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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (74534)2/16/2003 9:37:56 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 281500
 
the establishment tends to disagree less with the substance than with the style of the administration's foreign policy.

Kind of, "I don't mind what you say, it is the way that you say it." I think you are overreacting, Tek. But in any case, that is the way the Admin is. Ain't gonna change.

The initial feedback from the media is that the Admin is going to stretch things out until mid March. I doubt if Blair can last that long, if reports are right. Sounds like the "Labor Left" can use the protests to oust him. Hope not.



To: tekboy who wrote (74534)2/16/2003 9:41:22 AM
From: kumar  Respond to of 281500
 
wow, u dont mince words, Tek! friends of mine from Aus echo the same sentiment.



To: tekboy who wrote (74534)2/16/2003 12:26:43 PM
From: Rascal  Respond to of 281500
 
It's a terrible thing:

Mad Cowboy Disease. :>)

Rascal@ atleastit'scontained.com



To: tekboy who wrote (74534)2/16/2003 11:59:45 PM
From: LLLefty  Respond to of 281500
 
>>>>>Unlike the protestors in the streets, the establishment tends to disagree less with the substance than with the style of the administration's foreign policy<<<<<.

I attended an 80th birthday dinner last night for a colleague who had served as US ambassador to two European counties. It was a large gathering of retired FS types and much of the evening, of course, centered on shop talk.

I was surprised that a clear majority, with some inevitable reluctance that what-must-be-done-must-be-done, favored military action against Iraq. (I didn't see any hand-wringing Arabist types,though, on the guest list for balance).

For argument's sake, a few guests sought valiantly to defend swaggering Mr. Bush but lacking persuasive argumentation they surrendered unconditionally and we went on to open more wine before taking on the North Koreans. By that time, there was less coherence than consensus.



To: tekboy who wrote (74534)2/17/2003 3:56:22 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
War with Iraq Is Dangerous Folly

by Howard Baetjer Jr.
February 14, 2003
fff.org

Suppose we do get proof that Saddam Hussein is producing banned weapons and hiding them from UN inspectors. Starting a war with Iraq on that account would be utter folly. It would very likely do far, far more harm than good.

Those yearning to let slip the dogs of war, in a paroxysm of self-righteous power, justify doing so in terms of their intended goals: They seek “a regime change,” “to disarm Iraq,” “to make sure the day never comes” when terrorists release chemical weapons on American soil. Do these good intentions justify war against Iraq? No way.

The essential question is not whether our intentions justify war, but whether the likely outcomes of war justify it. The likely outcomes go far beyond the rosy postwar scenario the administration presumes, in which the celebrations of lightning-quick triumph are made poignant and solemn by the flag-draped caskets of a few tens, or hundreds, or thousands, of American soldiers. (As in the Gulf War of a decade ago, we can be confident that no video, no discussion, not even any acknowledgement of the Iraqi dead will be permitted to mar the bright portrait of American success.)

What are the likely outcomes of war? What are the chances that we would accomplish the administration’s goals?

We can certainly bring about a regime change — at least cosmetically; sheer might can kill or imprison those from the current regime we can identify and track down. Many of Saddam’s anonymous underlings, of course, (and his equally power-hungry enemies) will surely manage to hide their stripes today and maneuver into the next regime tomorrow, but it will be a changed regime.

We can disarm Iraq; well, at least partly, for a while. How thoroughly and for how long depends on our willingness to search the country for arms (as inspectors are doing today) and to occupy it for months — or years — monitoring shipments, chasing smugglers, and arguing with our “allies” in the new regime, who will insist on arms with which to counter the menace of the residual Saddamists.

Can we “make sure the day never comes” when terrorists release chemical weapons on American soil? No. Not by invading Iraq. Terrorists against the United States can arise anywhere people are angry and resentful at (what they perceive as) American oppression, invasion, sanctions, support for their enemies or corrupt oppressors, and other officious meddling in their business. And there will always be chemists, biologists, and physicists around the world who can make chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. No. We might take out Saddam’s stockpiles, but it is not possible “to make sure the day never comes.”

What are the likely outcomes of war? What are the chances that all will go well, that no dreadful unintended consequences will arise to plunge the world into deeper distress and conflict a decade, a generation, a half a century later? They are slim.

