The papers that cried wolf
Brian Whitaker looks at how the American media are
softening up public attitudes to war with Iraq
Monday December 16, 2002
Last week brought yet another terrifying headline from an
American newspaper: "US suspects al-Qaida got nerve agent
from Iraqis".
The 1,800-word story in the Washington Post last Thursday got
off to a reasonably promising start by saying: "The Bush
administration has received a credible report that Islamic
extremists affiliated with al-Qaida took possession of a chemical
weapon in Iraq last month or late in October, according to two
officials with firsthand knowledge of the report and its source."
Less promisingly, the second paragraph begins: "If the report
proves true ... " The remaining 28 paragraphs offer little to
suggest that it actually is true, and several reasons for thinking
it may not be. Paragraph six tells us: "Like most intelligence,
the reported chemical weapon transfer is not backed by
definitive evidence."
Paragraph eight says: "Even authorised spokesmen, with one
exception, addressed the report on the condition of anonymity.
They said the principal source on the chemical transfer was
uncorroborated, and that indications it involved a nerve agent
were open to interpretation."
In paragraph 12, we are told that the report may be connected to
a warning message circulated to American forces overseas and
an unnamed official is cited as saying that the message resulted
only from an analyst's hypothetical concern.
As one would expect from the Washington Post, the story is
carefully written and meticulously researched. But it's basically
worthless.
The reporter had clearly spoken to a lot of different people but he
failed - not for want of effort - to substantiate the claim that Iraq
provided al-Qaida with nerve gas. Although some officials were
happy to describe the claim as "credible", none appeared willing
to stand up and say that they, personally, believed it.
The sensible course of action at that stage would have been to
abandon the story, or at least file it away in the hope of more
evidence coming to light. That might have happened with any
other story, but in the case of Iraq at present the temptation to
publish is hard to resist.
This particular story was more tempting than many because it
carried, as the American military would say, a multiple warhead.
It not only suggested that Iraq - contrary to its recent declaration
- does possess chemical weapons but, additionally, that it has
close links with al-Qaida.
The effect, if not the intention, of publishing the story was to give
currency to both these ideas. Stories in the Washington Post
are instantly regurgitated by other news organisations around
the world, usually at much shorter length and without all the
cautionary nuances of the original.
Iraq itself helped the story along by issuing a denial which -
since it could produce no evidence by way of rebuttal - simply
sounded unconvincing.
The Post's story is also discussed on the BBC website. Under
the headline "Wanted: an Iraqi link to al-Qaida ", Paul Reynolds,
the website's world affairs correspondent, views it as part of a
long and unsuccessful effort to link Iraq with al-Qaida.
"One of the most intriguing questions in the 'war on terrorism',"
he writes, "is whether there are contacts between Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaida network.
Intelligence agencies are constantly looking for the 'missing
link'."
The quotation marks around "missing link" distance the BBC
from the idea that such a link exists, though the definite article
preceding it suggests otherwise. Why are intelligence agencies
looking for "the" missing link and not "a" missing link?
Journalistically, it's more interesting to talk about a "missing"
link than a "possible" link but even when the tone of discussion
is sceptical - as it was in the BBC's case - there's still a drip
effect. The more we mention missing links, the more people will
assume they are out there somewhere, waiting to be found.
The risk of giving currency to false or questionable claims is now
a daily problem for those of us who try to write about Iraq without
turning into other people's weapons of mass deception.
Even a simple reference to Iraq's weaponry can be problematic.
Some readers object that "weapons of mass destruction" is a
tendentious phrase. "Chemical, biological and nuclear" is
accurately descriptive, though it becomes too much of a
mouthful when used repeatedly in a story. Reuters news agency
and others increasingly - and rather emotively - talk about
"doomsday weapons". In practice, "doomsday" is beginning to
mean anything nasty possessed by Iraq, though not by the
United States.
Last Wednesday, for example, a Reuters report stated: "The
United States threatened possible nuclear retaliation against
Iraq if its forces or allies were attacked with doomsday
weapons." Let's see how that looks the other way round: "The
United States threatened retaliation with doomsday weapons
against Iraq if its forces or allies were attacked with chemicals."
In terms of mass death, it takes 28 Halabjas to make one
Hiroshima.
Meanwhile, to the delight of pharmaceutical companies, the
United States is pressing ahead with its smallpox vaccination
programme - though the recent New York Times "scoop" about
an Iraqi smallpox threat looks increasingly shaky. On December
3, Judith Miller, the paper's "bioterrorism expert" reported an
unverified claim that a Russian scientist, who once had access
to the Soviet Union's entire collection of 120 strains of smallpox,
may have visited Iraq in 1990 and may have provided the Iraqis
with a version of the virus that could be resistant to vaccines and
could be more easily transmitted as a biological weapon. (See
"Poisoning the Air", World Dispatch, December 9.)
Since the article was published, colleagues of the now-dead
scientist, Nelja Maltseva, have said that she last visited Iraq in
1971-72 (as part of a global smallpox eradication effort) and last
travelled abroad (to Finland) in 1982.
Another of Ms Miller's scoops, on November 12, cited "senior
Bush administration officials" as saying that Iraq had ordered a
million doses of atropine, which is an antidote to nerve gas, but
also a routine drug for treating heart patients. This was
interpreted as evidence that Iraq not only possesses nerve gas
but intends to use it in a conflict with the United States - hence
the need to protect its own forces from accidental injury.
The US then threatened to block a continuation of Iraq's
oil-for-food programme unless atropine were included in the list
of "suspect" items that Iraq cannot import without permission
from the United Nations' sanctions committee.
As I pointed out in world dispatch last week, the sudden horror
Over atropine was very strange, given that the US had previously
allowed Iraq to buy large quantities on normal medical grounds,
and that UN had lifted all restrictions on Iraqi purchases of the
drug only six months earlier.
This highly relevant information, which Ms Miller had failed to
mention, eventually found its way into the Washington Post and
the wires of Associated Press. The response from the New York
Times was to run the Associated Press report without reference
to Ms Miller's flawed scoop.
By no means do all the dubious scare stories about Iraq come
from shadowy intelligence sources or officials who can't be
named.
Last September, Turkish police announced the arrest of two
men in a taxi who were apparently smuggling 35lb of
weapons-grade uranium to Iraq from somewhere near the Syrian
border. But a few days later it emerged that the material was
harmless, containing only zinc, iron, zirconium and manganese.
Its actual weight was only 5lb but the police, in their excitement,
had weighed the lead container as well.
One day, perhaps, one of these scare stories may turn out to be
true - but don't hold your breath waiting for it. In the meantime,
readers are welcome to send more examples by email, to the
address below.
Useful links
Washington Post: U.S. Suspects Al Qaeda Got Nerve Agent
From Iraqis
BBC: Wanted: an Iraqi link to al-Qaeda
al-bab.com - Brian Whitaker's website
Email
brian.whitaker@guardian.co.uk
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