Thank God you are back! Even Sandy Berger is getting warlike. From the WP.
washingtonpost.com
Two Crises, No Back Burner
By Samuel R. Berger and Robert L. Gallucci
Tuesday, December 31, 2002; Page A17
The rapid escalation of the nuclear issue by North Korea -- at a critical moment in our confrontation with Iraq -- requires that we deal with both developing crises at once. There are no safe back burners.
North Korea is taking steps to restart plutonium production and reprocessing that was frozen under the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea. Within a matter of months, the North could have enough plutonium to produce five to six nuclear weapons, while continuing to produce more in its newly refueled reactor. A North Korea with a burgeoning nuclear arsenal, a long-range missile program and a record of selling weapons technology to others is a dangerous prospect -- for the direct threat it poses and the potential cascade of nuclear proliferation it could unleash in Northeast Asia.
Does that mean the United States should switch its focus from Iraq to North Korea? Iraq's nuclear program -- which many consider the most serious strategic threat the country poses to us -- is not nearly so far along. Iraqi nuclear weapons in the near term cannot be ruled out, but they are not likely. Nevertheless, putting Iraq on hold to deal with North Korea would have serious consequences. It would send a chilling message that the United States can be knocked off course in one arena by troublemaking in another. It would drive any expectation of the constancy of our purpose into a tailspin. The president has invested American credibility in disarming Iraq. The prospect of a nuclear Iraq, which would profoundly change the political landscape of a critical region, is strategically unacceptable to us. In the absence of voluntary disarmament, sidestepping Iraq now would be an emboldening victory for Saddam Hussein, making it even more difficult to deal with him later.
Conversely, some argue that the crisis in North Korea means we should accelerate our actions in Iraq -- get it over with quickly so we then can turn our attention to North Korea. If this means military action before we have convinced a broad international coalition of the legitimacy of such action, or planning a quick departure from Iraq before the hard work of stabilizing a post-Hussein environment is done, it would be a serious mistake. The success of a war with Iraq will be measured by its long-term consequences for our security and the security of the region, not by how quickly we get in and get out.
The administration's approach -- which appears to be "Iraq first, North Korea later" -- is equally unrealistic. If the North continues its rapid escalation, it could be building and dispersing a nuclear weapons arsenal within months. The Asia Pacific region would be a far more dangerous place.
So how do we manage two crises of this importance at the same time?
First, let's understand that none of the options is without risk. That doesn't solve the problem, but it helps cut down on self-righteousness from all quarters.
Second, we should press ahead with building the record of Hussein's intransigence, even as we build our military capacity in the region. By broadening the international coalition for disarming Hussein, we either will drive him into a corner where he -- or those around him -- will choose to avoid the coming tide and genuinely disarm, or we will have stronger footing for military action.
Third, on North Korea, our initial task is to close the serious gap with our South Korean ally that has opened and widened over the past two years, one that is now being exploited by the North. If the United States and South Korea do not act in concert, all of our options are undercut -- isolating the North by cutting off economic and diplomatic contacts, as well as military options that are virtually inconceivable without solidarity with the South. We need to fashion a course that reverses the current dynamic driving us and our allies in the region apart, and create a new dynamic that puts pressure on North Korea, not us.
South Korea wants us to engage with the North to resolve the confrontation. But we cannot reward the North for contemptuous behavior, including violating the Agreed Framework. Engagement with the North, direct or indirect, should be about more than restoring the status quo ante; we need to engage the North on concrete verifiable actions that go beyond the Agreed Framework and move the peninsula to greater security, not greater danger.
First, North Korea should be required to deal with its past now. The Agreed Framework deferred resolution of the North's history from the 1980s -- when it most likely produced enough plutonium for one or two weapons -- until later in the process of implementation. Under any new arrangement, this fissile material would have to be accounted for and safeguarded now, and any weapons disassembled, as was done by South Africa.
Second, the North must accept nationwide verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be supported by the most sophisticated monitoring technologies, intelligence from the United States and others and the right to conduct inspections anywhere in the country. This would make it far more difficult for the North to engage in illicit nuclear activities.
Third, the spent fuel containing plutonium accumulated in the past, which is, under the 1994 Agreement, sealed in canisters for shipment out of the country later, should be removed now. That material represents the quickest route to nuclear weapons for the North.
The extent to which North Korea is able to end its isolation from the United States and the rest of the world should not just depend on its willingness to step back from the threatening actions of the past several days and give up its clandestine enrichment program; it must be willing to step forward to resolve its past nuclear history and open its future behavior to comprehensive and verifiable international scrutiny. If it does, other issues between us can be addressed and steps toward a more normal relationship with us are achievable. This course is not without risks. But the support for a regional cutoff of all significant contacts -- or for more robust options -- is unlikely if we do not make such an effort.
We face a challenging moment, with a great deal at stake both in Iraq and North Korea. The future of each lies in the hands of its leaders -- but we can shape their choices. We cannot deal with one now and wait to deal with the other later. Firmness is essential, but rigidity is likely to drive our allies away from us, not toward a common stand.
Samuel R. Berger was national security adviser in the Clinton administration and is chairman of Stonebridge International, a global strategy firm. Robert L. Gallucci, former chief U.S. negotiator of the Agreed Framework, is dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. |
