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To: Mark_H who wrote (1053)1/29/2003 1:20:40 PM
From: tonto  Respond to of 1156
 
The Gadfly of Trinity Place
Edward Manfredonia has been crying in the Amex wilderness

His friends had warned him to stay away. But on Feb. 9, 1999, Edward R. Manfredonia decided to take a chance. For the first time in eight years, he walked through the front door of 86 Trinity Place, headquarters of the American Stock Exchange Inc., and asked to use the library on the fifth floor.

The Amex library is open to the public. Anybody who walks in off the street can just drop by and use it without even calling ahead. The visitor standing directly behind Manfredonia had no trouble getting a visitor's pass to use the library. But not Manfredonia. After waiting 20 minutes, the answer came down from an Amex manager: No. Manfredonia could use the library only if he were accompanied by a security guard, who would watch him while he was there. No one was available to keep an eye on him, so he had to leave. ''They let all kinds into this building,'' said one of the guards. ''I don't see why you should be the exception.''

But the real reason was made plain in the lobby of the Amex building. While Manfredonia was kept waiting, a trader on the floor of the exchange came by and said hello. Then another. And then others. Some were merely acquaintances. But others were contacts who had provided Manfredonia, at considerable risk to themselves, sensitive information about the inner workings of the exchange.

VOCAL THORN. That is what makes the diminutive, 51-year-old Manfredonia persona non grata at the American Stock Exchange. For the past eight years he has become a familiar figure in the vicinity of the Amex building. Talking to people. And then going home and writing letters. This former Amex trader works full-time with one aim in mind--to ferret out wrongdoing on the American Stock Exchange and pass it on to anyone who will listen.

Amex Chairman Richard F. Syron says that Manfredonia has made ''wild'' accusations and that the volume and extreme tone of his letters have hurt his credibility. And other Amex officials had little to say about Manfredonia on the record, though privately they sought to discredit him. But some Amex members privately take a far different view. ''Over the past couple of months, we've talked about a whole bunch of subjects, and I've taken a liking to the guy,'' says one former high Amex official. ''I think he's trying to do what he thinks is right and deal with things he thinks were unfair.''

Manfredonia first came to the Amex floor as a clerk in the early 1980s and then worked his way up to trader in 1984. Occasionally he would quietly go to the media with tips. In 1988 it came to his attention that certain brokerages were involved in ''index front-running''--trying to make a killing in index options by manipulating the price of the underlying index. Manfredonia learned his first lesson as a whistle-blower--some people just don't want to listen. One prominent financial journalist ''wanted trading records, which was just impossible. When I couldn't get them, he lost interest,'' he recalls.

Manfredonia became a permanent, vocal thorn in the side of the exchange after disturbing information came his way in 1989 and 1990. He learned that employees of a specialist firm, run by a highly placed figure at the exchange, had allegedly been sexually assaulted by the official. The women would not come forward--but Manfredonia did, in complaints to the authorities that, evidently, did not endear him to exchange officials. A year later he was fired from the now-defunct trading firm that employed him at the time--at the behest of the Amex, he insists, for ''spreading rumors.''

Manfredonia says he was blackballed--barred from employment with any firm doing business on the exchange. He has been unemployed since leaving the Amex floor, subsisting on savings and help from friends--and spending a good part of his time fighting the Amex, and losing. Manfredonia has written hundreds of letters to regulators, law enforcement, and the media, leaving him with little more than piles of green certified-mail receipts. ''We are well aware of the information you've given us, and we are in fact looking into it,'' one prominent newspaper executive assured Manfredonia back in 1993 after getting a series of letters about alleged transgressions at the Amex. ''We know how to reach you,'' the exec continued, ''and there's no need to keep sending letters.'' Manfredonia stopped sending letters--and the newspaper, he notes ruefully, did nothing.

Among the subjects of his letters was former Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Managing Director Pasquale ''Pat'' Schettino (page 102). Manfredonia wrote letters to, among others, officials of companies whose stocks were allegedly traded by Schettino. That led to a libel suit by Schettino. Manfredonia, who is struggling to fight the case without an attorney, says the suit was an effort to silence him and force him to reveal his contacts. He maintains the suit was inspired by the Amex, which the exchange's head of member-firm regulation, Stephen Lister, vigorously denies. Schettino's attorney, Eric Levine, declined comment on the suit.

