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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: LindyBill who wrote (62726)	12/22/2002 12:48:04 AM
From: LindyBill	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Speaking of Friedman, here is his Sunday Column. Still trying to ride the Fence. December 22, 2002 The Last Cartoon By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN [S] addam Hussein has always been a unique political creature, a combination of Don Corleone and Donald Duck. He's always been capable of the most shrewd, but brutal, survival tactics, à la the Godfather, and the most cartoonish miscalculations, à la the Donald. At the moment, we are witnessing his Donald Duck side. Imagine if instead of stiffing the U.N. and U.S. by issuing a report that he had no weapons of mass destruction, Saddam had simply said: "Oh my gosh, we just found eight Scud missiles and four barrels of chemicals hidden under some blankets in the basement. I had no idea they were there! Please, take them away. I've already executed the general who was hiding them." That would have created a huge problem for the Bush war team. Instead, by playing totally (and unbelievably) innocent, Saddam is helping the U.S. make the case for war. But does that mean war is inevitable? Not yet. I believe Saddam will have one more exit opportunity, and the Bush team needs to be ready for it. I call it: "the Primakov moment." Yevgeny Primakov was the Russian envoy and K.G.B. veteran who made several trips to Baghdad in 1990-91 to try to talk Saddam out of Kuwait to avoid a war, 11th-hour diplomacy that drove the first Bush administration crazy. Saddam probably could have kept half of Kuwait had he played along with Mr. Primakov. But he wouldn't compromise and, in the end, got smashed. My guess is that we will see this play again. Before Gulf War II is launched, there will be a Russian-French or Arab delegation that flies to Baghdad and tries to persuade Saddam to spare his family, and everyone else, from a war, either by disclosing his weapons or by going into exile under Arab or European protection. Why? Because, unlike Gulf War I, too many nations don't want Gulf War II to happen. Think about it. Egypt got two-thirds of its debts to the West forgiven for participating in Gulf War I. But today Egypt is terrified about a popular backlash against a Gulf War II, and Cairo is refusing to participate. Syria reportedly got paid $1 billion from Saudi Arabia for joining Gulf War I, but the autocratic regime in Damascus has no interest in Gulf War II, because it could be the next target. Turkey got $3 billion for its help in Gulf War I, but it will only get a huge headache from Gulf War II ? which will choke its critical trade with Iraq and possibly bring a huge influx of Kurdish refugees across the Iraq-Turkey border. Iran enjoyed watching Saddam get shellacked in Gulf War I, but the last thing the Iranian hard-liners want now is Saddam toppled and a pro-U.S. Iraqi democracy next door. Saudi Arabia had to fight Gulf War I to survive. But Saudi public opinion today is strongly against this war. Ditto the Russians and Europeans, who certainly are not keen on Iraq becoming part of pax Americana, with all the economic benefits that could entail. And then there are the Iraqi Kurds. Their zone is currently protected by the U.S. no-flight regime, and, as a result, the Kurds have established their own quasi-independent state in northern Iraq, with their own oil revenues. They've never been happier and are not at all keen on having some new "democratic" regime in Baghdad emerge that tries to reassert control over them. Finally, the Sunni Muslim-dominated Arab world knows that there is not a single credible Sunni Muslim among the whole U.S.-funded Iraqi opposition front (a group of losers, who will never be accepted as legitimate in a post-Saddam Iraq and will only bring the U.S. trouble). They are virtually all Iraqi Shiites and Kurds. The Arab Sunnis are worried that if Iraq becomes a democracy, Iraq's Shiite majority ? which has always been under the thumb of Iraq's Sunni minority ? will take over and energize Shiites in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Bahrain to start challenging Sunni domination. For all these reasons, the U.S. needs to be both cool and prepared for anything. We need to be cool and let the U.N. inspections process play out ? because we have such reluctant allies in this Gulf War II, we must not appear as overanxious warriors. We still need a smoking gun to justify a war, if we expect to have any allied support. And we need to be prepared for anything, because as we approach the climax of this story, an Arab or European delegation could show up in Baghdad at any time and forge a deal for Saddam to back down or go into exile. The Don Corleone side of Saddam just might say yes. Or, once again, the Donald Duck in him will miscalculate. In which case, it will be his last cartoon.

To: LindyBill who wrote (62726)	12/30/2002 9:29:02 PM
From: Dayuhan	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

I am getting a feeling from the Public Intellectual "Fencesetters" that they are frustrated with the Arabs and leaning more and more toward "Slum Clearance." The obvious problem with this formulation is that once your “slum clearance” is done, you’re still dealing with the Arabs, and the frustration is likely continue. It’s easy to clear a slum. Making sure that the cleared area does not revert to slummery is a somewhat thornier problem, and I see no evidence that anything resembling a coherent plan for approaching that problem is in place. I see no little or no discussion at all of the specific requirements for the development of a functioning democracy in Iraq, and how they are to be provided, none at all of the risks that are likely to emerge and how they are to be managed. I don't see even the most basic rudiments of a plan. Ajami suggests, albeit obliquely, an extended period of foreign rule under a “High Commissioner”. Others suggest installing a government and getting the hell out ASAP. Each strategy has attendant risks and potential rewards, as do all variants in between. What exactly do we plan to do? How exactly do we plan to do it? Where is the discussion? Most obvious, of course, is the question of duration. Do we have the commitment to stay the course, even if it turns out to be an extended course? The example in Afghanistan is not encouraging. I sometimes get the feeling that we are prepping for a sprint and showing up for a triathlon, which is not terribly encouraging. You are so unhappy with our present leadership that I think I am detecting a hint of "Paleoconservative" in your postings… are you ready to join the "Buchanan" camp? Buchanan begins with some valid observations, though by the time he filters them through his ideological bias there is little substance left. It is very true that democracy does not necessarily, automatically, or instantly produce good government. Many countries have elected very bad governments. The results of the democratic process are unpredictable, and can often run counter to our interests and those of the nation in question. Does this mean that democracy is not possible in the developing world, or is not a valid goal? Buchanan might say so. I don’t. I would say that democratization is likely in most cases to be an extended process, often involving periods of internal instability and extreme vulnerability to outside intervention. It is likely to involve false starts: regressions back into non-democratic government as frustration with the corruption and process gridlock so common in emerging democracies sets in. None of this means that democracy is a bad thing, anywhere. After all, our own democracy did not exactly spring into being in its current form. In the early part of the industrial revolution our government was controlled by elite factions and was as corrupt as any of today’s 3rd world backwaters. Human rights? Americans kept slaves for 100 years, and virtually annihilated the nation’s indigenous population. Stability? We had to fight a civil war as ferocious as anything we’ve seen in Africa to clarify the interface between the rights of States and central government control. Did any of this mean we were not suited for democracy? No. It just meant that democracy had to grow, and we had to grow with it. If we set out to promote democracy without an acute awareness of the extended growth processes involved, we are setting ourselves up for frustration and failure. At this point I don’t even see a consensus definition of what democracy is, and how progress toward it is to be measured, let alone practical discussion of the obstacles that will emerge and the means by which we intend to address them. All this makes me wonder we aren’t proceeding with excessive hubris, assuming that because we can defeat any army, we can achieve any goal. I don’t think that’s necessarily the case. There are things armies can’t do.