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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: lurqer who wrote (12545)2/4/2003 1:51:32 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
The latest from Noam Chomsky

Noam Chomsky

MIT professor, writer, activist

Tuesday February 4, 2003

There's never been a time that I can think of when there's been such massive opposition to a war before it was even started. And the closer you get to the region, the higher the opposition appears to be. In Turkey polls indicated close to 90% opposition, in Europe it's quite substantial.
In the United States the figures you see in polls, however, are quite misleading because since September there's been a drumbeat of propaganda trying to bludgeon people into the belief that not only is Saddam a terrible person but in fact he's going to come after us tomorrow unless we stop him today. And that reaches people.

They have to terrify the population to feel there's some enormous threat to their existence and carry out a miraculous, decisive and rapid victory over this enormous foe and march on to the next one.

Remember the people now running the show in Washington are mostly recycled Reaganites, essentially reliving the script of the 1980s. So one year it was an airbase in Grenada which the Russians were going to use to bomb the US. Nicaragua was "two days marching time from Texas". Nicaragua might conquer us on its way to conquer the hemisphere. A national emergency was called because of the threat posed to national security by Nicaragua.

I don't want to suggest that they have no reasons for wanting to take over Iraq. Of course they do. Controlling Iraq will put the US in a very powerful position to extend its domination of the major energy resources of the world. That's not a small point.

North Korea is a different case. What they are demonstrating to the world with great clarity is that if you want to deter US aggression you better have weapons of mass destruction, or else a credible threat of terror. That's a terrible lesson to teach, but it's exactly what's being taught.

In this particular case you can't predict what will happen once a war starts. In the worst case it might be what the intelligence agencies and the aid agencies are predicting - namely an increase in terror as deterrence or revenge, and for the people of Iraq, who are barely on the edge of survival, it could be the humanitarian catastrophe of which the aid agencies and the UN have been warning.

On the other hand, it's possible it could be what the hawks in Washington hope - a quick victory, no fighting to speak of, impose a new regime, give it a democratic facade, make sure the US has big military bases there, and effectively controls the oil.

The chances that they will allow anything approximating real democracy are pretty slight.

One major problem is that 60% of the population roughly is Shiite. If there's any form of democratic government, they're going to have a say, in fact a majority say, in what the government is. Well they are not pro-Iranian but the chances are that a Shiite majority would join the rest of the region in trying to improve relations with Iran and reduce the levels of tension generally in the region by reintegrating Iran within it.

That's the last thing the US wants. Iran is its next target.

Matthew Tempest

guardian.co.uk



To: lurqer who wrote (12545)2/4/2003 3:01:51 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
George Bush, Multilateralist?

By ROBERT WRIGHT
Editorial
The New York Times
February 4, 2003

PHILADELPHIA - When President Bush was asked last week whether he would seek a second Security Council resolution before invading Iraq, he flashed his multilateralist credentials. "I was the guy that went to the United Nations in the first place," he said, alluding to the November resolution that led to weapons inspections. Some liberal multilateralists scoff at such self-congratulation, dismissing Mr. Bush's November effort as a public-relations diversion en route to certain war.

But an honest liberal has to admit that Mr. Bush's unilateralist belligerence lit a fire under the Security Council, giving the United Nations a prominence it has rarely enjoyed in its 57-year history. In fact, there remains a slim chance that the president could, however paradoxically, emerge as a historic figure in the United Nations' evolution toward enduring significance. But only if administration hawks make an admission of their own: that working through the United Nations could get them everything they profess to want. That means not just disarmament, but regime change and the introduction of democracy.

Both the United Nations' champions and its critics sometimes indulge a gauzy conception of its founding mission. The idea wasn't to bring world peace through love and understanding. The main idea was that powerful nations would spot troublemakers and pound them into submission (hence bringing "collective security," in polite language).

At the time, right after World War II, the main form of troublemaking was cross-border aggression. (The first President Bush's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait — a multilateral attack sanctioned by the Security Council — was a textbook use of the United Nations' power.) Still, the United Nations Charter, in charging the Security Council with preserving "international peace and security," is broad enough to also address post-9/11 threats, like weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Doing this systematically will require expanding and tightening the main arms control treaties — the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This task may have to await another president, but in the meantime Saddam Hussein has created a crucial test of the United Nations' credibility. His invasion of Kuwait rightly exposed Iraq to intrusive weapons inspections. What happens next will shape the United Nations' ability to play a larger role in monitoring nations deemed suspicious by the international community. Sincere or not, Mr. Bush's insistence that the United Nations not be humiliated is right for the times.

And, just as Mr. Bush's autumn drive toward war softened up the Security Council, his winter rumblings have again set the stage for the successful use of the United Nations. Even if Colin Powell's speech tomorrow doesn't reveal a smoking gun, Hans Blix, a chief United Nations weapons inspector, has already given Mr. Bush all he needs to drive another multilateral nail in Mr. Hussein's coffin. The United States should now propose a resolution that explicitly defines particular acts of noncooperation with inspectors as automatic triggers of war. France is unlikely to veto a resolution devised to give Mr. Blix the power he seeks.

The United Nations should then send additional inspectors into Iraq as fast as it can train them. With guaranteed access to Iraqi scientists, aerial surveillance of sites before and during inspection, and the continued sharing of American intelligence, inspectors would hit paydirt before long. Indeed, if the administration's leaked claims are accurate — if the meager inspections to date have already sent Iraqis scurrying to move weapons and documents — then inspectors could find the smoking gun in "weeks, not months."

It would then be time for a third Security Council resolution: Demand that the Iraqi regime abdicate — perhaps via the exile that Mr. Bush and Colin Powell have informally offered — or face war. Assuming acceptance, troops would enter Iraq peacefully under United Nations authority and begin the long project of building a democracy.

