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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Bilow who wrote (73774)2/14/2003 1:12:22 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
A Whale of a Mess?

By David Ignatius
Columnist
The Washington Post
Friday, February 14, 2003

There's a scene in "Moby-Dick" where Captain Ahab, in his pursuit of the white whale, angrily destroys the quadrant he uses for navigation. It's the moment when the hunt becomes irrational, leaving the ship with nothing to steer by other than the dictates of the chase itself.

The Bush administration hasn't reached the Ahab moment yet, but it's getting close. Over the past few weeks, the hunt for Saddam Hussein has become so intense that it has seemed almost self-destructive. The administration appears willing to sacrifice almost anything -- America's alliances, its prosperity, even the security of its citizens -- in its determination to oust the Iraqi leader from power.

You can't wage war without having something of Captain Ahab's relentless passion. But a nation heading into war also needs prudence and good judgment. America's best generals, people such as Grant and Marshall and Eisenhower, were at once cautious and decisive. Their greatness lay in the fact that they never lost sight of the long-term interests of the United States.

I do not question the need for Hussein's ouster. It's a morally just cause. But this is what Israelis call "a war of choice." For all of President Bush's talk about Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, the Iraqi dictator does not pose an immediate threat to the American people. Indeed, the dangers are more likely to come later. Liberating the Iraqi people is a good deed, but the war should be justified by a coherent, long-term strategy.

Here the Bush administration has gone wobbly -- not in its resolve to make war but in its lack of a clear strategy. Waging war seems to have become a goal in itself -- an end rather than a means.

One obvious danger sign is the bitter argument that has broken out between the United States and its European allies, which threatens the future of the NATO alliance. Washington's pique over the defiance of France and Germany is understandable -- they're getting in the way. But however cynical and calculating Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder may be, they are also reflecting the political sentiment of their countries. The administration's indignation toward "old Europe" masks the fact that it hasn't done a very good job selling its policy.

Europe's reaction should not come as a surprise. To European eyes, America has been behaving like a rising imperial power. Through its modern history, Europe has sought to contain expansionist powers. Did the neo-imperialists in Washington imagine that Europeans would cheer America's new dominance?

In addition to alienating old friends, the Bush administration has been alienating new ones, too. The most important defector is Russian President Vladimir Putin. If Russia and China join France in the antiwar camp, then three of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council will stand against Washington. America could go to war anyway, but in doing so it would weaken the United Nations. That would harm U.S. security interests, in my view.

Another danger sign is the administration's invitation to Turkey a week ago to invade northern Iraq. That would allow Turkish troops to suppress Kurdish nationalists and perhaps exert future hegemony over Kurdistan. This concession to Turkey was apparently the price of gaining its support for the war, but it undercuts part of the rationale for the war.

A third danger sign is that Bush is putting the U.S. economy at risk. I am not talking here about the effects on investor confidence of constant war talk. No, what's truly reckless is that the administration has not made any serious provision in its budget for the costs of the Iraq war. A big lesson of Vietnam was that if you're going to fight a war, you must raise taxes to pay for it; otherwise, you risk damaging the economy severely. Instead, Bush is proposing tax cuts.

Waging war in Iraq should not require the destruction of American alliances and economic interests. Indeed, if America tries to reorder Iraq without support from a broad coalition, it will make itself a ripe target for terrorists, perhaps for years to come.

In these final days before conflict begins, the administration should stop hectoring its allies and make a final try to build a real coalition. Because that effort might well fail, the administration also needs a strategy for picking up the pieces of NATO and the United Nations after the war is over.

Bush can harpoon this whale, but he should do so in a way that does not weaken U.S. security. He needs to take firm hold of his quadrant and steer a steadier course. Win the war, captain, but save the ship, too.

© 2003 The Washington Post Company

washingtonpost.com



To: Bilow who wrote (73774)2/14/2003 4:27:22 PM
From: Jacob Snyder  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
re: strategies against guerrilla warfare:

<it leads to very high American casualties. You end up with huge numbers of easily overrun targets>

Casualties are lessened by:

1. starting the campaign in areas with the least guerrilla activity. Then, slowly, the guerrilla-free area is expanded, still avoiding the guerrilla strongholds, slowly surrounding them. Only then, do you move into their core areas, slowly closing a series of ever-smaller concentric circles. Americans want quick victories, their instinct is to aim at the heart of the enemy position from the start; the HeartsAndMinds (H&M) strategy won't work if we do that.

2. Go Slow. This method works over a period of many years, perhaps even decades. Again, it runs counter to the American love of Blitzkrieg. Every village, before U.S. soldiers are committed, would have spent some time (again, this time is years, not weeks) in the "halo" of our existing guerrilla-free zone, so much of the ideological indoctrination happens before our soldiers are committed.

3. Only a fraction of our army is tied down in these static small positions. The rest of the army (most of it, actually), still uses the conventional-war high-mobility, overwhelming-firepower tactics. Every team in every village has a radio, and can call in support at need.

4. If we are winning the HeartsAndMinds campaign, then the number of surprise attacks should be greatly diminished. The locals will act as our EyesAndEars, which means we have several orders of magnitude more EyesAndEars spread in a net around our positions. That's the real "net-war". In Vietnam, the enemy was able to routinely surround and overrun small positions, precisely because we lost the H&M campaign.

5. It is much harder to win a H&M campaign, if you allow the enemy a large Safe Haven, from which they can endlessly trickle reinforcements into the adjacent battlefield. I don't mean a DistantSponsor, who sends money and weapons. I mean an area that can supply large numbers of recruits who can melt into the civilians on the battlefield. In 1965, we should have landed the Marines at Haiphong, not Hue, and driven on Hanoi. Yes, that would have reduced casualties, in the long run. It would have been a big conventional battle, and we would have won it. For the rest of the war, the Communist's efforts would have gone entirely to re-taking Hanoi; there would have been nothing left to send down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We fortify a perimeter around those two cities, and outlast them. Try a H&M campaign within the perimeter; if that doesn't work, expel the entire hostile civilian population within our perimeter. Tell General Giap that we will withdraw from Hanoi, when all guerrilla activity has stopped in S. Vietnam, all communist sympathizers have been repatriated to N. Vietnam, the DMZ has been extended westward to the Thai border (and patrolled by a well-armed permanent UN force). And, once we withdraw, tell him we'll be back, at the first violation of those terms. Once a guerrilla army gets a big untouchable SafeHaven, their victory is just a matter of time.

6. With all that said, you are absolutely correct that the H&M method puts a lot of ground troops at high risk, for a prolonged period of time. The simple, brutal question is: how much is it worth to us? If we aren't willing to pay the cost (and if that potential cost hasn't been explained very very clearly to the home front), then we shouldn't commit one soldier. Use the MotherTest: If you can't sit down with the mother of every soldier who didn't come back, look her in the eye, and explain to her what her son or daughter died for, in a way that makes sense to her, then you made a mistake sending that soldier in Harm'sWay. Afghanistan, WWII, the Civil War, and the Revolutionary War pass the MotherTest. IMO, none of our other wars, from the War of 1812 to Iraq II, pass the Test. The fact that our military/civilian leaders are now so exquisitely sensitive about U.S. combat deaths, (like using proxies in Afghanistan even though that meant Bin Laden eluded us), means they want to avoid eye contact with American mothers.

----------------

Anyone who thinks I am an advocate of unilateral disarmament, isolationism, passivity, or surrender, I'll just refer them to this post. I believe the path to Victory is all-encompassing Engagement, an intimate study of the enemy, and developing the Will To Win at home. And a totally different set of beliefs and tactics than currently being used.