What should be the decisive consideration in this debate about whether to make war on Iraq is the overwhelming probability that American interference will make things worse in unpredictable ways. For evidence of this, look at the record of American intervention in the Middle East, beginning no earlier than the 1970s.

Rather than heed the wisdom of the Founders and “avoid entangling alliances,” President Eisenhower’s administration brought the shah of Iran to power, and subsequent administrations supported the shah “to stabilize the Middle East.” Our intentions were good. Now, the shah was a brutal dictator, one whom Americans should have been ashamed to support — but, as President Franklin Roosevelt once put it, he was “our son of a bitch.” Of course, that relationship caused problems for Americans when the mullahs overthrew the shah, because their justified hatred for him fed a corresponding hatred for us. Iran became our enemy; our good intentions of stabilizing the Middle East had unintentionally destabilized the Middle East. The best laid plans ...

That was a bad situation, but rather than try a new approach and mind its own business, our government, well- intentioned as ever, tried to fix the situation by intervening again. To oppose Iran our politicians supported, politically and militarily, Iran’s enemy, Saddam Hussein. They knew long ago that he was murdering his own people and the Kurds with chemical weapons, but, again, he was our son of a bitch; American government support, intended to counterbalance Iran, entrenched Saddam’s power.

Serenely unmoved by our politicians’ intentions, of course, Saddam invaded Kuwait. At this point rational statesmen, humbled by experience, might have said, “The heck with it; the Middle East is out of control; Jefferson was right; no more entangling alliances and foreign interventions for us.” Our politicians, of course, high on their military power and persuaded as ever that they could achieve their good intentions and make things right this time, intervened again. (One interesting rationale for getting involved was to “restore the legitimate government of Kuwait,” which, among other proofs of its “legitimacy,” denies women’s rights and freedom of speech.) They intervened with a massive military action, a coalition of other nations’ politicians in support.

A major unintended consequence of that intervention resulted from basing American forces in Saudi Arabia. That appeared to be wise, even necessary, at the time, given our politicians’ determination to meddle. Unfortunately, having American forces attacking Arab targets from bases in holy Saudi Arabia struck many Middle Easterners, including Osama bin Laden, as sacrilegious. He was still fighting back as of September 11, 2001.

A dozen years after the bloodshed and blown $60 billion of the Gulf War, conditions in Iraq are worse than ever. Let’s concede that all along our politicians have had good intentions. What good have they accomplished?

Many say, “Ah! But if only we had finished the job in 1991, Iraq would be no threat.” There it is again: the childish presumption that politicians can achieve the outcomes they wish, by force, in foreign lands. It is not in our politicians’ power “to finish the job” as they would like. They are on other people’s turf, in an unfamiliar culture, and they do not have — can never have — control of the outcome. They can influence it, but they can’t control it. With each intervention our government fails to learn that human affairs are too complex and unpredictable even for very smart, very wise, very educated, well-intentioned — but nevertheless human and limited — politicians and bureaucrats in Washington to control.

Better to have stayed out from the beginning. Better to get out now. Cut the string; break the pattern; end the cycle of well-intentioned, foolish intervention that makes things worse in new and unexpected ways, at staggering expense.

It’s not just in the Middle East that American intervention in foreign regions has been a travesty. Let me beat this horse a bit more to illustrate how foolish — if we judge by history — is the notion that our government protects American interests by intervening in foreign lands:

The communists were gaining power in Vietnam in the 1960s. That was a potential threat. Communism was surely the greatest evil of the 20th century. Admittedly, Vietnam (like Iraq) was half a world away, and (like Iraq) a weak and impoverished nation. But our politicians declared, with solemn gravity, that we could not allow the communist threat to grow. Well-meaning American politicians, proclaiming liberty, righteousness, and vital American interests, intervened in Vietnam. Shall we say to those silent names, carved into dark stone on the Mall, that this time we’re sure things will go our way?

The Soviets were a threat, surely worse than Saddam is today — they had 6,000 nukes. When they invaded Afghanistan our politicians intervened, to help the Afghanis. Part of the outcome was good — the Soviets got their noses bloodied. But, alas, one way we intervened was to provide arms, money, and CIA support to Islamic fundamentalists, among them Osama bin Laden. How might things have played out if we had stayed out of that one?

