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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Dayuhan who wrote (65075)1/9/2003 5:30:55 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 281500
 
Ann Coulter's take on the North Korea debacle.

Axis of stupidity

When President Bush included North Korea in the axis of evil last year, foreign policy experts concluded that he was a moron. On the basis of years of scholarship and close study, the experts pointed out that Iran, Iraq and North Korea were -- I quote -- "different countries." As Tony Cordesman, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explained, "these are three very different countries here." USA Today sniffed that there was no axis because, "The countries have more differences than similarities." Koreans don't even look like Iranians.

Moreover, as the ponderer class repeatedly reminded us, President Clinton had struck up a brilliant agreement with the North Koreans in 1994, with guidance from Nobel Peace Prize-winner Jimmy Carter. The deal consisted of this fair trade: The Clinton administration promised North Korea 500,000 tons of fuel oil annually and $4 billion to construct a pair of nuclear reactors for "electricity"; in exchange, North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

We were assured that the North Koreans had been peaceful little lambs since then. As Clinton himself said of North Korea, "I figure I left the next administration with a big foreign policy win." Alas, he said, Bush had squandered that "win." Clinton's secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, concurred: "When we left office, we left on the table the potential of a verifiable agreement to stop the export (from North Korea) of missile technology."

USA Today said that "even critics concede the regime seems to have kept its promises so far regarding nuclear weapons and missile tests." But Bush had botched the peace agreement with his "hot-war posturing" -- "a simplistic policy of hubris that alienates allies and inflames problems that can be managed more benignly."

The principal area of disagreement among the ponderers was what on earth could have provoked Bush to call North Korea part of the axis of evil in the first place. One popular explanation was ... Enron! Antony Blinken, a Clinton national security staffer, said Bush's axis of evil gambit was intended to distract the public's attention from "things less comfortable, like the economy and the Enron scandal."

Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, took a break from denouncing America's treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo to opine that "Bush's State of the Union speech was best understood by the fact that there are mid-term congressional elections coming up in November."

Robert Scheer wrote in the Los Angeles Times that Bush's axis of evil drivel was the "rationale for a grossly expanded military budget." Throwing North Korea into the mix was an obvious scam, Scheer said, because, "North Korea is a tottering relic of a state whose nuclear operation was about to be bought off under the skilled leadership of the South Korean government when Bush jettisoned the deal."

And then in October 2002, the North Koreans admitted that immediately after signing Clinton's 1994 "peace" agreement, they had set to work building nuclear weapons. A few months after that, U.S. intelligence forces tracked an unmarked ship carrying Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen.

It was beginning to look like an "axis of evil." The experts had never paused to consider the possibility that Bush had called North Korea part of an "axis of evil" because North Korea was part of an axis of evil.

With impeccable timing, just two weeks before North Korea admitted it had been feverishly developing nuclear weapons since the mid-'90s, New York Times columnist Bill Keller snootily referred to North Korea as among "the countries the White House insists on calling the axis of evil."

A week later -- or one week before North Korea owned up to its nuclear weapons program -- Keller's op-ed rival at the Times, Nicholas Kristof, wrote: "In 1994 the vogue threat changed, and hawks pressed hard for a military confrontation with North Korea. ... In retrospect, it is clear that the hawks were wrong about confronting North Korea. Containment and deterrence so far have worked instead, kind of, just as they have kind-of worked to restrain Iraq over the last 11 years, and we saved thousands of lives by pressing diplomatic solutions."

Instead of owning up to their ludicrous attacks on Bush and unrestrained praise for Clinton's "peace" agreement, the ponderers once again concluded that Bush was a moron. Bush, it seems, had somehow provoked the North Koreans to build nuclear weapons by being mean to them. Robert J. Einhorn, who helped negotiate Clinton's masterful 1994 peace deal, said Bush's "tough rhetoric" had "unnerved the North Koreans." Derek Mitchell, another veteran of the Clinton administration, agreed: "We did call them the 'axis of evil.'"

