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Politics : DON'T START THE WAR -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: BubbaFred who wrote (8577)	2/15/2003 3:44:15 PM
From: PartyTime	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 25898

One last post--it's a good one: atimes.com COMMENTARY The world outside the castle walls By K P S Gill NEW DELHI - There is, without doubt, truth in the argument of US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that "defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st century threats may well require that we take the war to the enemy". The political paralysis, vacillation and policy reversal that have characterized counter-terrorism responses in the democratic world cannot generate an adequate response to the fanatical forces that threaten civilization today, and the initiative will have to be seized by those who stand for freedom and order if these forces are to be defeated. Success in this enterprise, however, depends on the accuracy and effectiveness with which we define, engage with, and neutralize the "enemy". That's the problem with Iraq. The autocratic and oppressive Saddam Hussein regime is, without doubt, a problem - but it is still far from clear that it is the most significant problem within the context of the rising threat of international terrorism. The American case has certainly been poorly argued on this count; but worse, there appears, in the American strategy, no clear theory of closure or coherent exit policy. America has an extended record of untidiness in this context - and this has been underlined in the recent past by the experience in Afghanistan and the visible strategy on Pakistan. The war in Afghanistan is far from over; the stability and survival of the tenuous Hamid Karzai regime are under constant threat; and, though Afghanistan has been all but destroyed, terrorism may well have emerged stronger, more dispersed and more complex as a result of the US intervention in that country. On the other hand, Pakistan - which is projected as America's strongest ally in the war against terrorism - is fundamentally and ideologically in conflict with everything that the US represents and is presently and certainly the worst nest of Islamist extremist terror in the world; and is probably - and in the Indian perspective, unquestionably - the most active state sponsor of international terrorism. America's engagement with these two countries does not appear to have sufficiently secured the ends of the global war against terrorism, even as a new and potentially immensely destabilizing campaign is planned in Iraq. The US itself still remains substantially insulated from the consequences of instability and disorder in Asia - though the threat of an occasional terrorist act on American soil is great and rising. If a particular situation remains "messy", or worsens further, withdrawal to the now imperfect "fortress America" can still be contemplated. Those who are permanently located in this troubled neighborhood, however, do not have this option, and would be required to deal with the chaotic impact of unfinished wars, collapsing states and a rootless, violent diaspora. These dangers, precisely, are what underlie India's cautiously disapproving line on Iraq. Ironically, India voices many of the same concerns regarding Iraq that the US does in its advocacy of a peaceful resolution of, and disapproval of any preemptive action in, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir: that the existing regime can be bribed or coerced to improve its record without recourse to war; that the alternative to the present regime is uncertain and likely to be worse; that the destruction of an unsatisfactory but stable regime would plunge the entire region into disorder, and would create wider spaces for the operation of the forces of extremism and terror. But India's immediate concerns regarding the impending war in Iraq are wider and far more direct. The economic and political impact of such a war, and of the possible destabilization of the Middle East, could be substantial and immediate, and the memory of the deep financial crisis into which the country was plunged by the last Gulf War in 1990-91 is still fresh in the minds of policymakers here. Iraq is a significant source of oil for India, but more importantly, the fear is that a war would send the prices of oil spiraling from all sources, feeding an inflationary spiral that could undermine India's economy at a crucial phase of its current transformation. Over 3 million Indian workers in the Gulf are also threatened with a decline in, or loss of, employment, and foreign exchange remittances from these sources can be expected to fall dramatically. The potentially dampening effect of the war on the US economy also impacts on the Indian economy, as America is India's largest trading partner. The greater danger, however, is that a war against Iraq may lead to more violence and instability in the immediate neighborhood - and especially in Pakistan, Afghanistan and, possibly, Iran and Saudi Arabia as well. There are already indications of rising terrorist action in Afghanistan, and this trend can be expected to intensify when the campaign against Iraq begins. In Pakistan, the Pervez Musharraf regime is expected to attempt to deflect domestic discontent and criticism of its support to the US war on Iraq by intensifying cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and other theaters in India. Despite these specific risks to Indian interests, the Indian position does accommodate the ambiguities of the situation and is not defined by an inflexible opposition to war - but reflects, rather, qualified opposition to unilateralism and haste in this engagement. It recognizes, moreover, that - irrespective of the decision and outcome of the proposed Iraq campaign, and the tactical disagreements on Pakistan and other issues - India is now fundamentally and irrevocably committed to the development and deepening of strategic ties with the US, and the basis of this commitment is not a transient and opportunistic convergence of interests, but a convergence of basic ideologies and shared values of pluralism, democracy, constitutional governance and an open global system that comprehends and promotes these values. K P S Gill, president, Institute for Conflict Management, a non-profit society set up in 1997 in New Delhi committed to the evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. Published with permission from the South Asia Intelligence Review of theSouth Asia Terrorism Portal Feb 12, 2003

To: BubbaFred who wrote (8577)	2/16/2003 8:54:44 AM
From: Mao II	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 25898

