Projection on Fall Of Hussein Disputed
Ground Forces Chiefs, Pentagon at Odds
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, December 18, 2002; Page
A01
With war possible soon in Iraq,
the chiefs of the two U.S. ground
forces are challenging the belief
of some senior Pentagon
civilians that Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein will fall almost
immediately upon being attacked
and are calling for more
attention to planning for
worst-case scenarios, Defense
Department officials said.
The U.S. war plan for a possible
attack on Iraq, which has been
almost a year in the making,
calls for a fast-moving ground
attack without an overwhelming
number of reinforcements on
hand. Instead, some follow-on
troops would be flown into Iraq
from outside the region. Among
other things, this "rolling start"
would seek to achieve tactical
surprise by launching an attack
before the U.S. military appears
ready to do so.
In addition, the plan calls for
some armored units, instead of
traveling a predetermined
distance and pausing to allow
slow-moving supply trucks to
catch up, to charge across Iraq
until they run into armed
opposition and then engage in
combat, officials said.
Those aspects of the plan, which
appear riskier than usual U.S.
military practice, worry the chief
of the Army, Gen. Eric Shinseki,
and the commandant of the
Marine Corps, Gen. James L.
Jones, defense officials said.
Shinseki and Jones, who as
service chiefs are members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have
questioned the contention of
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
D. Wolfowitz and other top
officials that Hussein's
government is likely to collapse
almost as soon as a U.S. attack
is launched, the officials said.
The two generals are concerned
that the Wolfowitz school may
underestimate the risks
involved, the officials said. They
have argued that planning
should prepare thoroughly for
worst-case scenarios, most
notably one that planners have
labeled "Fortress Baghdad," in
which Hussein withdraws his
most loyal forces into the Iraqi
capital and challenges the
United States to enter into
protracted street fighting,
perhaps involving chemical or
biological weapons.
In an interview last night,
Wolfowitz rejected the view that
he has been overoptimistic in his
views. He said he also believes that, "You've got to be prepared for the worst case."
He added: "It would be a terrible mistake for anyone to think they can predict with
confidence what the course of a war is going to be." In discussions of the war plan,
he said, he has repeatedly emphasized the risk of Hussein "using his most
terrible weapons."
The dispute, which is taking place mainly in secret reviews of the war plan,
promises to be the last major issue in the Pentagon's consideration of that plan,
as more signs point toward forces being ready to launch a wide-ranging, highly
synchronized ground and air attack in six to eight weeks. Psychological
operations, such as leafleting and broadcasting into Iraq, have been stepped up
lately, and there is talk at the Pentagon of large-scale troop movements or
mobilizations being announced soon after the holidays.
The debate became more open last week when Jones alluded to it in comments
made at a dinner held in his honor by former defense secretary William S. Cohen.
Jones is scheduled next month to leave the Marine post to become the
commander of U.S. military forces in Europe. At that dinner, Jones indicated that
he and other senior officers did not share the "optimism" of others about the ease
of fighting in Iraq.
In an interview, Jones said that he did not name who he thought was being overly
optimistic. "I did not say, 'folks at the Pentagon,' " he said. "I said I didn't align
myself with folks around town who seem to think that this is preordained to be a
very easy military operation."
If a victory were swiftly won, he continued: "It is to be celebrated. But military
planners should always plan for the worst case." He insisted that in his remarks
he had not expressed a conclusion about how quickly Hussein might fall.
He said he believed that he and Shinseki, the Army chief, "are of the same view
on this."
If anything, the Army's leadership is even more worried than Jones, said a senior
officer who sides with the Wolfowitz view. "The Army really is conservative on
this," he said dismissively.
The Army also has qualms about the likely burden of postwar peacekeeping in Iraq
-- a mission that is likely to be executed mainly by the Army. "They're concerned
they're going to be left holding the bag after everyone else has gone home," said
Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer who is now director of the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a small but influential defense think tank.
The chief of the Air Force, Gen. John P. Jumper, is said to side with the Wolfowitz
view, believing that the opening round of bombing, combined with an intense
propaganda campaign and Special Operations attacks, is likely to topple the
government quickly. The fourth service chief, the Navy's Adm. VernClark, sides
with Jumper, but not as emphatically, officials said.
The influence of the Joint Chiefs on military policy appears to have diminished
under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, so it is not clear what effect the
recent round of questioning will have on the war plan.
Former House speaker Newt Gingrich, a Rumsfeld confidant, predicted that it
would have little. "If the chiefs wanted to be extremely cautious, extremely
conservative and design a risk-avoiding strategy, that would be nothing new," he
said in an interview.
Gingrich, who also is a member of the Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory
panel, said he was confident that Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the commander of
U.S. forces in the Mideast, would not be swayed by suggestions that he include
more reinforcements and plan a more cautious attack. Franks, he said, "will
probably have a more integrated, more aggressive and more risk-taking plan."
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