To: i-node who wrote (157081 ) 12/30/2002 5:43:24 PM From: hmaly Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1580419 David Re..The stakes are higher now. And while I have no problem with the nature of the deal Carter cut, there is a critical missing element: Verifiability. The fact that this element is missing means the agreement was destined to fail. Frankly, that is a bit much, to expect Carter to have been able to draw up a treaty whereby it would have been impossible for NK to cheat on the agreement. Even if it would have been possible, it would have been the minions working in the back room who take care of the finer points. Also, as the article shows, Carters agreement did basically what it was intended to do, buy time until NK implodes on its own. Here is another article. I like this part. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/DL20Dg03.html The North Koreans, however, failed to grasp fully their irrelevance in global politics. North Korea is important only as long as China or Russia is backing it; otherwise, Pyongyang is just a blot on the map. However ugly the reality might be, North Korea has no strategic value per se. It has no oil, like Iraq or Iran, and even if it blocks land routes between Japan and China, it has already been doing so for 60 years - waiting a little longer to unblock these routes won't change a thing. To make sure where things were standing during the visit to China in late November of Russian President Vladimir Putin, China and Russia reaffirmed their commitment for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. In other words North Korea was alone in its development of an atom bomb. The United States didn't rise to the North Korean bait, and cut its fuel aid. This would possibly not have a great impact by itself, as the US fuel accounts for just a fraction of North Korean consumption, but it could trigger a cumulative effect that would, once more, make life difficult for the North. In other words, the United States was saying that it didn't trust North Korea again. Pyongyang cheated in 1992, by developing arms against the agreements, and would do so in the future. The US did not believe either that North Korea would use the bomb, as any move in that direction could be detected and would bring about the physical end of Kim Jong-il and all his minions, as is likely to occur in Iraq with Saddam Hussein. So without the once-guaranteed support of China and Russia, North Korea could be left festering on its own. The only tool left in Kim Jong-il's hands was the civilian population, whose daily welfare, malnutrition, cold and other sufferings are held like human shields in defense of the leadership in Pyongyang. But the threat of killing one's own people to arouse the attention of a government that strictly speaking has nothing to do with those people has never been very compelling, although the missionary spirit is deeply ingrained in the American raison d'etre. On the other hand China's irritation with North Korea has brought Beijing and Washington even closer, and this could be the real turning point of the game. North Korea exists because Russia and China wanted a buffer state, a pressure point against the Americans sitting in South Korea. But Pyongyang's survival always depended on Beijing's and Moscow's goodwill. With the weakening of Russia's international influence and rise of China's, further strengthened by its geographic and cultural proximity, Beijing was more important. I think it is a great strategic article. We here on the board all too often think in terms of Rep vs dem. whereas the president really needs to have a global focus. Articles like this bring out the whole picture. We are just focusing on the minutiae, of a certain point in time. The president must look at the whole picture, and that is what strategic think tanks do; put everything in a global perspective; whereas political advisors try to adjust global strategies to political realities. I see what you're saying. I suppose I anticipate hearing, "You're right, I'm wrong". I've said it before (not often, though<g>), but I haven't heard that from Ted. He either quietly ignores the post or gives a subtle capitulation as you suggest. Ah then you concede and will send the money. As soon as I get it, I can send Ted his half. <g>