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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: JohnM who wrote (62256)12/18/2002 12:12:27 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Projection on Fall Of Hussein Disputed

Ground Forces Chiefs, Pentagon at Odds
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, December 18, 2002; Page A01

With war possible soon in Iraq, the chiefs of the two U.S. ground forces are challenging the belief of some senior Pentagon civilians that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein will fall almost immediately upon being attacked and are calling for more attention to planning for worst-case scenarios, Defense Department officials said.

The U.S. war plan for a possible attack on Iraq, which has been almost a year in the making, calls for a fast-moving ground attack without an overwhelming number of reinforcements on hand. Instead, some follow-on troops would be flown into Iraq from outside the region. Among other things, this "rolling start" would seek to achieve tactical surprise by launching an attack before the U.S. military appears ready to do so.

In addition, the plan calls for some armored units, instead of traveling a predetermined distance and pausing to allow slow-moving supply trucks to catch up, to charge across Iraq until they run into armed opposition and then engage in combat, officials said.

Those aspects of the plan, which appear riskier than usual U.S. military practice, worry the chief of the Army, Gen. Eric Shinseki, and the commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James L. Jones, defense officials said.

Shinseki and Jones, who as service chiefs are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have questioned the contention of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and other top officials that Hussein's government is likely to collapse almost as soon as a U.S. attack is launched, the officials said.

The two generals are concerned that the Wolfowitz school may underestimate the risks involved, the officials said. They have argued that planning should prepare thoroughly for worst-case scenarios, most notably one that planners have labeled "Fortress Baghdad," in which Hussein withdraws his most loyal forces into the Iraqi capital and challenges the United States to enter into protracted street fighting, perhaps involving chemical or biological weapons.

In an interview last night, Wolfowitz rejected the view that he has been overoptimistic in his views. He said he also believes that, "You've got to be prepared for the worst case." He added: "It would be a terrible mistake for anyone to think they can predict with confidence what the course of a war is going to be." In discussions of the war plan, he said, he has repeatedly emphasized the risk of Hussein "using his most terrible weapons."

The dispute, which is taking place mainly in secret reviews of the war plan, promises to be the last major issue in the Pentagon's consideration of that plan, as more signs point toward forces being ready to launch a wide-ranging, highly synchronized ground and air attack in six to eight weeks. Psychological operations, such as leafleting and broadcasting into Iraq, have been stepped up lately, and there is talk at the Pentagon of large-scale troop movements or mobilizations being announced soon after the holidays.

The debate became more open last week when Jones alluded to it in comments made at a dinner held in his honor by former defense secretary William S. Cohen. Jones is scheduled next month to leave the Marine post to become the commander of U.S. military forces in Europe. At that dinner, Jones indicated that he and other senior officers did not share the "optimism" of others about the ease of fighting in Iraq.

In an interview, Jones said that he did not name who he thought was being overly optimistic. "I did not say, 'folks at the Pentagon,' " he said. "I said I didn't align myself with folks around town who seem to think that this is preordained to be a very easy military operation."

If a victory were swiftly won, he continued: "It is to be celebrated. But military planners should always plan for the worst case." He insisted that in his remarks he had not expressed a conclusion about how quickly Hussein might fall.

He said he believed that he and Shinseki, the Army chief, "are of the same view on this."

If anything, the Army's leadership is even more worried than Jones, said a senior officer who sides with the Wolfowitz view. "The Army really is conservative on this," he said dismissively.

The Army also has qualms about the likely burden of postwar peacekeeping in Iraq -- a mission that is likely to be executed mainly by the Army. "They're concerned they're going to be left holding the bag after everyone else has gone home," said Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer who is now director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a small but influential defense think tank.

The chief of the Air Force, Gen. John P. Jumper, is said to side with the Wolfowitz view, believing that the opening round of bombing, combined with an intense propaganda campaign and Special Operations attacks, is likely to topple the government quickly. The fourth service chief, the Navy's Adm. VernClark, sides with Jumper, but not as emphatically, officials said.

The influence of the Joint Chiefs on military policy appears to have diminished under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, so it is not clear what effect the recent round of questioning will have on the war plan.

Former House speaker Newt Gingrich, a Rumsfeld confidant, predicted that it would have little. "If the chiefs wanted to be extremely cautious, extremely conservative and design a risk-avoiding strategy, that would be nothing new," he said in an interview.

