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Non-Tech : The Enron Scandal - Unmoderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (2565)12/13/2002 10:48:51 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Despite Denial, Enron Papers Show Big Profit on Price Bets

The New York Times
By DAVID BARBOZA
December 12, 2002

Even as Enron's top executives were insisting that the company
did not engage in speculative trading, Enron was reaping the bulk of its profits
during the California energy crisis by betting on the direction of gas
and electricity prices, according to company records and interviews with
former Enron traders and executives.

Enron made the hugely profitable bets - including one that resulted
in a $485 million gain on a single day in December 2000 - at a time when
federal and state investigators say the company was conspiring with
other energy trading companies to manipulate power and natural gas prices in
the West.

Indeed, Enron's standing as the nation's biggest energy trader may have
bolstered its ability to profit on bets on the direction of prices. While it is
unclear whether Enron could singlehandedly move markets with its trades,
several Enron trading officials said that to justify their risk-taking, they
told the company's executives and directors that, like a casino, Enron
had a "house advantage" in the energy markets.

A result of the speculation, the records show, was one of the most
stunning runs ever for a corporate trading operation - some $7 billion in net
trading profits for Enron during a power crisis that wreaked havoc on
consumers in 2000 and 2001 and forced rolling blackouts in some parts of
California. That tally included days with immense trading losses, including
a $550 million reversal just a week after the $485 million gain. Former
Enron executives said the company hid its speculative activities to shield
it from criticism that it was profiting from California's energy woes.

More than a year after Enron's collapse, the company's full role in the
energy crisis is only now coming to light. The disclosure of its speculative
trading practices, which are being reviewed by federal and state investigators,
comes as California officials await a decision by a Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission judge on the state's demand for billions in
refunds from power merchants. That ruling is expected soon.

At the time, Kenneth L. Lay, Enron's chairman and longtime
chief executive, and other Enron officials said that the company was simply a
middleman in the fast-growing market for buying and selling natural gas and electricity.
Most of the company's profits, they said, were made on the
markup taken as Enron's traders bought and then resold soaring
volumes of electricity and natural gas, as well as on selling to other companies
hedges against big moves in energy prices.

But in recent interviews, several former traders said that
a huge share of Enron's profit came from big bets on whether
natural gas and power prices
would rise or fall.

"Yes, we were speculating," said John Arnold, who was Enron's most
successful trader last year, alone making a $750 million profit for the company
by trading natural gas in 2001. "There was a big move in 2001. I identified
it early and played it with lots of leverage."

In dozens of pages of profit-and- loss tables obtained by The New York Times,
Enron's records show a winning streak that several trading experts
called astounding.

For instance, at a time when Wall Street executives say a $100 million
daily trading profit was considered sizable for a major trading operation,
Enron recorded a $485 million profit on Dec. 4, 2000. For the
full month - a period when, California regulators, say the company was trading with
its own affiliates in an effort to raise energy prices - the records show that Enron's
net trading profit was $440 million.

Federal regulators have also accused Enron of trying to raise
prices by engaging in sham trades with an unnamed company on Jan. 31, 2001. On
that day, according to Enron's internal records, the company recorded
a $114 million trading profit.

Over the course of 2000 and 2001, the records show single-day trading profit
of $100 million or more on at least 17 days.

Wall Street analysts, who bullishly endorsed Enron's shares for much
of the period, said that they might have shown more restraint had they known
the extent of the company's speculative trading. Enron disclosed some
risk measures about its trading activities, and careful analysts could have
noted how those numbers rose in 2000 and 2001. But analysts paid more
heed to guidance from the company's executives.

"They specifically told us they were not speculating," said
an analyst at one of the nation's biggest brokerage houses, who insisted on anonymity. "At
the time, Enron was valued at close to 40 times earnings
And Enron naysayers were saying, `How is this different from Goldman Sachs, which on a
good day is valued at 12 times earnings?' "

In a March 27, 2001, interview, Mr. Lay said: "We're basically making markets,
buying and selling, arranging supplies, deliveries. We do not, in fact,
speculate on where markets are headed." The company also denied,
in meetings with Wall Street analysts, that California accounted for a large
share of its profit in 2000, at the height of the state's energy crisis.

