Korea through a Chinese glass
worldtribune.com
December 30, 2002
The current Korea crisis may well force the Bush Administration to hone its China policy for only Beijing can effectively rein in Kim Il Jong and his game of nuclear Russian roulette.
True, a finely coordinated strategy among the other main players – Seoul, Tokyo and Washington – could wait out Pyongyang; that is, hold up aid to the tottering Pyongyang regime [entering a new famine which has already cost two million lives]. Steel nerves could wait out the lead-time necessary for Pyongyang to create additional nuclear weapons. That, of course, would require more realism and nerve than has been shown by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi – willing to go to Pyongyang to kowtow even after Washington told him about Pyongyang’s new nuclear weapons program. And President-elect Roh, at least until the past few days continuing to propagate President Kim’s failed “sunshine policy” to buy off Kim Il Jong, would have to be brought around.
But, ultimately, the North Korean regime survives on aid from China. Furthermore, the Chinese aided North Korea’s missiles program – which relatively soon might be able to deliver a nuclear weapon to Alaska, Hawaii, and the West Coast. Could Beijing have been unaware of nuclear technology transfers to the North Koreans by their longtime ally, the Pakistanis, especially since former President Bhutto apparently initiated them during a detour on a 1993 China visit? And a Bangkok Overseas Chinese firm with People’s Liberation Army connections is said to play middleman in sales of North Korean missiles to Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Libya – and, as recent events proved, Yemen.
Although North Korea’s Kim has taken a liking for Russian travel, despite Putin’s puffery it seems unlikely Moscow, North Korea’s one-time foil to Beijing, could play an important role. Recent events in Moscow and Chechnya prove Putin has neither the military nor logistics competence, particularly in the crippled Russian Far East [where Chinese encroachment is one of Moscow’s principle problems].
That leaves China. Washington gurus repeat a mantra that China, as well as South Korea, Japan, and the U.S., does not want a nuclearized Korean Peninsula. That may be. But is Beijing prepared to step into the breach, either in concert with the U.S. and its allies, or on its own, to restrain Kim? A decade ago my Chinese interlocutors who set up an early Americans’ visit to Pyongyang joked about their limited influence over their fellow Communists. That could well be true now, at a point when Kim and his generals are closer than ever to a decision to risk a dangerous transition, or to continue an equally dangerous balancing act in which the regime’s resources go to its million-man military and missiles and nuclear program.
It cannot be an easy decision for Beijing. Successful Chinese pressure on Pyongyang could be the final nail in the coffin of the ultra-Stalinist regime. Policy indecision/change in Pyongyang could result in a sudden implosion, much as came in East Germany after Gorbachev set it adrift. Resulting Korean reunification would present Beijing with a whole set of new circumstances. Not the least, it might disrupt rapidly growing South Korean-China high technology trade so important to Beijing’s economy. A decision to take a tough line to Pyongyang might be difficult for China for other complex reasons. President Jiang Zemin, who despite Hu Jintao’s recent elevation to the Chinese Communist Party secretary-generalship, remains “supremo” as chairman of the Central Military Commission, apparently made an offer to President Bush at their meeting at Crawford, TX, last fall to remove his missiles buildup opposite Taiwan if the U.S. would welch on its commitment for new defensive weapons to Taipei. Would the Chinese be willing to offer – and could they deliver -- defusing the North Korean nuclear threat as part of such a “bargain”? Perhaps even more important, in the continuing struggle for succession, are Korean nukes embroiled in Jiang’s intra-Party [and intra-military?] attempt to hang on to power?
We may get some indication of where Beijing stands if Washington goes ahead to take the International Atomic Energy Agency’s expulsion from North Korea to the UN Security Council. There China would have to face the choice of supporting action to halt the North Korean nuclear program – for example, by the threat of UN sanctions–, abstain, or use its veto against such action All this speculation, in turn, means Washington has to prioritize its relations with China with far more acuity than in the recent past. If China offers some deal on North Korea, what price would the U.S. be willing to pay in its long list of issues with Beijing – human rights, the growing enormous trade imbalance, dual technology transfers which have enhanced Chinese weaponry, WMD proliferation, Chinese access to U.S. financial markets, etc., etc.? |