The thousand-year conflict in the Balkans is another bad situation, one that any well-meaning person would want to fix — if he were so foolish as to believe he could. Presumably, our politicians were well-meaning; they tried to fix it. They intervened and have fixed nothing. How long will American soldiers live hunkered down there, and in what form will the old hatreds break out when we leave?

Somalia was a dreadful situation; our intentions were good; we intervened; we got “Black Hawk Down.”

What of the tough cases, World War I and World War II? Surely it was right to intervene then, wasn’t it? No. Those two wars, the latter of which depended on the outcome of the former, illustrate well the problem of unintended bad consequences that propagate down through history and should make us draw back in horror from attacking Iraq.

Again, the intentions, the aims of the American government’s intervention in World War I were good. But what were the results? Did it “make the world safe for democracy”? The question is too painful to consider. One chain of events is clear: American military participation allowed the Allies to crush Germany so badly that they could impose on Germany the Versailles peace treaty, and punitive, embarrassing terms of that treaty led to the social conditions that let Hitler take power.

Even in World War II, however, into which we were forced at Pearl Harbor, the details of our intervention carried ugly unintended consequences. Our politicians did not just fight Hitler; they did it by allying with Joseph Stalin, who murdered far more of his own people and conquered more territory than Hitler did. Congress sent him arms and money; our president gave him our prestige; he called him our ally. The devilish details of that American intervention allowed the Soviet regime to hold half of Europe in tyranny and economic backwardness for half a century. If we could have stayed out militarily (while of course welcoming Jewish refugees instead of sending them back) it might have been better on the whole.

Not only do our foreign wars fail to benefit the country when all is said and done. Our domestic “wars” fail also, for the same basic reason. Suppose we could be sure that war on Iraq would bring the same success and good effect as the “war on poverty” or the “war on drugs.” Contemplate the years of frustration, futility, and expense that would mean. But is there any reason to expect more success in war on Iraq?

Why is attacking Iraq a dangerous folly? Because American politicians don’t have the control they imagine. They can start a war, but they can’t control how it plays out or ends. The current American administration might be a well-intentioned group that wants to fix a bad situation, and it has the military strength to try. But their good intentions will not determine outcomes. American political and military adventuring overseas rarely achieve good results for the nation. Any given interference in another nation’s affairs is likely to backfire, including this proposed war with Iraq. Why? Because human affairs are too complex to direct. It is not in any politician’s — or even any statesman’s — power to build nations, to install good regimes (that can last), to clear out the bad guys, and to leave nice guys in their place. Picture our occupying Iraq for a decade or so while our politicians try to establish a viable regime they choose, amid the swirl of local politics. The similarities to Vietnam should worry us sick.

A bitter irony of the Bush administration’s stance on Iraq is that it contradicts the principles that supposedly guide its economics. They know, or should know, that governments must not intervene in the market process, because the market process is too complex for central planning. Why don’t they see that the same is true in the social processes of foreign affairs?

Interventionist American foreign policy is the core problem. It is foolish; it is counterproductive; it is dangerous. War with Iraq would be one more misguided step on a path we should abandon. Our foreign policy should be what Thomas Jefferson advised in 1801: “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations — entangling alliances with none.” Our policy toward evildoers such as Saddam should be what John Quincy Adams urged in 1821. He said of America: “Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”

What the U.S. government needs to do is mind its own business. We should be armed to the teeth on our own territory and retaliate fully against al-Qaeda and others who attack us, and by all means preemptively destroy specific, imminent threats (not speculative, possible future ones) to our own territory.

Beyond that we need to stop inflaming the hatred of people around the world through our politicians’ well-intentioned, ill-considered meddling. We need to stop giving Arabs excuses, valid or not, to hate us. We need to give Iraqi children no cause to avenge their parents’ deaths on us a generation hence.

_________________________________

Howard Baetjer teaches economics at Towson University.



To: tekboy who wrote (74534)2/18/2003 2:33:10 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Marching Forward

Issue of 2003-02-17
The New Yorker
newyorker.com

In this week's issue and elsewhere online, Nicholas Lemann's "After Iraq" deals with questions in Washington about a war with Iraq and its aftermath. Here Lemann discusses his article and new developments as America moves closer to war.