But the trading records show that about $1.3 billion, or over half
of Enron's trading profit that year, was tied to soaring gas and power prices on the
West Coast.

"We had meetings every morning," one former trader said. "And there
was a lot of pressure to use more and more leverage and to put on bigger and
bigger trades."

A spokesman for Enron, which is struggling to emerge from
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, said the company was cooperating with investigators.

Mr. Lay's spokeswoman declined to comment. Jeffrey K. Skilling,
who built Enron's trading operation and served as the company's chief executive for
half of last year, was unavailable for comment.

Three weeks ago, a report issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
said that Enron conspired with Portland General Electric, an
Oregon utility it owns, to manipulate the price of power in the spring
of 2000. In October, Timothy N. Belden, a former Enron senior trader, pleaded
guilty in federal court to helping manipulate power prices in the West
during the California energy crisis. Mr. Belden is cooperating with the
government in continuing investigations.

According to the records, Enron's trading profit soared during the
most volatile trading periods in 2000 and 2001, when consumers and politicians in
the West started complaining about unusually high gas and power prices.

In November and December 2000, for instance, Enron made nearly $1 billion
in trading profit just in North America, according to a presentation the
company made to Moody's Investors Service, the credit rating agency.
Those results are evidence that the company was engaged in speculative
trading, financial experts said.

"Given their profit-and-loss swings, they were taking on huge positions,"
said Robert Litzenberger, the former head of risk management at Goldman
Sachs. "You might have swings, but not like that in a hedged market. That's quite extreme."

Occasionally, Enron got on the wrong side of the market, as it did in
mid-December 2000, when the trading operation lost nearly $1 billion over
three days.

The worst day was Dec. 12, when gas prices unexpectedly plummeted.
Enron's traders lost $550 million - a figure that sent shock waves through
the company. The loss equaled what Long Term Capital Management, the hedge fund,
lost on one of its worst trading days in 1998, when its
near-collapse shook global markets.

The $550 million reversal exceeded the company's risk control levels,
meaning that they had to be reported to the board. A week earlier, after the
traders recorded their $485 million gain, they had persuaded the board
to loosen Enron's risk limits. Trading executives argued that Enron had
superb risk management controls and that the traders could reap even bigger
profits in a volatile market, executives and trading officials said.

During the last three months of 2000, according to internal company records,
Enron's so-called value-at-risk limits - what Enron was willing to lose
on a single day - were raised three times, from $80 million in October to $140 million on Dec. 7.

J. C. Nickens, a lawyer for Richard B. Buy, who at the time was Enron's chief risk officer,
said that it was obvious that Enron was speculating.

"Of course they were speculating; they were traders," Mr. Nickens said this week.
"But they thought they were better traders and less risky. They
thought they had the system beat."

Another limit set by Enron's board - the "risk appetite," or the overall
amount of the company's capital that the company was willing to risk losing in
the course of a year - was set at $2 billion in early 2001, records show.

"That figure is huge, shocking," said Mark Williams, a former energy trading
executive who now teaches at Boston University. "This gets back to, was
Enron really a hedge fund disguised as an energy company?"

Early in 2001, Herbert S. Winokur Jr., who was then the chairman of the finance
committee of Enron's board, began asking the company's risk
managers to re-evaluate the trading policies and tighten risk controls,
according to W. Neil Eggleston, a lawyer for Mr. Winokur.

After learning about the Dec. 12 loss, Moody's also grew concerned
about Enron's risk profile. Mr. Buy traveled to New York in late 2000 or early
2001 to soothe Moody's concerns, according to several former Enron executives.
Moody's said it decided not to take any action against the company
after Enron assured it that there were good controls in place and that this
was an opportunity to make even bigger profits.

In retrospect, officials at Moody's feel duped.

"We did express concern about the level of trading activity that they showed us,"
said John Diaz, a managing director of Moody's energy group. "But
what we have come to believe is that the information Enron provided to us
was misleading, incomplete and designed to deceive. If we had known
that they were really speculating in a big way, that probably would have led to a lower rating."