Manfredonia's letter-writing campaign has hardly been an example of effective business communication. His letters are often filled with trading-floor jargon and accusations in screaming-headline boldface. ''We got letters. I think we looked into it or referred to it to someone else. I didn't give it much merit or credibility. I never really looked into his allegations,'' says one former regulator who has received letters from Manfredonia. ''That's the problem with whistle-blowers. They may have a very meritorious claim, but they don't convey it well.''

Manfredonia has become a figure of fun, sometimes openly taunted by Amex traders and clerks. But one thing is certain. Regulators and law enforcement cannot claim that they could not have known what's been going on at the American Stock Exchange. Ed Manfredonia has been telling them for years.

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To: Mark_H who wrote (1053)1/29/2003 2:37:27 PM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1156
 
Here is another reference to Manfredonia (also from back in 1999):

John Crudele's N.Y. Post story: ONE defendant in a recent securities fraud case said he tried to cooperate with prosecutors by giving up damning information about two big Wall Street investment firms.

The U.S. Attorney's office in New York said "no thanks."

A second defendant said he, too, was willing to give damaging leads to prosecutors about one of those same firms. He was also told the feds weren't interested.

Then there is the case of a third man who recently came to my attention - a guy named Edward Manfredonia who's been carrying on a five-year correspondence with federal prosecutors in hopes he'll get someone interested in corruption on Wall Street.

"In the beginning, they were very interested. They wired me. They were going to tap my phone. And then it died," said Manfredonia, who was a trader on the floor of the American Stock Exchange before he turned into a whistle-blowing, letter-writing reformer. Some members of the Amex "bragged that it wouldn't be investigated. It went too high" - involved important people - said Manfredonia, whose accusations have been partly aired already in a series of Business Week stories.

The three men - all of whom I spoke with last week - have a simple question: Is someone protecting the Wall Street big shots while the government goes after the minnows ? That isn't to say going after any wrongdoing is bad. Anyone who ignores securities laws - whether they're home-based Internet traders or big firms - should be punished. But most of the enforcement lately has been against small fries- no big firms.

For instance, a former partner of Spear, Leeds & Kellogg last week was fined $100,000 for illegal trading on the Amex. Pasquale Schettino, that former partner, was barred for life by the National Association of Securities Dealers for trading without his company's or the Exchange's approval. That case came two months after a Spears trader was suspended and another was barred from the industry over violations at the New York Stock Exchange.

Spear Leeds wasn't cited for any wrongdoing in either case.

The NASD, the Amex and the NYSE wouldn't comment about it. The NASD also declined to comment to the Journal on why Spear Leeds wasn't named or to confirm or deny any ongoing investigation.

The U.S. Attorney's office in Manhattan says it evaluates cases on an individual basis and that no deal exists for the securities industry to handle its own problems.

There are explanations for refusing to accept information.

The U.S. Attorney's Office in lower Manhattan, famous for going after every Wall Street violator back in the '80s when now-Mayor Rudy Giuliani was in charge, may simply think the information being offered wouldn't be useful. Or wrong.

Or, in not accepting information about big, powerful securities firms, the regulator/prosecutor establishment may understand that there are other ways for these matters to be handled - like the Schettino matter was, through disciplinary channels.

But if this trader breached securities laws, why wasn't he prosecuted the way someone would be if he was tipped off about an upcoming takeover?

While authorities say Schettino didn't make any money, the whistle-blowers - one of whom was intimately involved in that case - say there are plenty of examples of illegal profiteering by securities professionals.

One of the snitches says he volunteered to give authorities information on illegal activities of two major firms.

"They don't care," he said. Says another source: "We spoke about (one company). They didn't say anything. They didn't care. We didn't get an answer back."

The most prominent case in recent months has been the one against people connected with Oakford Corp., which wasn't a member of the NYSE, but which did trade through brokers on the floor of that exchange.

In that case, charges were filed through criminal channels and not administrative ones. And people are going to jail.

Plus, published reports say that another 64 brokers on the NYSE floor are under investigation, some as offshoots of the Oakford probe.

But the betting is they will be handled through securities industry channels. And if wrongdoing is found, my three sources above believe something akin to the Schettino punishment - will be invoked.

In fact, the ambiguity of the rules may convince criminal authorities that it would be best to let the brokerage industry regulate itself.

That would be especially handy for everyone if large and powerful Wall Street firms suddenly find themselves in the target area. End

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