Time magazine was a rare voice of honesty amid the claptrap. "In January, Bush said the three states were seeking weapons of mass destruction and posed a grave and growing danger." On the evidence, Time said, "he's right."



To: Dayuhan who wrote (65075)1/9/2003 11:11:06 AM
From: JohnM  Respond to of 281500
 
Steven,

Terrific riff on the Times piece on US post invasion Iraqi plans. It belongs on our refrigerator as a check list to keep issues in mind as that period of all this progresses.



To: Dayuhan who wrote (65075)1/9/2003 11:39:32 AM
From: Win Smith  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 

When a Kleptocratic, Megalomaniacal Dictator Goes Bad
nytimes.com

[ that was quite a note, Steven. With which I am largely in agreement. "Democracy in Iraq" has been one of the three main pillars of the war marketing plan, but there's no indication I can see that it'll be easy. Rather than a point-by-point ataboy, I will broaden things a little by tying in this other article from the NYT magazine. ]

( from the NYT article JohnM noted, nytimes.com )

Only "key" senior officials of the Hussein government "would need to be removed and called to account," according to an administration document summarizing plans for war trials. People in the Iraqi hierarchy who help bring down the government may be offered leniency.

The administration plan says, "Government elements closely identified with Saddam's regime, such as the revolutionary courts or the special security organization, will be eliminated, but much of the rest of the government will be reformed and kept."


SR's take on that:

This is going to be a problem, probably a big one. Actually it will be several problems. The first, of course, revolves around the populations that bore the brunt of Saddam’s oppression. They are not going to be at all happy about seeing the people who participated in genocide at the ground level being let off. They will want revenge, or justice, or something like it, and some effort will have to be made to go beyond the people who gave the orders and remove individuals who held key roles in the implementation process.

As I’ve mentioned before, we also have to decide what to do with the people who used to be in the intelligence services, the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the police, and other key elements of Saddam’s administration. Many of these institutions will be disbanded, but the individuals that composed them will be at large and will remain connected. Together, they form a significant antidemocratic power bloc. They will also be targeted for recruitment by terrorist organizations and local antidemocratic politicians.

Other problems are more complex. Bureaucracies almost always reflect the character of the government that created them. If the government is authoritarian, corrupt, paranoid, and nepotistic, the bureaucracy will reflect that. I am quite sure that the existing Iraqi bureaucracy exhibits all these characteristics, and that key posts at all levels are dominated by Sunnis and Tikritis. Leaving this bureaucracy intact is going to create an extremely difficult challenge for the occupation government and whatever Iraqi government succeeds it, particularly if that government is not dominated by Sunnis and Tikritis. Easy to say that much of the government "will be reformed and kept". Actually reforming it will be a whole lot harder.


From the NYT article on Turkmenistan:

Like the other formerly Soviet republics in the Central Asian tinderbox, Turkmenistan has made the transition to freedom only in the sense that it is ruled now by a local dictator rather than by one in Moscow. Turkmenistan also shares with its neighbors rampant corruption and economic calcification masked by wealth from natural resources -- in Turkmenistan's case, plentiful reserves of natural gas. But even in this unstable region, which has suddenly become a focal point for the war on terrorism, Turkmenistan stands apart. A year or two ago, it was a wobbly country ruled by a profoundly weird and corrupt but apparently benign dictator. More recently, things have grown even weirder, and darker.

The whole story is very depressing. The "nation building lite" plan for Iraq might work better, but leaving much of anything from the existing regime in place seems like a pretty bad idea, as you say. Then again, the alternative is not real clear. On the other other hand, there's the locally favored "Arab Mind" theory, I don't know how any of the local purveyors of that line of thought can consistently argue that Iraq will be governable at all.

On a vaguely related note, there were these depressing figures from Ignatieff's big article, nytimes.com

Each month the United States spends an estimated $1 billion on military operations in Afghanistan and only $25 million on aid.

Spending $1 billion a month in Afghanistan, where there are maybe a few hundred American military on the ground, and where by all indications things haven't gone all that well on the nation-building front , does not give me a good feeling about the likely long term costs of the Iraq operation.