Instead, the trading profits during the California energy crisis only heightened
Enron's hunger for more, according to a former executive in the
company's risk-management unit.

"Enron's appetite for risk was huge," he said. "We could set some limits, but we couldn't stop the train."

Copyright The New York Times Company



To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (2565)12/15/2002 4:39:17 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Life Without a Jet, and Other Laments

By ANDREW ROSS SORKIN
The New York Times
December 15, 2002

IT was just another guys' night out on Nantucket. A group of locals, year-round islanders, had gathered for their weekly poker game. At the table were a pair of fishermen, a signmaker, a retired doctor. And L. Dennis Kozlowski.

Since last spring, when Mr. Kozlowski, the former chairman of Tyco International, was charged with looting the company of more than $600 million, the invitations to hobnob with captains of industry at exclusive clubs and on the charity-ball circuit have disappeared. Gone, too, are the accouterments of the executive suite — the personal assistants, the limousines, the fleet of corporate jets.

"I was just at Walgreen's last week," Mr. Kozlowski said during a telephone interview last week, a store he hardly frequented as a chief executive. Reflecting on his reduced circumstances, he added: "I try to fill my days with nonrevenue-producing things," like working on his defense and volunteering for local charities. Perhaps most important, he said, he was "getting a handle on my own personal finances," which he has not managed in years and which have been frozen by a judge. These days, he must seek permission to spend any money whatsoever.

When he travels, he is now flying coach.

Other former top executives are rediscovering life without the company plane, too. Twelve months of scandal have turned a dozen or so of them into symbols of what is wrong in corporate America. They have been blamed for creating the stock market's crisis of confidence. Some, disgraced by criminal charges, were led away in handcuffs and perp-walked before cameras; others, under investigation but not yet charged, were excoriated in Congress and in the news media.

And then what?

For most of these executives, the specter of negotiations, trials, probation, prison or other similar unpleasantness still lie ahead. Their lives are in limbo.

"You're dealing with a psychological problem as much as anything else," said Stanley Sporkin, a former federal judge and top enforcement lawyer at the Securities and Exchange Commission. "A lot of these people are going through depression."

Some of them say they are finding out who their friends are. Many have had passports confiscated. "My life has changed dramatically," said John J. Rigas, 78, the founder and former chairman of Adelphia Communications, the cable company, who has been charged, along with his two sons, of pillaging $1 billion from the company.

It may be hard to feel sorry for people who have caused so much pain for investors, employees, creditors and others — especially because they themselves have suffered very little real pain, at least so far. Many are almost leading their normal, pre-scandal lives — minus the office.

Andrew S. Fastow, the former chief financial officer of Enron who is under indictment on fraud charges, for example, has been seen on his regular jog around the track at Rice University near his home in Houston. Mr. Fastow still coached his son's baseball team, the Houston Gators, part of the Tadpole Little League; he still participates in his children's carpooling, friends say, and he still takes out his 18-foot Boston Whaler on weekends to go fishing with his sons.

He has also become more religiously active at his temple, Congregation Or Ami, a conservative synagogue.

Meanwhile, Scott D. Sullivan, WorldCom's former chief financial officer, continues construction on his 24,000-square-foot megamansion in Boca Raton, Fla. Mr. Sullivan was indicted on charges that he conspired to hide billions of dollars in losses at the company.

Like the others, of course, "he is working on handling his litigation," said Irving B. Nathan, his lawyer. "That is his main preoccupation."

Still, Mr. Sullivan is regularly seen zipping around town in his silver Range Rover on his way to inspect that $15 million construction project, which includes an 18-seat movie theater, a private art gallery and a lagoon.

While Mr. Sullivan may not be safe from jail and civil lawsuits, his new home is secure; even if he is forced to file for bankruptcy, Florida's Homestead Act could protect the home and the land from creditors.

"Some of these guys have been living high off the hog for so long that it is hard to come back," Mr. Sporkin said.

