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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: NickSE who wrote (74365)2/15/2003 9:54:15 PM
From: Sig  Respond to of 281500
 
<<< Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said in an interview with CNN on Saturday that it would be"unacceptable" for U.N. weapons inspectors to destroy Iraqi missiles found to violate U.N. limits and dismissed the idea of sending U.N. peacekeepers to Iraq. >>>

The same spokesman, in 1995 .......
(Denial worked then, hey, if something works dont change it!)
geocities.com

>>>But Iraq's belated confessions about its missile machinery and biological weapons are only the latest in a long series of evasions and outright lies by Iraq about its covert weapons programs. Confessions about its nuclear, missile and chemical warfare programs were all delayed until Iraq's regime was confronted with evidence of their existence, even before the biological issue surfaced.

Iraqi promises to provide data when required by U.N. inspectors or commission officials, moreover, have often proved to be empty. Last October, an Iraqi report on the suppliers and ingredients of its chemical weapons proved worthless, according to a U.N. official. It lacked documentation and provided "close to zero" information, according to inspection team leader Horst Reeps.
"I demanded a new declaration which then should be complete, consistent and verifiable," he said. And even when valid evidence is produced, Baghdad has attempted to negotiate the outcome by exchanging more complete
information in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The Security Council reacted angrily in late May when Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz proposed such an exchange on biological data. "We're not buying carpets, we're talking about compliance with Security Council resolutions," declared British U.N. representative Sir David Hannay.

The delays in fulfilling the prerequisites for ending the sanctions have resulted in massive suffering among the Iraqi people and severe damage to the Iraqi economy. But that damage, often assiduously publicized, has hardly inhibited President Saddam Hussein and his close associates and supporters from continuing to enjoy luxuries. The Security Council was given details last November of a number of new palaces built by Saddam despite the population's hardships. One such palace was said to be three times the size of the U.S. White House. Saddam "has spent a half billion dollars on building literally dozens of opulent new
palaces for the exclusive use of his family," United States Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright told the Security Council.>>>>

And then there is this , also from 1995 ( how soon the French and Germans forget
geocities.com
<<<European security agencies are now monitoring agitators who are trying to recruit young Muslims resident in their countries for training in special camps in Sudan, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iran. In late 1994 French raids on GIA strongholds in France found liquid explosives of a type rarely used outside of Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the Hezbollah camps in Lebanon. It was the same type of explosive used by the GIA in the Boulevard Amirouche operation, an attack on an Algiers police housing complex that killed 42 and wounded 286.

The type of technology used in assembling the Boulevard Amirouche bomb was used by supervisors of the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. The camps were run by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami party until they were overrun earlier this year by opposition Taliban forces. Hekmatyar has close connections with Sudan and Iran, Tehran having brokered a deal for Sudan to exchange cotton for surplus weapons held by Hekmatyar's forces. Tehran has backed Hekmatyar against the government in Kabul. >>>



To: NickSE who wrote (74365)2/22/2003 8:02:03 AM
From: FaultLine  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Blix's List: Missile Parts Marked for Destruction
February 22, 2003

Following are excerpts from a letter by Hans Blix to Gen. Amir al-Saadi, an Iraqi presidential adviser, as provided to The New York Times.

During our latest discussions in Baghdad on Feb. 9 and 10, 2003, I informed you that an international panel of experts would be convened in New York to conduct a technical assessment of the range capabilities of Al Samoud 2 and Al Fatah missile systems. The assessment was also to include the refurbished casting chambers associated with the proscribed Badr 2000 missiles that had been destroyed under Unscom supervision, as well as the capability of the test stand under construction at the Al Rafah Liquid Engine Test Facility.

The panel, which met on Feb. 10 and 11, consisted of experts nominated by the governments of China, France, Germany, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States. The Russian expert nominated was unable to attend. . . .

The panel was unanimous in its assessment in reaching the attached conclusions. . . .

