leading military thinker of the 20th century, wrote that the object of war is not victory, but peace. A war that fails to achieve clear political objectives is merely an exercise in violence and futility.

In its headlong rush to invade Iraq, the Bush administration is violating Fuller’s simple yet immensely important strategic dictum. Britain’s Prime Minister Anthony Eden committed the same grave error in 1956 when he launched an ill-conceived invasion of Egypt which, like modern Iraq, had the audacity to defy a great power. The Suez operation was a military success that turned into a political fiasco.

The Bush administration is clearly obsessed with Iraq, but it has no clear plan on what to do with this Mideast version of ex-Yugoslavia once America’s military might overthrows Saddam Hussein’s regime. Nor is there understanding of how invasion and occupation will affect the Fertile Crescent, America’s client Arab regimes, Turkey, indeed, the entire Mideast.

There is also the dearth of reliable political information on Iraq from human sources that has long plagued U.S. Mideast policy. Much of the Bush administration’s current view of the region has been fashioned by neoconservatives, who hold key policymaking positions in White House, Pentagon, and vice president’s office. Equally significant, the administration’s non-electronic human intelligence on the Mideast and terrorism relies heavily on self-serving data supplied by foreign intelligence services and Iraqi exile groups.

The ideologues and Pentagon hawks driving administration policy recall the Roman senator Cato, who ended every oration with, “Carthage must be destroyed!” Few of these armchair warriors have even been to Iraq; less have ever served in U.S. armed forces, yet all are eager to send American soldiers to fight a potentially bloody war whose benefits to the United States are doubtful.

Lust for destruction is not policy, no matter how much Pentagon hawks and neoconservative media trumpets may yearn to plow salt into the fields of Iraq. Nor is the piratical proposal that the U.S. “liberate” Iraq and plunder its great oil reserves to bring “civilization and democracy” to that benighted nation.

If Washington were truly concerned about democracy and human rights in the Arab World, it could long ago have promoted democracy in the military dictatorships and feudal sheikdoms over which the U.S. exercises paramount influence: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf emirates. Instead, under the banner of a war on terrorism, the U.S. has been buttressing autocracy and despotism, most recently in Central Asia and Pakistan.

The first question, of course, is why should the U.S. attack and invade Iraq, a nation that has not committed any act of war against America? The rest of the world will rightly see such an act as naked aggression, a return to British and Soviet-style imperialism, and a personal vendetta by George Bush against Saddam Hussein.

According to President Bush, Iraq must be destroyed because Saddam Hussein might possess some hidden chemical or biological weapons (WMDs), or because Iraq might one day develop nuclear weapons, or might slip WMDs to anti-American terrorists, or simply because he is “evil.” The Bush administration’s insistence on the right to preemptively intervene anywhere on earth recalls the old Brezhnev Doctrine of Soviet days.

Why Iraq alone is a danger among the 18 nations that possess weapons of mass destruction – including India whose new ICBMs will be able to deliver nuclear weapons to the U.S. – remains a mystery. Why Saddam’s ravaged, hermetically bottled up Iraq would be more of a danger to the US than 1.5 billion Muslims enraged by America’s perceived persecution of Iraqis, Afghans, and Palestinians also remains unclear. Terrorists don’t need Iraq to concoct germ weapons, as Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo showed, and Saddam Hussein is too intelligent to invite nuclear attack by the United States or Israel by slipping germ weapons to terrorists. If Saddam had wanted to do so, he had ample opportunity from 1991-2001.

Equally unclear is why the U.S. refuses to seek diplomatic accommodation with Iraq rather than war. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly shown himself a wily survivor willing to deal with the devil, when necessary. The United States was a close ally, financial backer, and provider of arms and intelligence to Saddam in the 1980s. He is certainly not eager to face an American invasion that would bring his own demise, and would therefore welcome a diplomatic escape from the dire fate he faces.

Just before the 1991 Gulf War, this writer discovered a group of British scientific technicians in Baghdad who had been “seconded” to Iraq by the British Ministry of Defense and the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, to help Baghdad develop biological weapons. The British technicians were based at the secret biowarfare complex at Salman Pak where they were developing anthrax, botulism and possibly Q-fever for Saddam’s military – with the full knowledge and support of the British and American governments. Other British scientists were developing poison gas for Iraq. They showed me documents confirming that the feeder stocks for Iraq’s germ weapons had been supplied by the United States.