THE NEW YORKER: Since you wrote the piece in this week's issue, we've heard a new tape that's apparently from Osama bin Laden and we seem to be witnessing a near-breakdown of NATO. How has the past week changed the terms of debate?

NICHOLAS LEMANN: I don't think much has changed, because the debate, in Washington, at least, ended with Colin Powell's presentation at the United Nations on February 5th. Washington is for war, and new information isn't going to make it any more or less for war.

You began writing about George W. Bush's interest in Iraq during the first month of his Administration, in January, 2001. At that time, you described hawks within the Administration who, even then, wanted to use force to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. How does the post-September 11th argument for regime change compare with the case made early on by people like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle? Has it changed?

The hawks used to favor regime change in Iraq accomplished through heavy American support of the Iraqi National Congress, the exile organization headed by Ahmad Chalabi. Sometime soon after September 11th, the idea of accomplishing regime change through an American invasion came to the fore. Also, the hawks began asserting that Saddam had links to Al Qaeda, which they hadn't before. But the underlying case hasn't changed much; it's the proposed means that have changed.

In your piece, you discuss one intriguing—not to say speculative—argument being advanced for war with Iraq: that removing Saddam could help bring about a wholesale change for the better in the political, cultural, and economic climate of the Arab Middle East. Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is a proponent of the theory that a war with Iraq could help bring democracy to the Arab Middle East, by a sort of democratic domino effect. Is this realistic?

To borrow a phrase, it depends on what you mean by democracy. The Administration defines democracy less in electoral terms, especially in the short run, than in terms of "civil society" and "democratic institutions," such as court systems, free speech, opposition parties, the right of assembly, and a free press. They want these to spring up across the Arab world, and it should be said that, even if they spring up spontaneously, in many cases the government of the country would normally just repress them. Therefore the application of American power will probably be a necessary part of any spreading of democracy in the Middle East.

How about the argument that the real key to a new Middle East is a resolution not of the Iraq problem but of the Israel-Palestine question? Can removing Saddam really solve the problem of two peoples who want the same land?

We've been talking about the Administration's hawks thus far. There are lots of hawks, but it's certainly fair to say that, generally, the hawks regard a Palestinian Authority headed by Yasir Arafat as illegitimate—another nation in need of regime change, if you will—and don't see the point of conducting peace talks with Arafat. Most of them would also strongly disagree with the idea that the dispute over the West Bank is actually the crucial issue across the whole region. Instead, they see it as an excuse that Arab governments use to distract their people's attention from closer-to-home problems like poverty and unemployment. And some hawks would argue that removing Saddam will be a blow to the pan-Arab ideology under which one territorial dispute is enlarged into a region-wide issue. The hawks just don't buy the idea that Palestinian statehood is the key to anything in the Middle East.

The sudden triumph of democracy is the best-case scenario. Talk a little bit about the worst-case scenario.

The worst worst-case scenario, I suppose, would be that the United States would lose the war. Next worst would be a bloody, protracted war. If the war itself ends very quickly in an American victory, as practically everybody in Washington expects, the next-worst scenario would be either that Iraq would dissolve into internal ethnic strife, on the model of Yugoslavia, or that large portions of the country would not be under government control and would become havens for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, on the model of Pakistan.

You mention how the very problems that democracy in the Middle East is meant to solve, including rising Islamic radicalism, might, ironically, make democratic elections dangerous to our national interest, because anti-American Islamists could win. Would the prospect of real democracy in the Middle East do more to help or to hinder our campaign against radicalism, anti-Americanism, and terrorism?

Again, it depends on what you mean by democracy. The Administration seems to have in mind encouraging conservative pro-American elements in the Arab world, not—in the short run, at least—forcing countries to hold open elections that Islamists might win.

Of course, there's some feedback at work here: we support a kleptocratic monarchy, for example, because it is pro-American, and then we become more unwelcome in a nation that identifies us with unpopular rulers. We see ourselves as champions of democracy because we believe in democracy, but how can we convince the Arab world to see us this way?

The Administration truly believes that the American system of government is the one best system for all people in all parts of the world. President Bush repeated that sentiment in the State of the Union address. By the Administration's lights, the idea that the Arab world wouldn't embrace American-style democracy if it were a real option is inconceivable. I've asked several officials a version of the kleptocracy question, and they say, "We'd make sure that the governments we set up would not be kleptocracies."