For those whose lives have changed significantly, the most concrete alteration has been a curbing of their movement and spending. Mr. Kozlowski, Mr. Fastow and Mr. Rigas face travel restrictions. So does Mark H. Swartz, Tyco's former chief financial officer, who, with Mr. Kozlowski, is accused of plundering the company.

(Page 2 of 3)

But they are not trapped: Mr. Kozlowski can travel in Massachusetts, New York and Florida, where he has multimillion-dollar homes. He also received permission to travel with his family to his chalet in Beaver Creek, Colo., for Christmas to ski.

Mr. Rigas can travel between Pennsylvania and New York, though he complained in an interview that he missed a planned trip to France and Greece because he cannot leave the country.

Mr. Swartz, who lives in Boca Raton, may travel only between Florida and New York, which he visits to see his lawyer. He received permission to travel to California for the holidays to visit his in-laws. Mr. Sullivan is limited to Florida, Washington, Mississippi and New York.

ON the spending front, Mr. Kozlowski must submit receipts for every penny he spends, including the most recent electricity bills for homes on Nantucket ($726.46), in Florida ($1,047.26) and in Colorado ($267.57) and his itemized $7,200 credit card bill. "It's not a whole lot of fun," he grumbled.

Mr. Rigas's assets have also been frozen by the judge overseeing Adelphia's bankruptcy, though he was given permission to spend "reasonable" amounts to maintain his day-to-day life.

Oddly, the one disgraced executive who feels as if he is under house arrest, associates say, has not been charged with a crime, at least not yet, let alone found guilty. Jack B. Grubman, the former star telecommunications analyst at Citigroup's Salomon Smith Barney who is the focus of regulatory and prosecutorial scrutiny, can hardly leave his town house on the Upper East Side of Manhattan without being chased by television reporters or occasionally cast disdainful glances by passers-by, friends say.

On the day after WorldCom restated its earnings by $3.8 billion last June, Mr. Grubman was famously chased down the street outside his home by a CNBC reporter, a scene that the network now uses in its promotional commercials. Several weeks back, Mr. Grubman was trailed by another camera crew, this time for "20/20" on ABC, as he strolled through Central Park.

He spends several days a week in marathon sessions reviewing documents with his lawyer, Lee S. Richards, at his office in Chase Manhattan Plaza in Midtown Manhattan, associates said.

Mr. Grubman no longer feels comfortable, either, dropping off and picking up his twins at their nursery school run by the 92nd Street Y. He leaves that duty to his wife or the family nanny, friends said. Being seen around the nursery school has been an especially touchy subject for Mr. Grubman since news reports that he had boasted in an e-mail message that his former boss, Sanford I. Weill, the chairman of Citigroup, had helped secure spots at the nursery school for his two children after Mr. Grubman began recommending that investors buy AT&T stock.

Mr. Grubman declined to comment through a spokesman, citing the New York attorney general's continuing investigation of analysts.

Mr. Rigas, too, has been reluctant to leave home. "I've kind of withdrawn," he lamented. He said he made a rare outing in his hometown of Coudersport, Pa., last week to see "My Big Fat Greek Wedding" at the local movie theater, which he happens to own.

But when he does go from his home into downtown Coudersport, where he is considered the patriarch of the 2,650 residents (of which 1,500 are Adelphia employees), he is often rushed by townspeople who remain supporters. "You know what? I don't know how to express this with enough emotion, but when I'm in town, the people that used to give me a wave, now they come up to me and give me a hug," he said. "That's extraordinary."

In October, Adelphia sent a three-page memo to employees entitled "Contact With Members of the Rigas Family," dictating how they should, or rather should not, communicate with the Rigases if they run into them. The company said that if any of its 1,500 employees come into contact with them, they must "report all such contacts to the legal department." Or if they get a phone message, the memo directs them: "Do not attempt to return the phone call."

Mr. Rigas, who has no contact with the company's new management, said the memo was hurtful. "It was devastating to me," he said. Still, he has kept up with many of the company's current and former employees. Adelphia let go about 150 employees locally this fall. "A lot of people have been laid off and they have made sure to call me," he said.