In other words, it was fine for Iraq to shower poison gas – and potentially germs – on Muslim Iranians and Kurdish rebels during the Iran-Iraq War. But once Iraq invaded Kuwait, a protectorate inherited by the U.S. from the British Empire, and once Israel felt threatened by Saddam WMDs, then it was time to destroy Iraq. But Iraq did not use its WMD arsenal during Gulf War I, though U.S. troop concentrations at crowded Saudi ports would have made ideal targets.

No matter, answer administration critics, Saddam might have some gas or germ weapons hidden away. Yes, he might. But as former UN arms inspector Scott Ritter has observed, all leftover WMDs from the 1980s have a shelf-life of only 3-5 years and are no longer lethal. Iraq may have developed a few toxins since then, but it has no delivery systems for these complex, unstable, clumsy weapons. Britain, France, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Iran, Libya, India and Pakistan, Ukraine, Russia, Serbia, China, Taiwan – and Cuba – also have chemical weapons; some have biological weapons. Castro’s are only 90 miles from Miami.

Then, there is North Korea. Amidst cries for war against Iraq, it’s fascinating to consider Stalinist North Korea, a nation that, unlike Iraq, well and truly threatens Americans. The 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea are within range of North Korea’s huge numbers of heavy guns, rocket batteries, and Scud missiles that can deliver tons of poison gas and biowarfare toxins. U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and Okinawa are prime targets for North Korean WMDs and attacks by its 100,000-man commando force, the world’s largest. North Korea has at least two nuclear devices and has repeatedly threatened to “burn” Seoul and “slaughter” American troops in South Korea. The North continues to work on an ICBM capable of reaching Japan and the U.S. mainland.

Surely on the scale of threats to Americans, aggressive, sinister and wholly unpredictable North Korea should demand more urgent attention than demolished Iraq? On the contrary, both the Clinton and Bush Administrations chose to negotiate with Pyongyang and bribe it to be good with $ 4.6 billion worth of light water nuclear reactors, oil, food, and cash. American aid feeds starving North Koreans while the US denies Iraq chlorine to purify its contaminated drinking water, the main cause of death for hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children.

Why indulge North Korea while scourging Iraq? First, oil. Iraq’s oil reserves are second only to those of Saudi Arabia. Considering that the Bush administration has embarked on a long-term campaign militarily to dominate and exploit the oil of Central Asia’s Caspian Basin, it is not a stretch of imagination to believe that control of the more proximate oil of Iraq is also high on the administration’s petro-agenda.

Second, Iraq, unlike North Korea, poses a potential threat to Israel’s regional hegemony and Mideast nuclear monopoly because of its oil wealth and – at least until 1991 – industrial base. For Administration hawks who view the Mideast mainly through the lens of Israel’s strategic needs, crushing Iraq is a high priority. A shattered Iraq, divided into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia regions, would permanently terminate any future challenge to Israel.

Iraq’s northern oil fields could then be annexed by Israel’s new strategic ally, Turkey, which has no oil. Turkey’s generals have long eyed Iraq’s oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk regions, once part of the Ottoman Empire. Oil would transform Turkey from a financial cripple into a major political and military power, and assure its role as America’s regional gendarme.

Overthrowing Saddam Hussein and splintering Iraq would certainly be beneficial for Israel, but there are a host of arguments to be made why such aggression would be inimical to America’s interests. First and foremost, the substantial loss of American lives, unless there is a surprise coup against Saddam, in what inevitably would be a conflict fought out in urban areas where U.S. firepower and technology would be attenuated.

During the 1973 war, the crack Israeli army was forced to withdraw from Suez City in the face of stubborn resistance from dug-in Egyptian troops and irregulars. Though U.S. forces could quickly defeat Iraq’s regular army in the field, there is a high risk of prolonged urban guerilla warfare and great numbers of civilian casualties.

If Saddam does have any active chemical or biological weapons hidden away, he might well use them against American troops concentrations in the Gulf, unlike 1991. A cornered Saddam facing death might fire a few Scud missiles with chemical warheads at Israel in a Mideast Gotterdammerung. Israel warns it will retaliate with nuclear weapons if Iraq attacks with WMDs.

Virtually the entire world is against an invasion of Iraq, save Israel and Britain, and Tony Blair’s Labour Party is deeply split over the issue. Waves of anti-Americanism would intensify across the Muslim world, jeopardizing American diplomats, businessmen, and tourists. The costs of an invasion of Iraq using at least 100,000 troops would begin at $75 billion and soar from there. Reserves will have to be mobilized.