Obviously, even if Saddam is overthrown quickly, polls won't open the next day. How will the interim leaders of Iraq be chosen, and by whom? And how can that be done in a way that encourages democratic transformation?

That's a fight inside the Administration. Evidently, those who wanted to install Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress as the country's new government immediately have lost out to those who want an American military occupation for a year or two. So General Tommy Franks, of the Central Command, will rule Iraq in the short run. In the longer run, the U.S. will set up a government that includes all the major groups in the country, as it did in Afghanistan. Whether the new government takes hold is another question.

It's hard to imagine a sudden flowering of democracy without some social stability in postwar Iraq. And, assuming that it will take bombing and battles to get Saddam out, rather than a quick coup d'état, it's hard to imagine that stability can be achieved without significant investment in reconstruction. The Bush Administration is willing to fight for democracy in Iraq, but will it be willing to pay for it?

That will be another fight—the one over how much to spend on Iraq's reconstruction. Everybody sees the merit in spending a lot, but, with a long recession on, after the war there will quickly be political pressure not to spend. That will be an interesting one to watch.

Here's a related question: Rumsfeld and others seem to have concluded that Europe—"Old" Europe, anyway—is irrelevant to American decision-making. But if we don't manage to bring France and Germany along with us can we still ask them to help pay for the rebuilding of Iraq?

It certainly doesn't look as if Old Europe is going to help out much. That will only make the arguments over how much the U.S. should spend more bitter. Big numbers will be involved.

In your piece, Stephen Cambone, who is in charge of evaluating weapons systems for the Pentagon, suggests that Iraq manipulates the governments of countries like Syria and Jordan through oil supply. This raises an issue that has provided fodder for the war's opponents: who will control Iraq's oil? For example, France already has contracts in place, contingent on the lifting of sanctions. Would these contracts be voided if they're not in on the fighting? How does oil fit into America's plans?

I would guess that the United States will honor the French contracts. The main oil motivation for the Administration, I would think, is to make the U.S. less dependent on the Saudis, and to make the Syrians and the Jordanians more dependent on the U.S. It's a foreign-policy play, in other words, that doesn't have much to do with a desire to enrich American oil companies.

Does having this longer view of the Middle East make coöperation with the U.N. more necessary for the United States, or less? If we've traded for the chance to eliminate Saddam, have we made a good deal?

Again, we're talking about the Administration's hawks here. They are not big believers in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations and treaties. To them, America's going it alone is a good thing, not a bad thing.

The talk of political and economic transformations seems to ignore a crucial factor: religion. Do proposals for regime change incorporate a sensitivity to the religion factor? After all, one of the deepest divides in Iraq is between the Shiite majority and the Sunni minority, which has enjoyed a relatively favored position under Saddam Hussein.

Part of the hawks' scenario is that after the war, if Iraq's Shiites are empowered, that will make the Saudis nervous, because they have a large disenfranchised Shiite population, and it will weaken the regime in Iran, because Iran will lose the argument that it is the only institution of Shiite power in the region. Both of those outcomes, from the Administration's point of view, would be good.

You spoke at length with Douglas Feith, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, about our long-term goals in Iraq and the Middle East. Feith talks about one of the goals of a war with Iraq; namely, to dissuade other states from supporting terrorists by making an example of Iraq. Will eliminating state support solve the problem of terrorism?

The question is more whether the U.S. really will be able to mount a concerted attack on all the state sponsors of terrorism in the region—Iraq is far from the worst offender—than whether eliminating state support will eliminate terrorism. If all state support ended, and if the government of every country truly controlled the whole country, it would certainly be bad for terrorist organizations. Those are difficult goals to achieve, though.

Feith also talks about fostering a new international way of thinking about terrorism. He compares it to piracy or the slave trade, to a practice that must be delegitimated—a theme that Bush picked up in his State of the Union address. As with the spread of democracy, the subtext here seems to be that military action can be used to reinforce our philosophical messages. But the world is full of bad countries that could, in effect, use a lesson. Does this principle put America on the path to being a missionary with a sword? Can we make the world safe for democracy?

That's the right question. The hawks think of themselves as neo-Wilsonian moralists. They really do want to change the whole world, through the use of, and the threat of, military force. That's the whole idea. Whether it will work, and whether the American public will support it, is another question.