To: LindyBill who wrote (73285 ) 2/12/2003 12:26:53 PM From: Win Smith Respond to of 281500 A passing note on this bit:Could he have been dealt with earlier? Yes. When his armed forces were routed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, he was extremely vulnerable. But the first Bush administration halted military operations after Kuwait was freed, in part to reassure the other Muslim countries in the alliance and in part because it believed that Hussein would be either overthrown or easily contained by an inspection regime. Seven years later, when the international inspectors were ordered to leave, the Clinton administration could have forced a showdown, but its actions never matched its hard-line rhetoric. Leaving aside who, exactly ordered the inspectors to leave, that was basically my understanding. Recently, though, I've been reading Judith Miller's "God Has Ninety-Nine Names", reviewed in query.nytimes.com and query.nytimes.com Very interesting, and not exactly a glowing portrait of the Muslim world. But: in her chapter on Saudi Arabia, she claims that King Fahd was actually quite unhappy about the way that war ended. From page 119-120, in case anyone wants to look it up:Contrary to many published accounts, Riyadh-Washington ties were strained after the war. For one thing, King Fahd had been stunned by America’s decision to end the war before Saddam Hussein was destroyed. According to Knowledgeable Saudi and American officials, Riyadh, had done its best to keep the conflict going. First, senior Saudi officials had urged the Americans to continue the aerial bombing of Iraq’s retreating army for two or three more days. When that failed, the recommended that the allies bomb republican Guard divisions on the outskirts of Baghdad. When this request, too, was denied, the Saudis deliberately slowed down the translation of Iraq’s acceptance of the terms of surrender, which President Bush insisted that King Fahd approve before it was signed. When the translation was done, an administration official told me, Saudi officials ordered their linguists to translate it again. Fahd was still determined to topple the ungrateful Saddam, in whom Riyadh had given more than $25 billion in aid during Iraq’s war with Iran. For Fahd, the fight had become personal: After the war Saddam sent an assassination squad to the kingdom to try to kill him. But Saudi Arabia, also keen to retain US favor, maintained diplomatic silence when American officials blamed the war’s sudden end on Riyadh’s concern about the possible disintegration of Iraq, in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s death or sudden departure. And in case anybody discounts this as an NYT fabrication, rest assured that Miller's reporting on Saudi Arabia is in general less that flattering. Particularly amusing is her story of the "I am not a whore" letter of recommendation she was given to assure safe passage on a post-war trip. Plus, this book was published in 1996, safely distant from any current domestic political influences.