Of course, if Iraq rejected the offer we'd have war, which unilateralist hawks have wanted all along. But at least it would be war of the kind multilateralists wisely prefer: under explicit United Nations authority, with multinational participation. Perhaps more important, the ensuing peace would share those properties.

This wouldn't eliminate terrorist blow-back. An American-led war followed by military occupation would be a publicity bonanza for Al Qaeda, with grave long-term consequences. But a multinational, United Nations-administered presence would at least complicate terrorist recruiting efforts, and would deflect some of the blow-back toward other coalition nations. This may sound cynical, but the United Nations is all about cost-sharing, and one cost of confronting nations that build illicit weapons is possible terrorism. The seeming indifference of some administration hawks to this virtue of multilateralism is puzzling, given their self-image as pitiless calculators of national interest.

If President Bush starts a war without explicit Security Council sanction, and before weapons inspectors have caught Iraq red-handed, he will have undone any good he did for the United Nations in November. The lesson learned — by, say, a North Korean dictator — will be that if you let weapons inspectors in, America may attack you anyway, even if they don't find much of anything. But if the president works through the Security Council and unseats Saddam Hussein without war, this could be a watershed in the history of the United Nations.

The first President Bush dusted off and put to use United Nations machinery that had lain dormant for most of the cold war. His son might yet sustain the United Nations' evolution toward the powerful instrument of peace it was originally meant to be. This would rank as one of the great paradoxes of presidential history. But if Nixon could go to China, President Bush can go through New York.
_________________________________________________

Robert Wright, a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, is author of "Nonzero."

nytimes.com



To: lurqer who wrote (12545)2/4/2003 4:29:51 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Religiosity and Foreign Policy: When Power Disdains Realism

by William Pfaff
Published on Monday, February 3, 2003
the International Herald Tribune

PARIS -- Javier Solana, the European Union’s high representative in foreign affairs, spoke recently about what he saw as a confrontation between a religious vision of world affairs in the White House and the secular and rationalist vision of the Europeans.

This is not quite the same thing as Robert Kagan’s division of the alliance (or the former alliance) between ‘‘Kantian’’ Europeans ‘‘from Venus,’’ who believe in reason, compromise and accommodation, and ‘‘Hobbesian’’ Americans ‘‘from Mars,’’ who use military power to reorder the world to the ultimate benefit, among others, of the free riding and feckless Europeans.

According to U.S. policy and political intellectuals quoted by the contemporary historian Timothy Garton Ash in the latest New York Review of Books, Europeans are ‘‘weak, petulant, hypocritical, disunited, duplicitous, sometimes anti-Semitic and often anti-American appeasers.’’

And as the president has said (rashly assuming to himself the words of Jesus in Matthew 12:30), ‘‘He who is not with me is against me.’’

Yet the religion — or religiosity, to make a distinction not usually made today — of the Bush administration is only one strand in modern American Protestantism, although currently an important one. It derives from Calvinist dualism, dividing mankind between those who are saved and born-again, and the sinners. This view of a moral universe riven in two is easily transferred to foreign policy.

While George W. Bush is ‘‘born again’’ and his White House includes many evangelical Protestants, it is hard to see the Donald Rumsfelds, Paul Wolfowitzes and Richard Perles of the administration as part of this. They are tough, power-oriented, bureaucratic operators and ideologues. On their side, the alliance must be a fairly cynical one.

Relevant to the trans-Atlantic confrontation of political cultures is a man now largely forgotten, who was the most important religious influence on modern American political thought, and specifically on its foreign policy thinking. This was the distinguished theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.

From the early 1930s on, he was concerned with the use of power in international relations. Religious people then tended to be uncomfortable with power, as they often remain today. They are inclined to respond to serious international conflicts of interest and ideology with a sentimental pacifism.

Niebuhr rejected this, as part of his coming to terms with what society had become after World War I, and with the rise of the totalitarian regimes of the 1920s and 1930s. He gave up ‘‘Christian absolutism’’ as a result of the pressure of world events, writing a deeply influential book called ‘‘Moral Man and Immoral Society.’’

He was concerned with that zone where ethics and power meet, defending the necessity of power in ordering society while refusing to yield on ethical standards. The historian and diplomat George Kennan called him ‘‘the father of us all,’’ speaking for all who belong to the ‘‘realist’’ intellectual tradition in American foreign policy.

The tradition is all but absent in American government today. It is certainly absent from the Bush White House. But it also seems to have limited influence on modern post-Christian European political thought and practice, disposed toward what Niebuhr considered the illusion that institutions in and of themselves can reshape society.

The institutions of the European Union have been unprecedentedly effective in reshaping West European society since the war. But they failed completely in the Balkan crisis of the 1990s. The United States ignored that crisis, too — America had ‘‘no dog in that fight,’’ as Secretary of State James Baker said — but eventually, under liberal popular pressure, it did force NATO to use its power to stop the war.

The Europeans had been held back by reluctance to make moral and political judgments. They wanted to keep their hands clean (and failed). As the French poet Charles Péguy once said, having clean hands can mean having no hands.

The problem with this American government is that its ‘‘realists’’ — the neoconservatives — are not realistic at all, while the president and his domestic policy advisers are shallow and simplistic.

I say the neoconservatives are not realistic because they are pushing America into an attack on Iraq on the basis of stubbornly biased and ideologically based scenarios of an easy war and easy democratic transformation of the Middle East. They exclude other possibilities.

They are also unrealistic in that they have no compassion or empathy for the enemy. This failure is ethical. It means that they totally underestimate what he represents. In this respect, the Europeans are more realistic, fearing what may come in the region. But the Europeans have no power, and they don’t want power.

Copyright © 2003 the International Herald Tribune

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