Gingrich, who also is a member of the Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory panel, said he was confident that Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the commander of U.S. forces in the Mideast, would not be swayed by suggestions that he include more reinforcements and plan a more cautious attack. Franks, he said, "will probably have a more integrated, more aggressive and more risk-taking plan."

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

washingtonpost.com



To: JohnM who wrote (62256)12/18/2002 9:27:55 PM
From: Dayuhan  Respond to of 281500
 

That is the argument Hersh offers which is that these kinds of ventures can and often do have consequences that are worse than the policy. His invocation of the Phoenix operation in Vietnam was telling to me. My guess is that, and it's definitely only a guess, these operations are done with great care in their early incarnations. And then, if things go reasonably well, mistakes are not too bad, the policy makers and, for that matter, the ones doing the actions, get careless; if the scale increases, that carelessness gets magnified. At those points, the medicine can easily get worse than the disease.

Apples and oranges, I would say. Given the context of the Vietnam war, I'd say Phoenix was bound to backfire. It simply wasn't appropriate to the situation. The current problem is entirely different. We aren't out there looking for village headmen, people who have a following and whose killing will push more people into the enemy's camp. We are looking at a network of confirmed terrorists, many of whom operate outside their home territory. Al Qaeda may have been training thousands of men, but I believe that only a small number of these were capable of conducting operations outside the Middle East. They need people who hold neutral-country passports, people who can travel easily, speak English or other target-country languages, and still have the commitment to mount suicide attacks. The supply of these is limited. The number of key people involved in support, logistic, and planning roles is also limited, and these people are hard to replace. I think that if key people can be killed or kidnapped the effect on the offensive capabilities of the terrorists could be considerable.

I do believe that the chief targets should not be highly visible leaders, but the operational people, especially those operating outside the ME. These are the people that can actually do damage to us.

As with any plan, of course, it's important to know when to stop.



To: JohnM who wrote (62256)12/18/2002 10:12:03 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 281500
 
REASON: An update on the glowing reviews we get of Woodrow Wilson in our History Books.

Dixiecrats Triumphant
The menacing Mr. Wilson
By Charles Paul Freund

It was Inauguration Day, and in the judgment of one later historian, "the atmosphere in the nation's capital bore ominous signs for Negroes." Washington rang with happy Rebel Yells, while bands all over town played 'Dixie.' Indeed, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who swore in the newly elected Southern president, was himself a former member of the Ku Klux Klan. Meanwhile, "an unidentified associate of the new Chief Executive warned that since the South ran the nation, Negroes should expect to be treated as a servile race." Somebody had even sent the new president a possum, an act supposedly "consonant with Southern tradition."

This is not an alternate world scenario imagining the results of a Strom Thurmond victory in the 1948 election; it is the real March 4, 1913, the day Woodrow Wilson of Virginia moved into the White House. The details, above and below, are drawn from the work of historian Lawrence J. Friedman, especially 1970's The White Savage: Racial Fantasies in the Postbellum South.

The extended scandal involving Sen. Trent Lott's dismal remarks in honor of Thurmond's 100th birthday, especially Lott's stated regret that Thurmond's segregationist Dixiecrats failed to win the 1948 presidential campaign, have led a number of writers to examine the Dixiecrats' old platform so as to put Lott's statement in perspective. But the whole Dixiecrat enterprise has a historical perspective of its own.

Breakaway segregationist Democrats didn't need to pluck the racist dystopia implicit in their 1948 platform from thin air, nor did they have to base their political hopes on hazy Lost Cause nostalgia and distant antebellum dreams. An openly racist Southern presidency had existed fewer than 30 years earlier: Wilson's. His White House had not only approved of the South's discriminatory practices (many of which were also widespread in the North), it implemented them in the federal government. Had Dixiecrat dreams come true, a Thurmond administration would have revived Woodrow Wilson's racial policies.

Wilson's historical reputation is that of a far-sighted progressive. That role has been assigned to him by historians based on his battle for the League of Nations, and the opposition he faced from isolationist Republicans. Indeed, the adjective "Wilsonian," still in use, implies a positive if idealistic vision for the extension of justice and democratic values throughout the world. Domestically, however, Wilson was a racist retrograde, one who attempted to engineer the diminution of both justice and democracy for American blacks?who were enjoying little of either to begin with.