MR. KOZLOWSKI, too, has been encouraged by occasional well-wishers. At a movie theater a couple of weeks ago, "a guy came up to me and said he was a Tyco shareholder and believed in me," he said.

But neither he nor other disgraced executives canvassed for this article seem to be garnering much attention when they are in public. Mr. Kozlowski said that, with the exception of "tabloid people" stalking him over the summer in Nantucket, he goes mostly unnoticed.

Mr. Rigas said that he worried about being noticed when came to New York, but was not. "Nobody recognizes me despite all the publicity," he said. "So that's fine."

(Page 3 of 3)

Mr. Kozlowski said the most difficult part of his newfound circumstances has been dealing with friends. He acknowledged that some people he had considered friends had deserted him. "You can sort out who you friends are," he added, saying that he has become even closer with his core group of friends.

Mr. Kozlowski said he had noticed a "reverse relationship" with people to whose charities he had given money. "Some of those people have vaporized," he said, observing that the more money he had given, the quicker they had turned on him.

For Mark A. Belnick, Tyco's former general counsel, who has been charged with falsifying company documents to conceal unauthorized pay, it was some students who turned on him. Aside from stewing over his legal case, Mr. Belnick continues in his part-time job as the director of Cornell University's prelaw program. During the summer, he taught his regular class, Government 315 — "Introduction to the American Legal System: Its Nature, Functions and Institutions," though he did cancel two weeks of the eight-week program while he dealt with his indictment.

While students still rave about Mr. Belnick as a teacher, the campus paper, The Cornell Daily Sun, wrote an editorial seeking his resignation and criticizing the university for allowing him to teach while under indictment. "Although the case has yet to go to trial, the circumstances of Belnick's employment with Tyco International and his role with Cornell render him a threat both to the university's reputation and the students he mentors," the newspaper wrote. "Cornell is taking an unnecessary risk in allowing Belnick to continue on staff." Mr. Belnick's lawyer, Reid H. Weingarten, declined to comment.

Kenneth L. Lay, Enron's former chairman, has been equally active. He and his wife, Linda, have become increasingly visible on Houston's social and charity circuit, recently making an appearance at a fund-raising dinner for the United Way at the home of Gordon M. Bethune, the chief executive of Continental Airlines. Friends say they did, however, leave early.

Mr. Lay spends most days at his private office near his apartment in the Huntingdon high-rise in River Oaks, a Houston suburb. After he resigned from Enron a year ago, he rented the office so he could work on his pet charity projects, like the Greater Houston Partnership, where he is board member, and to examine new investment opportunities in the energy sector, according to his spokeswoman, Kelly Kimberly.

Occasionally, Mr. Lay stops by his wife's store, Jus' Stuff, which sells furnishings, antiques and decorative items from, among other places, the 14 homes and investment properties the Lays recently sold, including their Aspen ski house.

Jeffrey K. Skilling, who for six months in early 2001 succeeded Mr. Lay at Enron and then abruptly quit, has also stepped outside his gated mansion. He has been spotted with friends at several trendy restaurants and bars, like Zimm's and Martini & Wine. Once, recently, he was harassed at a restaurant, another diner said.

E is also back in business, sort of: he has started an investment firm called Veld Interests and has leased space in Greenway Plaza, an office complex in the upscale Galleria shopping area.

Bernard J. Ebbers, the former chief executive of WorldCom who is under investigation, has been spotted regularly at his favorite restaurants, Tico's and Dixie Springs, in Brookhaven, Miss., where he lives, about an hour from Clinton, where WorldCom is based. He also teaches Sunday school for an hour every week at his Easthaven Baptist Church there.

Like other humiliated executives, Samuel D. Waksal, the former chief executive of the biotechnology company ImClone Systems who pleaded guilty to insider stock trading and is awaiting sentencing, has stepped up his do-good activities. Mr. Waksal has been quietly volunteering daily at a nonprofit organization in SoHo, near his home, that teaches skills to homeless people to enable them to enter the work force.

Good deeds, of course, have been known to influence a sentencing judge.