Accordingly, the government of Iraq should present to Unmovic for verifiable destruction all Al Samoud 2 missiles and associated items, as follows:

1. All Al Samoud 2 missiles and warheads, whether deployed, assembled or partly assembled;

2. Fuel and oxidizer, where deployed with Al Samoud 2 missiles;

3. The SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the export/import mechanism and in contravention of Paragraph 24 of Resolution 687 (1991), which have been configured for use in the Al Samoud 2, are in the process of being so configured, or are otherwise associated with the Al Samoud 2 missile program;

4. All engine components acquired for the modification of the SA-2 engine for use with the Al Samoud 2 system, such as thrust regulators, gas generators and air pressure regulators;

5. All SA-2 autopilots and other guidance and control items, such as gyroscopes, accelerometers, inertial equipment and software imported or developed for use with the Al Samoud 2 system;

6. With respect to launchers, all parts of the launching mechanism that are designed for use with the Al Samoud 2 system. The basic platforms of the vehicles need not be destroyed, but will be tagged and their future use monitored;

7. Those components specific to the Al Samoud 2, which are incorporated in the logistic support vehicles required for the operation of the Al Samoud 2 missile force;

8. Equipment and components designed for the production and testing of the Al Samoud 2 missile; and

9. All software and documentation concerning corruption, research and development, production and quality control related to the Al Samoud 2 research program.

With respect to the casting chambers that had been deemed proscribed and were destroyed under Unscom supervision, the panel confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers. Accordingly, these changes remain proscribed and are to be destroyed.

The panel found that clarification of the Al Fatah missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile system could be assessed. Unmovic will request such clarification.

The panel also assessed that the Al Rafah static test stand under construction would be capable of testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. The test stand will be monitored.

The necessary destruction is to be carried out by Iraq under Unmovic guidance and supervision. Unmovic will select from a variety of methods of destruction, depending on the items to be destroyed, such as explosive demolition, crushing, melting and other physical and chemical methods.

The appropriate arrangements should be made so that the destruction process can commence by March 1, 2003. . . .

Al Samoud 2

Both versions of the Al Samoud 2 were evaluated using four independent computer models. Calculations, employing information declared by Iraq, show that both versions are inherently capable of flying more than 150 kilometers, the range limit defined by U.N. Security Council resolutions. The lighter version of the Al Samoud 2 was determined to be capable of flying about 193 kilometers, the average range calculated by the computer models. This is consistent with the maximum range achieved as declared by Iraq (183 kilometers) during the flight test program for the Al Samoud 2. The heavier version of the Al Samoud 2, as determined by the average of the computer modeling results, is capable of achieving a range of approximately 162 kilometers.

The four independent computer models provided consistent results; all flight simulations performed during the seminar demonstrated that both variants of the Al Samoud 2 are capable of exceeding the 150 kilometer range limit. Moreover, it should be noted that the input parameters for the models relied on information declared by Iraq, even when this information was in conflict with well documented information concerning the liquid propellant engine. For example, Iraq asserts that the mass flow rate of propellants to the engine is 15.1 kg/s, whereas the engine is designed for 15.88 kg/s. Using the lower mass flow rate reduces the performance capabilities of the engine.

Al Fatah

The Al Fatah is a solid propellant rocket currently being developed by Iraq, although 32 missiles have already been deployed to the army. Four independent computer models were used in an attempt to assess the performance characteristics.

The models all showed that the Al Fatah is capable of flying 150 kilometers. However, these modeling results contrast with flight test data declared by Iraq, which state that the Al Fatah has flown as far as 161 kilometers with a different configuration from the one declared. . . . A final conclusion cannot be developed until Unmovic has verified the Iraqi declaration. . . .

Casting Chamber

. . . During the 1980's, Iraq procured two large casting chambers for the production of the Badr 2000 missile. As the Badr 2000 was a proscribed missile system under U.N.S.C. Resolution 687, these casting chambers were destroyed under U.N. supervision.

Iraq has refurbished the ex-Badr 2000 casting chambers by repairing the destroyed sections and reducing the depth by 2 meters.

The chambers, which now have a depth of 6 meters, and a diameter of 2 meters, are capable of supporting the production of solid propellant motor rockets with sufficient capacity to fly significantly more than 150 kilometers. For instance, the chambers would still be capable of supporting the production of the proscribed Badr 2000 first stage motor.

Al Rafah Liquid Engine Test Stand

. . . The stand is larger than the SA-2 test stand presently used at Al Rafah. It is also larger than the Scud test stand destroyed under U.N. supervision. The expert panel reviewed the characteristics of the new test stand and concluded that it will be capable of testing liquid propellant engines exhibiting a thrust of 15 tons after completion, with one expert estimating that up to 30 tons force could be accommodated. (Note: The Al Samoud generates 3.5 tons of thrust). One expert also noted that each of the two large tanks collocated at the test stand has an estimated capacity to store 2.2 cubic meters of liquid fuel or oxidizer. This is about 3 times the amount used by the Al Samoud missile.

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company