Wilson's racist views were hardly a secret. His own published work was peppered with Lost Cause visions of a happy antebellum South. As president of Princeton, he had turned away black applicants, regarding their desire for education to be "unwarranted." He was elected president because the 1912 campaign featured a third party, Theodore Roosevelt's Bullmoose Party, which drew Republican votes from incumbent William Howard Taft. Wilson won a majority of votes in only one state (Arizona) outside the South.

What Wilson's election meant to the South was "home rule;" that is, license to pursue its racial practices without concern about interference from the federal government. That is exactly what the 1948 Dixiecrats wanted. But "home rule" was only the beginning. Upon taking power in Washington, Wilson and the many other Southerners he brought into his cabinet were disturbed at the way the federal government went about its own business. One legacy of post-Civil War Republican ascendancy was that Washington's large black populace had access to federal jobs, and worked with whites in largely integrated circumstances. Wilson's cabinet put an end to that, bringing Jim Crow to Washington.

Wilson allowed various officials to segregate the toilets, cafeterias, and work areas of their departments. One justification involved health: White government workers had to be protected from contagious diseases, especially venereal diseases, that racists imagined were being spread by blacks. In extreme cases, federal officials built separate structures to house black workers. Most black diplomats were replaced by whites; numerous black federal officials in the South were removed from their posts; the local Washington police force and fire department stopped hiring blacks.

Wilson's own view, as he expressed it to intimates, was that federal segregation was an act of kindness. In historian Friedman's paraphrase, "Off by themselves with only a white supervisor, blacks would not be forced out of their jobs by energetic white employees."

According to Friedman, President Wilson said as much to those appalled blacks who protested his actions. He told one protesting black delegation that "segregation is not a humiliation but a benefit, and ought to be so regarded by you gentlemen." When the startled journalist William Monroe Trotter objected, Wilson essentially threw him out of the White House. "Your manner offends me," Wilson told him. Blacks all over the country complained about Wilson, but the president was unmoved. "If the colored people made a mistake in voting for me," he told The New York Times in 1914, "they ought to correct it."

Wilson appears to have perceived his presidency as an opportunity to correct history, and to restore white Americans to unambiguous supremacy. That is apparently the reason he embraced the poisonous message of D.W. Griffith's 1915 film, The Birth of a Nation; it offered a congenial narrative.

Griffith's notorious film portrays the overthrow of debasing black rule in the Reconstructionist South by the rise of the Ku Klux Klan. The film's black characters (most of them white actors in blackface) are either servile or savages; Klan members are represented as both heroic and romantic. The movie was based primarily on The Clansman, a novel written by Thomas Dixon in 1905. Not only was Dixon a personal friend of Wilson's, he had been pushing for a Wilson presidency for years, and Wilson regarded himself as being in Dixon's debt.

Wilson discharged that debt by helping Dixon and Griffith publicize their movie. He arranged for preview screenings for his cabinet, for Congress, and for the Supreme Court, and he gave Dixon and Griffith an endorsement they could exploit. "It is like writing history with lightning," Wilson said of this KKK celebration, "and my only regret is that it is all so terribly true." The first half of Wilson's endorsement is still affixed to prints of the film that are screened for film students studying Griffith's advances in editing.

Obviously, Southern hopes that Wilson could force blacks into servility were always delusional. Nevertheless, Wilson's Jim Crow presidency remained an available model for segregationists and supremacists who came later. Thurmond and his fellow Dixiecrats didn't necessarily require a model of triumphalist racism, but the point is that in Wilson they had one. The Lott Affair has been treated as if its origins lie in 1948; they don't. The past isn't dead, said Mississippian William Faulkner. "It's not even the past." He might have added that the past we attempt to grapple with usually isn't even the real past.



To: JohnM who wrote (62256)12/20/2002 4:26:01 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Good article From Hoover on the Third World Economic Problem. It correctly identifies the problem, IMO, but has no answer for it.

The Poverty Trap

Stephen Haber, Douglass C. North,
and Barry R. Weingast

If economists are so smart, why are developing countries so poor?

