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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: TimF who wrote (157388)	1/3/2003 7:44:38 PM
From: tejek	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 1582729

I didn't say you should feel good. I was just responding to your implied claim of my arrogance. Which BTW even if true would amount to an example of the ad-hominem logical fallacy rather then a refutation of my point. To repeat the point we did not quickly or consistently apply overwhelming force in Vietnam. Yes, from what I read, it started out as a peacekeeping move that was supposed to be a relatively easy operation....then escalated into a war. I think if we get involved in a real war (as opposed to a small peace keeping operation) we should do what it takes to win. If we are not willing to do what it takes to win that we should stay out. I don't get anywhere in the history of the Vietnamese War that there was a real lack of commitment until the very end. I am not sure you read my post very carefully......my attack wasn't vague or unfocused. Your point to Ray was not vague or unfocused. Your response to my point was or at least was focused on me rather then what I said. In my sarcasm it might have seemed focused on you but the real focus of my second post was when I discussed the jungle terrain and the difficulty we had fighing in that environment. I have always understood that that was the real issue for our defeat in the Vietnamese War. Of course, what D. Ray has conveniently forgotten is that it was concluded at the end of the Vietnam War the reason we lost was because we were unfamiliar with jungle terrain and the kind of fighting that it requires. The terrain was certainly an issue but the main thing is our enemy was more commited to win then we where. I really question this view. I don't underestimate the importance of commitment and certainly, the Vietnamese were playing on their home turf but Americans have a huge hero complex. We expect to win. The commitment may have waned near the end but I don't think this issue was the crux of the problem. Despite are relative unfamiliarity with the jungle we outfought the Vietnamese communists again and again. They never won anything that could be called a major battle against us and it was rare for them to win a minor battle or anything more then a quick skirmish or ambush. But that's runs to the heart of the issue.....jungle fighting didn't lend itself to major battles but rather small skirmishes, and particularly ambushes because of the jungle foliage. Tet is often looked on as a defeat for the US and it was in terms of its political impact at home but militarily the communists where shattered by Tet and our response. But we never followed up military wins by pressing harder to take advantage of the situation. And why was that? Then you step in with your unsupported claim that in the Vietnam War [and apparently no other war].....guys were sent to the front on tours and therefore the total manpower shown on the link is incorrect and does not reflect the true totals of that war. I didn't say the total manpower number was incorrect. I said or at least implied it was misleading. The number is correct but just looking at the total number that ever went to Vietnam gives a misleading impression of how many people we had fighting in Vietnam at any time. Its foolish to argue this point because neither of us know for sure how they arrived at the head count on that link. Now, what's interesting is that it doesn't tell you on the link how they calculate their manpower numbers......your assuming your position is correct. It doesn't have to tell me on the link. I know how tours in Vietnam worked and how it was different in WWI or WWII or Korea. The link said it mentioned the total number service members world wide at the time and the total deployed to South East Asia. Those figures are simple. What it doesn't list is the maximum that was deployed at any one time or the average amount deployed during the conflict. The peak deployment was 543 thousand in April of 69. The peak deployment in the Gulf war was slightly higher at about 560k . In WWI and WWII and Korea the peak number is a higher percentage of the total number because most of the people sent to combat where there for the duration. I am less concerned about this issue because I feel comfortable with the notion that the amount of resources was not the reason for our defeat. Further, if you look at the numbers of deaths in the Vietnam War, the number is higher than even the number for the Korean War which had an even higher manpower total. Mainly because Vietnam lasted so much longer then Korea. Good point. But as I pointed out before the total number that fought, or I would add even the amount fighting at an particular time is not an indication of overwhelming force. Overwhelming force has to be force applied in such a way as to overwhelm the enemy. I am not sure that was possible again because of the jungle terrain and the level of successful camouflage the Vietnamese used. When he is hurt or weak you just pound on him harder. In Vietnam we were strategically on the defense. We didn't seek out the enemies center to destroy it, rather we left North Vietnam as a haven subject only to bombing not invasion, and even the bombing had numerous halts and many off limits militarily important targets. We applied a lot of force and sent many people to fight but the force we used was applied in such a way that the enemy would never be totally overwhelmed. Apparently the thought was that we could hurt the enemy a bit and then they would sue for peace but they never did push for peace except as a delaying tactic or for peace on their terms rather then ours or some acceptable middle ground. That seems to be very strange reasoning. Its not unlike Bush Sr. pulling his punch in Kuwait. Maybe its an American aberration.......we hesitate to inflict the coup de gras. ted

To: TimF who wrote (157388)	1/4/2003 11:03:59 PM
From: i-node	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 1582729

The terrain was certainly an issue but the main thing is our enemy was more commited to win then we where. There were incidents on the Ho Chi Minh trail where artillery drawn by VC would get stuck in the mud, and one or more VC would literally lie down in the ruts, allowing themselves to be used as human boards, crushed to death, to allow a piece of artillery to be pulled out of the mud. That's commitment. But the lack of commitment on our part was NOT with our soldiers. In fact, early on, our soldiers were extremely committed to the effort. It was only after LBJ failed to make the true committment to the war that was necessary to win it that our troops became disillusioned, and which bred the disillusionment at home. Ted is quite confused on this matter. I'm guess he is too young to remember it. Estes has written on the subject that we had the resources, but we just weren't allowed to use them. This is totally consistent with the often-expressed views of Colin Powell, Hackworth, and even Schwartzkopf.