The Taliban of northern Iraq
By Ian Urbina
atimes.com
For over a year now the Bush administration has been committed to demonstrating the existence of a bridge between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, and while it was this bridge that would allow Washington to move from its war on terrorism to a war on Iraq, finding support in hard evidence was no easy endeavor.
As claims about the much-vaunted meetings between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi agents fell through under the weight of close scrutiny, it seemed that Washington might finally abandon this line of argument. Yet, with Secretary of State Colin Powell’s recent presentation to the United Nations Security Council, Washington went at it again. This time, the bulk of the contention rested on Baghdad's relations to a band of Taliban-style Kurdish Islamists called Ansar al-Islam.
But once again, the new and improved bridge of evidence is proving wobbly at best, and its worth citing some of the reasons for skepticism.
Though Islamism has long historical roots in the area, Ansar al-Islam was officially created on September 1, 2001. Taking control of a mountainous enclave of villages near the town of Halabja, the group resides not far from the Iranian border in the northeast of the country. Estimated to have roughly 200 men, the band of fighters have expressed their desire to impose an Islamic state in the Kurdish territories of northern Iraq. Their disdain for and armed conflict with secular Kurdish parties in these parts is only slightly surpassed by their fierce hatred for Saddam and his years of anti-Kurdish (and secular) policies in the area.
As a fundamentalist and Islamist group, Ansar in all likelihood shares many of al-Qaeda’s ideals. Some of Ansar’s followers probably fought in Afghanistan with the Taliban. But establishing a concrete and material connection, such as arms, training, logistics or monies, between the group and al-Qaeda has not occurred largely because there is no independent access to Ansar-controlled areas. In fact, there are also real concerns about the sources from which Powell draws his information about the group.
The biggest problem is that much of the relevant intelligence is drawn predominantly from individuals in custody of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the main Iraqi Kurdish factions. But, since the highly secular PUK is Ansar al-Islam’s sworn enemy, having lost many of its men fighting the group, they have their own agenda in the information they extract on behalf of the US. But even if the PUK didn’t have a gripe with Ansar al-Islam, the conditions in which any of the region's detainees are providing intelligence is highly questionable. As the Washington Post reported in December, US officials have acknowledged that many of the area detainees are being beaten and threatened with torture by their local captors. In some cases these individuals have been turned over to officials of countries such as Syria, known to practice the most severe torture.
An important part of Powell's contention concerning an al-Qaeda/Saddam connection was tied through the person of Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian and alleged al-Qaeda operative who last year had a leg amputated in Baghdad after he was wounded in the war in Afghanistan. During al-Zarqawi's two-month stay in Baghdad, Powell claimed, two dozen "al-Qaeda affiliates" established a cell in the city. Al-Zaqawi subsequently disappeared. The Jordanian is also thought to have provided weapons and money to the murderers of US diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan last October. But aside from emphasizing al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda/Iraq connections, Powell also showed the UN a satellite photo of a camp al-Zarqawi supposedly set up in northeastern Iraq to produce poison.
That al-Zarqawi is a dubious character seems beyond doubt. That he was in Baghdad is also firmly established. But that any of this means that the Jordanian radical has created a chemical weapons base in Iraq and/or established al-Qaeda ties to Saddam is far from proven.
First, there is the issue of the poison production facilities in Powell's photos. After Powell's speech, a number of journalists went immediately to investigate the destination in the photo and they all reported finding no indication that any such chemical production facility was or had ever been there. Reporters were allowed to wander freely and found only living quarters and a radio station.
The possibility of course remains that all signs of prior chemical activities were removed. But even if the site was a weapons site, that does not tell us about Baghdad’s involvement. It's worth remembering that the site referenced in Powell's photo is in the Kurdish zone of northern Iraq, within the no-fly zone, and outside of Saddam's control.
The dots are there, but the evidence to connect them in any credible way is still lacking. Many within the intelligence community have raised this exact concern. For example, an unnamed German intelligence sources cited by the Wall Street Journal recently stated that there is no evidence that either Ansar al-Islam or al-Zarqawi are linked to Saddam. But if German sources are questionable because of that country's leanings on the war, then look to US sources. The Washington Post quotes unnamed US officials arguing the same thing. Indeed, one told the Post that Zarqawi may have no connection whatsoever to al-Qaeda. Though Powell spoke of Saddam having "an agent at the most senior levels of the radical organization" US intelligence sources have since subsequently filled in this picture too, explaining that Saddam’s alleged agent might logically be spying on the group, not running it.
Interestingly enough, if there is a clear bridge to be highlighted, it is between Ansar al-Islam and Iran, not Iraq. To compensate for its weak foothold locally, the group has shrewdly built its ties across the border to Tehran, which has provided not only free passage, but also significant amounts of light artillery. The PUK also contends that Iran has provided Ansar with aerial spotting of PUK positions and artillery.
Though Iran is Shi'ite and Ansar is predominantly Sunni, Iran has always seen Islamist proxies in Kurdistan as a counterweight to the more formidable PUK and KDP factions, both of which, if left to their own devices, could stir up Iran's highly repressed Kurdish population. And since some in Washington would like to make Iran the next US target after Iraq, Tehran is apt to see the US forces get bogged down in messy cross-fighting.
If anything is to be learned from Ansar al-Islam, it is as an indicator of the dangerous and fractious scene in northern Iraq. The tension which comes to play with this group previews a real possibility for bloody infighting - not to mention the chance of volatile involvement (through well-armed proxies) from neighboring powers. The US hopes to use the Iraqi Kurds to overthrow Saddam, yet both the PUK and Ansar consist of Iraqi Kurds. Both groups are well armed and each group despises the other. Once and if their common enemy (Saddam) is removed, it would not be surprising if they finally took the chance to settle old scores, all the while with Iran discretely in the mix on one side and the US on the other.
Ultimately in this scenario it would hardly matter who is tied to al-Qaeda or not. The US will be faced with the two unattractive options: pulling out entirely, thereby tacitly opening the field to a bloodbath, or getting mired in what could easily spiral into a small civil war.
At that stage, the only bridges Powell would be looking for would be the ones to get the US out of Iraq, not in. |