The past two decades have witnessed two large-scale experiments to transform centrally planned economies (such as that of the former Soviet Union), or market economies in developing countries with high levels of central planning (such as those found in Latin America in the 1950s?1980s), into economies with efficient markets. Much to everyone?s surprise, the end results of these experiments have not been sustained economic growth. The economy of the former Soviet Union sputtered and stalled and then collapsed after 1998. The economies of Latin America, with the sole exception of Chile, performed only somewhat better. Most countries have undergone periods of strong growth that are then followed by equally strong collapses, of which the recent Argentine meltdown is only one example. The GDP figures for virtually all Latin American countries tell the same story: Real per capita incomes in 2002 are at the same level that they were in 1980.

An Uneasy Marriage: Government and Markets

A major reason for these failures is that the set of market-based policies?the so-called Washington consensus?that underpinned the Russian and Latin American experiments has a fatal flaw: It assumes that it is possible to carry out economic reforms to create efficient markets without a concomitant reform in the political institutions that limit government and guarantee property rights and individual liberty.

The reason this assumption is flawed is that there is no such thing as a ?free market? independent of politics. The efficient functioning of a market requires that some individual or organization enforce contract and property rights. Without such an enforcer, transacting is a free-for-all: Everybody knows that everybody else can behave in an opportunistic fashion; therefore everybody behaves opportunistically. The inevitable result, as Thomas Hobbes warned in Leviathan, is very low levels of transacting. Moreover, in order to be credible, the individual or organization that enforces contract and property rights must be able to force people to adhere to its decisions. This necessarily implies that the enforcer is the government. In point of fact, world history offers us no case of a well-developed market system that was not embedded into a well-developed political system.

The necessary connection between government and the market creates a thorny problem. Government is crucial because it enforces contract and property rights. Yet any government that is strong enough to enforce property rights is also strong enough to abrogate them for its own benefit, either by outright expropriation or by taxing away all of the income produced by private property. Governments, in fact, have powerful incentives to do this. First, the government needs revenue for its own political survival. It must make expenditures to gain political support, and it must defend itself against internal and external enemies. Second, politically crucial constituents typically demand that the government use its power to provide them with economic benefits. Often, these benefits come at the expense of the property rights of other economic agents. They may demand, for example, that the government tax away all of the profits of their competitors and provide them with monopoly rights, protection from competition, or other special privileges.

Thus, human beings have two natural tendencies. Following Adam Smith, humans have a natural tendency to barter, truck, and trade. Second, following Thomas Hobbes, they have another equally natural tendency?to use politics to force others to transfer their wealth and sources of value.

The fundamental problem of economic development is therefore devising the appropriate means for channeling government action to support rather than predate on markets.

One approach to solving this fundamental problem of economic development is to search for political leaders who have the right kind of values and vision. The problem with this approach is that it assumes that the ability of political actors to make good decisions is a function of their personal attributes, rather than the political incentives they face. Doubtless, there have been extraordinary individuals in many countries who have made hard decisions and stood by them regardless of the personal consequences. Yet the relative economic success of the countries of the developed West over other countries cannot be attributed, over the course of several centuries, to the fact that they have larger stocks of extraordinary individuals.

Another approach to solving this fundamental problem of economic development is to remove political leaders from economic decision making. This approach underlies much of the Washington consensus. The problem with this approach is that there are strong incentives for both political decision makers and citizens to politicize the policymaking process. In point of fact, there has never been a case in world history in which political leaders did not play a key role in economic decision making. This view is therefore utopian and unrealistic.

These observations mean that the diagnosis of the problem of economic development in the literature and in the Washington consensus?namely, that development requires taking politics out of economic policy making?is wrong. Any attempt to remove politics from policy making will inevitably end in economic failure.

Vibrant markets require government, but not just any government will do. There must be institutions that limit the government from predating on the market. Solving the development problem therefore requires crafting political institutions that limit the discretion and authority of government and of individual actors within the government. That necessarily requires institutions that protect individual liberty. As Friedrich Hayek, one of the foremost students of liberty, observed, ?There is only one such principle that can preserve a free society: namely, the strict prevention of all coercion except in the enforcement of general abstract rules equally applicable to all.?