The US has a long history of using gas and chemical agents in warfare. Consider Vietnam. Chemicals Used In Military Operations During The Vietnam War Download Chemical List in Microsoft Word Format General use: Insecticide, DDT - Pyrethrum aerosol, G-1152, 12-oz, can.* Insecticide, Dichlorvos, 20% impregnated strips Insecticide, Lindane, 1% dusting powder, 2-oz. can Insecticide, Pyrethrum, 0.6% aerosol, 12-oz. can Insecticide, Pyrethrum, 0.4% solution, 1-gal. can Repellent, Clothing and personal application, m 75% DEET, 6-oz. (aerosol can) Repellent, Clothing and personal application, m 75% DEET, 2-oz. (plastic bottle) Repellent, Clothing and personal application, m 75% DEET, ½-oz. (bottle, component of survival kit) Rodenticide, Anticoagulant, Ready mixed bait, 5-lb can Rodenticide, bait block, diphacin, 8-oz. block Supervision Required: Insecticide, Aluminum phosphide, tablets, can Insecticide, Aluminum phosphide, pellets, flask Insecticide, Baygon, 1% solution, 1-gal. can Insecticide, Baygon, 2% bait, 5-lb. bottle Insecticide, Carbaryl, 80% powder, 15-lb. pail Insecticide, Carbaryl-DDT, Micronized dust, 1-gram* Insecticide, Carbaryl-DDT, Micronized dust, 5-gram* Insecticide, Carbaryl-DDT, Micronized dust, 13-gram* Insecticide, Chlordane, 72% emulsifiable concentrate, 5-gal. pail Insecticide, Chlordane, 5%-6% dust, 25-lb. pail Insecticide, Diazinon, 0.5% solution, 1-gal. can Insecticide, Diazinon, 48% emulsifiable concentrate, 1-gal. can Insecticide, Dieldrin, 15% emulsifiable concentrate, 5-gal. pail Insecticide, DDT, 25% emulsifiable concentrate, 5-gal. pail For disinsectization of aircraft in compliance with Public Health Quarantine. * For use in control of body lice. ** For disinsectization of aircraft in compliance with Agricultural Quarantine. Insecticide, DDT, 75% wettable powder, 20-lb. pail Insecticide, Dichlorvos, 20% impregnated pellets, 30-lb. pail Insecticide, Dursban, 40.8% emulsifiable concentrate Insecticide, Lindane, 12% emulsifiable concentrate, 5-gal. pail Insecticide, Lindane, 1% dusting powder, 25-lb. pail Insecticide, Malathion, 57% emulsifiable concentrate, Grade A, (1-gal. can) Insecticide, Malathion, 57% emulsifiable concentrate, Grade B, (55-gal. drum) Insecticide, Malathion, 57% emulsifiable concentrate, Grade A, (5-gal. pail) Insecticide, Malathion, 95% solution concentrate 55-gal. Drum Insecticide, Methyl bromide, 98%, 150-lb. cylinder Insecticide, Methyl bromide, 98%, 1-lb. can Insecticide, Naled, 85% solution concentrate, 15-gal. drum Repellent, Clothing application, M-1960, 1-gal. can Repellent, Clothing application, 90% Benzyl benzoate, 1-gal. can Rodenticide, Anticoagulant, Universal concentrate, 1-lb. can Rodenticide, Calcium cyanide, 42% powder, 1-lb. can Rodenticide, Zinc phosphide, 80% powder, 1-oz. bottle Fungicide, Pentachlorophenol, 5% moisture retardant, 55-gal. drum Soil fumigant, SMDC (VAPAM) 32.7% solution Herbicide, Borate-Bromacil mixture, 50-lb. bag Herbicide, Bromacil, 80% powder, 50-lb. drum Herbicide, Chlorate-Borate mixture, 50-lb. bag Herbicide, Dacthal, 75% powder, 50-lb bag Herbicide, Dalapon, 85% powder, 50-lb. drum Herbicide, Dicamba, 49% solution, 1-gal. bottle Herbicide, Diquat, 35.3% solution, 5-gal. drum Herbicide, Diuron, 80% powder, 50-lb. drum Herbicide, DSMA, 63% disodium methylarsonate, 100-lb. drum Herbicide, Monuron, 80% powder, 50-lb. drum Herbicide, Picloram + 2,4-D, 5-gal. drum Herbicide, Picloram, 11.6% pellets, 50-lb. drum Herbicide, Silvex, Low Volatile Ester, 4-lb/gal., 5-gal. drum Herbicide, Simazinc, 80% powder, 5-lb. can Herbicide, 2,4-D, Low Volatile Ester, 4-lb/gal., 5-gal. can Herbicide, 2,4-D, Amine, 4-lb/gal., 5-gal. can Herbicide, 2,4,5-T, Low Volatile Ester, 4-lb/gal., 55-gal. drum Herbicide, 2,4,5-T, Low Volatile Ester, 4-lb/gal., 5-gal. pail Tactical: Herbicide, Cacodylic Acid (Blue), 55-gal. drum Herbicide, Picloram + 2,4-D, (White), 55-gal. drum Herbicide, 2,4-D + 2,4,5-T, High Volatile ester (Orange), 55-gal. drum gmasw.com