Very interesting. I never said that Arab powers were per se behind the rioting, and I have no idea why you think I would have to prove that in order to validate my thesis.
What you said was this:
You keep forgetting that the Arab powers were behind the intransigence of the Palestinian Arabs
You inserted this comment into a discussion that has revolved from the beginning around the earliest manifestations of Arab/Jewish violence, specifically around the riots of 1921 and 1929. If you were not referring to these, what examples of “intransigence” were you referring to?
it is obvious that more than one word of what I quoted does suggest that Arab powers had a significant impact on British immigration policy. You may think the case is not made, but a prima facie case is laid out, at least.
Pardon me, but the information you cited demonstrates nothing but that England was exploring for oil in Arab states in the mid to late 1930’s. Nothing you cited suggests even remotely that events in Palestine were related to this exploration. In any event, events in the mid to late 1930’s occurred well after the pattern of Arab/Jewish violence was established, and are not relevant to discussion of how and why that pattern was established, which is what we’ve been trying to discuss.
the idea that the Jews were going to be able to take over when the Arab population was so much larger, and when the Arab powers were becoming increasingly committed to maintaining an Arab Palestine, is absurd. Thus, the idea that the persistence of violence had to do with the fear of Zionist sovereignty, especially as Jewish immigration was restricted, and the Arab population grew, is even more absurd.
I don’t know how many times I have to repeat this. The conversation between Nadine and myself, which you entered, was about how and why the pattern of violence between Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine was established. The question of how this conflict expanded to a regional level is also interesting, but it is a completely different discussion with completely different terms of reference. At the time this pattern was established, “the idea that Jews were going to take over” was absolutely the most critical factor involved. The Jewish population may have been small, but they had overtly declared their intention to bring in as many immigrants as they could and achieve sovereignty over Palestine. They had obtained specific sanction from the League of Nations for the establishment of their “National Home” in a territory already occupied by others, and, most important, enlisted the overtly stated support of the most powerful empire of the day. The Arabs had every reason, during the period in question, to fear a takeover. The promise of support from the Arab States cannot possibly have been a factor in the establishment of the pattern of violence, because the pattern was first established in the early 1920s and before, and in this period there were no Arab states.
…they thought that the aspirations of the Zionists were impossible, in the end. That is my main argument, that the idea that, during the period from the Mandate to the establishment of the State of Israel, the Palestinian Arabs had persistent reasons to feel threatened, even as they grew even further beyond the Jews in population, and their cause became part of the pan- Arab cause, is absurd, even if it made some amount of sense in the '20s.
Again, during the period in which the pattern of violent conflict was established, the local Arab population had no reason to think that the aspirations of the Zionists were impossible.
Trying to bite off the period from the Mandate to the establishment of the state of Israel is tossing apples in with oranges. As I’ve said before, repeatedly, the character of the conflict changed dramatically once the rebellion that began in late ’35 was established. At this point many of the factors you cite did become significant. What I’ve been trying to explain is that while these may have become a factor once the conflict was already established, they were not the influences that created the conflict, which was already well established before those influences came to bear. If I were forced to propose a historical division, I would say that if you want to examine the sources of the conflict you have to focus on events and attitudes between the Balfour Declaration and the riots of 1929 (that cutoff could arguably be moved back to 1921). At any point after that, you would have to say that the pattern of violent confrontation was well established. Subsequent events are certainly relevant to the question of how and why the conflict developed as it did, but not to the question of how the conflict was initiated.
I have never argued that local Arab reaction to Zionist immigration and to the Zionist goal of sovereignty was responsible for all aspects of the conflict to date. That would be ridiculous. I argued that this reaction was responsible for the establishment of the pattern of conflict. Specifically, I argued that the combination of Zionist immigration and the declared intention to achieve sovereignty made violent confrontation with the local population inevitable. I did NOT say, as some have apparently believed, that these influences made the entire subsequent course of events inevitable.
Thus, the increase in Arab hostility throughout the '30s and '40s could not have been provoked by Jewish immigration, which was practically curtailed
Again, this is well outside the margins of the current discussion, but immigration during the 1930’s was anything but “practically curtailed”. I must yield to the temptation to impose actual data on the discussion:
Jweish Immigration to Palestine, 1920-1940
1920 8,223
1921 8,294
1922 8,685
1923 8,175
1924 13,892
1925 34,386
1926 13,855
1927 3,034
1928 2,178
1929 5,249
1930 4,944
1931 4,075
1932 12,533
1933 37,337
1934 45,267
1935 66,472
1936 29,595
1937 10,629
1938 14,675
1939 31,195
1940 10,643
As you can see, far from being “practically curtailed”, immigration rose precipitously in the mid 1930s, trailing off only after the Arab population went into a state of open rebellion in late 1935. It might be entirely coincidental that the rebellion erupted in the year that immigration peaked, but then again it might not be.
Therefore, one must cast about for an alternative hypothesis to the knee- jerk "neocolonialist" hypothesis. What is ready to hand is the rise of pan- Arabism (why should Arab Powers that cared little for their own peasantry be willing to go to war for Palestinian peasants?), especially the fascist version known as Ba'athism........
This explains the entry of the other Arab powers into the conflict. It does not explain the initiatory phases of the conflict, which involves events that happened well before the ideologies you mention became a significant force. |