The problem in the developing world is thus as much a problem of governance as it is of economic policies that support markets. Indeed, the fundamental problem in the developing world is not that there is no protection of property rights; it is that the government may protect the property rights of some people while simultaneously abrogating or reducing the property rights of others. Too often governments in developing countries arbitrarily reallocate the property rights of some individuals to other individuals who happen to be in the governments? good graces. Governments may also craft economic policies in such a way as to increase the property rights of that select group (for example, by giving them tax exemptions or awarding them special concessions to exploit public resources).

There are times when the government can seize upon these kinds of political opportunities and turn them to its own fiscal advantage. Consider, for example, Mexico?s experience with bank privatization in the early 1990s. When the Mexican government privatized the banks, it created a banking system that was highly concentrated. From the point of view of the purchasers of the banks, this was attractive: They did not have to compete against one another. This arrangement was also attractive to the government: It could obtain more revenue than otherwise because investors will pay more for an oligopoly than they will for a firm that has to face effective competition. There was only one problem: Maximizing government revenue meant that most of the capital of the banking system went to purchase the banks; little was left to provide reserves against economic volatility. The result was a tragedy: Four years after privatization the banking system collapsed under the weight of peso devaluation. The resulting bailout cost Mexican taxpayers $100 billion, roughly 20 percent of annual Mexican GDP.

Sanctions and Incentives

Limited government is therefore necessary for economic development. But the question of how to do it is a thorny one. It preoccupied the two great seventeenth-century English philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. It loomed throughout the debates surrounding the writing of the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, it is a major theme of the Federalist Papers. In more recent times, it preoccupied the influential economists Friedrich Hayek and James Buchanan.

No simple recipe for limiting government exists. Yet two principles are clear. First, a country must create mechanisms and incentives for different branches and levels of government to impose sanctions on one another if they exceed the authority granted to them by the law. Second, these sanctions cannot be imposed in an arbitrary or ad hoc fashion: The sanction mechanisms themselves must be limited by the law. This is not to say that the sanctions cannot be harsh (indeed, if they are not harsh they are not credible sanctions).

There are essentially two ways to create these sanction mechanisms and incentives. One is a system of checks and balances that limits a strong central government. In a system like this, political competition among actors in the different branches of government provides incentives for actors to police one another?s actions. France is a good example of this kind of system.

A second way to limit government is federalism, in which different levels of government limit one another. Here the incentives to police the actions of other government actors come from the self-interest of each level of government. Imagine, for example, that local, state, and federal governments all individually tax a particular business enterprise. Each knows that increasing taxes discourages this enterprise from additional productive investment (as well as creating other economic distortions), which will ultimately limit the amount of tax that a particular level of government can extract from the firm. This means that each level of government has a strong incentive to limit the taxation of the firm by other levels of government. Concomitantly, actions by a level of government that reduce the property rights of the firm also reduce the taxes that any of the other levels of government can collect. The result is an outcome in which each level of government essentially balances the others?without the need for checks and balances within the central government. Canada is a good example of this kind of system.

The United States is an unusual combination of both kinds of systems: It contains checks and balances in the national government as well as a strong federal system. This means that the president faces multiple bodies that can check arbitrary actions, including a bicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, state and local governments, and a professional civil service that staffs executive federal agencies. The combination of both methods of limiting the authority of government provides an unusually high degree of property rights protection.

The problem in the developing world is that those countries have neither system. Federalism and checks and balances often exist on paper?as in Mexico and Argentina?but in reality they fail. Power is too concentrated in two senses: The central government has too much power over the federal system and, within the federal government, the president has too much power. These characteristics allow arbitrary behavior and hinder development.

This is not to say that the only necessities for economic development are constitutions that establish limited government?either through checks and balances or federalism. In point of fact, there are countries that have essentially mimicked the U.S. Constitution?Liberia being a case in point?but which have neither limited government nor economic growth. To make laws and constitutions work in practice requires an appropriate mix of other institutions such as an educated population with a sense of civic duty.

But no attempt at economic reform can hope to succeed if it ignores the concomitant need for political reform. Without attention to their political foundations, markets cannot flourish. Donor agencies must therefore attend to the political security of markets as well as to the economic policies creating them.

Stephen Haber is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor of political science and history at Stanford University. Douglass C. North is the Bartlett Burnap Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Barry R. Weingast is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution as well as the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor in the department of political science at Stanford.