This huge cost, born entirely by American taxpayers, would come just as the Bush administration has created a yawning deficit that will inevitably trigger rising inflation. The faux war in Afghanistan, where some 12,000 US troops are chasing shadows, is costing $5 billion each month. The U.S.-installed Karzai regime rules only Kabul, and that only with the bayonets of western troops.

But the most important practical reason not to attack Iraq comes from General Fuller. What will the US do with this Mideast Yugoslavia once it conquers Iraq?

Consider Iraq’s bloody history: Britain created Iraq after World War I to acquire its oil, and put a puppet king, Faisal I, on the throne. Iraqis and Kurds rebelled in 1920 and were crushed by British troops and bombers. Iraq’s second king, Gazi, vowed to “liberate” Kuwait and died mysteriously soon after, murdered, Iraqis say, by British intelligence.

Faisal II, another British puppet, was overthrown in a 1958 military coup by Col. Kassem. The Kurds rebelled again. Kassem massed troops in invade Kuwait but was stopped by British forces, then murdered in a military coup led by Col. Aref. Two years later, Saddam Hussein seized power. The Kurds rebelled once more, aided by the U.S., Israel, and Iran. In 1979, the U.S. and Britain armed and financed Saddam to invade Iran and overthrow its Islamic regime. In 1990, Washington gave Saddam what he took as a green light to invade Kuwait.

This chronically unstable “Pandora’s Box,” as Jordan’s King Abdullah calls it, is the nation the U.S. plans to rule. When Saddam falls, Iraq will almost certainly splinter. This is the very reason why Bush père wisely decided against marching on Baghdad in 1991. President Bush Sr. and his Arab allies concluded Iran would annex southern Iraq. The only leader who could hold the nation together was the iron-fisted Saddam. Interestingly, one night in 1942, Hitler observed, “The only person who knows how to deal with Russians is Stalin. When I take over Russia, I will put him back in power.”

A gelded, isolated Saddam is far less of a danger than a geopolitical maelstrom in Iraq that might force US troops to put down Kurdish rebels seeking their own state, or battle Shias, Iraq’s religious majority. War in Iraq may spark an anti-western revolution in Turkey or reignite the Kurdish uprising there. Will the Arab world explode, as Egypt warns?

What about Iran? The same rationale advanced by neoconservatives to invade Iraq also applies to Iran, a nation of 68 million, and a greater challenge to Israel than Iraq. Will the U.S. face a lengthy guerilla war in the cities of Iraq or the lush valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, where the British were defeated by the Turks in 1916. The cost of permanently garrisoning Iraq will strain America’s already overstretched armed forces and make them less effective in responding to a genuine threat elsewhere, notably the Korean Peninsula.

The squabbling Iraqi opposition groups cultivated by the United States are sneered at even by their American paymasters, discredited because of their links to Israel, and most unlikely to form a stable regime. Whatever Iraqi general the US puts in power in Baghdad will, like all his predecessors, battle the rebellious Kurds, yearn to annex Kuwait, and inevitably seek nuclear weapons to counter Israel’s nuclear arsenal and Iran’s advantage in manpower. Iraq will be Iraq, no matter who rules. The best way to end the Mideast’s WMD arms race is to impose regional disarmament. This includes Israel, which continues to refuse nuclear arms inspection

However brutal and aggressive, Saddam Hussein has also been Iraq’s most effective ruler since 1957. It was Saddam who transformed Iraq into a modern, industrialized nation with one of the Arab world’s highest standards of education and income. Washington could yet rue the day it failed to keep this Arab Stalin in power.

America may seize and exploit Iraq’s oil in the short term, as neo-imperialists in Washington are urging, but in the long run, the cost of protecting oil installations and a puppet regime in Baghdad will exceed profits gained from pumping stolen oil. Bush is wrong if he thinks Iraq can be turned into another docile American protectorate, like Kuwait or Bahrain.

The Muslim world increasingly views George Bush’s America as set on a crusade against Muslims everywhere, a view reinforced by U.S. attacks on Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan over past two decades.

There is simply no political benefit for the United States in invading Iraq.

On the contrary, such an act of brazen aggression would summon up a host of unforeseen dangers and unimagined consequences that could destabilize the Mideast and Turkey, create a world economic crisis, and, perhaps, cause the aggressive Bush Administration to commit an act of imperial overreach that permanently injures America’s geopolitical interests and, let us not forget, its moral integrity.

______________________________________________________

Eric S. Margolis is author of War at the Top of the World – The Struggle for Afghanistan and Asia (Routledge, New York 2002) and Contributing Foreign Editor of Sun Media. He has covered Iraq since the 1970s.