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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: JohnM who wrote (75024)2/17/2003 9:53:18 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
A Position of Principle

Le Monde Editorial

Saturday 15 February 2003

Diplomacy is repetition. France said simple things, stated principles on Friday February 14, at the UN through the voice of Dominique de Villepin. It was not the objective, but along the way, the Foreign Affairs Minister pulverized certain more or less insulting nonsense that had been hammered out in some of the American and British press. No, it's not the oil, and still less trade that doesn't amount to more than a few hundred million Euros, that explains France's position on Iraq; still less a supposed obsession to systematically oppose the United States, a country with which, whatever Richard Perle, the gloomy Pentagon counselor, may think, France wants to maintain alliance and friendship; and still less some Munichist atavism on the part of a nation which has soldiers in absolutely all international forces- and which does not expect that there be "zero mortality'' among them.

From the beginning of this affair, Jacques Chirac has maintained three basic principles.

The first: the objective really is to make sure Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction which might fall into the arsenal of international terrorism. The second: the UN disarmament inspectors must have a reasonable opportunity to realize the first objective. The third: the use of force will take on the form of a North-South war, the West against the Arab-Islamic world, the exact strategic configuration Osama Bin Laden wants.

It's because this position is not totally without foundation that Mr.de Villepin, was able to swing the balance Friday from the strongest to the weakest and align twelve of the fifteen other members of the Security Council behind France's position. While it was being said that the minister was isolated in a flamboyant losing minority posture... Serious-mindedness requires that we add another thing. The French objective of disarmament by inspections would not be credible without the American army's deployment. Baghdad only conceded with gestures of flexibility under the military pressure of the United States. Complementarity?

Mr.de Villepin's message was also addressed to those in Washington who hope to use a war for other purposes than disarmament: to begin to remodel the political landscape of the Near East, even under Crusader missile showers and at the price for the United States of several years' occupation and administration of Iraq, a prospect, which, once again, could only delight Mr. Bin Laden! The final French principle, which does not exclude the use of force, targets those people. But any use of force may only be decided by the UN, all the more so because it is a question of an intervention that would have the quality of preventative war. The message is the obligation to apply a multilateral approach, a UN approach in an unstable world. And of the necessity to reject the sovereignty of power which some advocate in Washington and which turns its back on the complexity of the world and the universalism it demands.

-------

Translation: TruthOut French language correspondent Leslie Thatcher

truthout.org



To: JohnM who wrote (75024)2/17/2003 10:03:56 PM
From: Rascal  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Liberal Press.

February 18, 2003
Behind the Great Divide
By PAUL KRUGMAN


There has been much speculation why Europe and the U.S. are suddenly at such odds. Is it about culture? About history? But I haven't seen much discussion of an obvious point: We have different views partly because we see different news.

Let's back up. Many Americans now blame France for the chill in U.S.-European relations. There is even talk of boycotting French products.

But France's attitude isn't exceptional. Last Saturday's huge demonstrations confirmed polls that show deep distrust of the Bush administration and skepticism about an Iraq war in all major European nations, whatever position their governments may take. In fact, the biggest demonstrations were in countries whose governments are supporting the Bush administration.

There were big demonstrations in America too. But distrust of the U.S. overseas has reached such a level, even among our British allies, that a recent British poll ranked the U.S. as the world's most dangerous nation — ahead of North Korea and Iraq.

So why don't other countries see the world the way we do? News coverage is a large part of the answer. Eric Alterman's new book, "What liberal media?" doesn't stress international comparisons, but the difference between the news reports Americans and Europeans see is a stark demonstration of his point. At least compared with their foreign counterparts, the "liberal" U.S. media are strikingly conservative — and in this case hawkish.

I'm not mainly talking about the print media. There are differences, but the major national newspapers in the U.S. and the U.K. at least seem to be describing the same reality.

Most people, though, get their news from TV — and there the difference is immense. The coverage of Saturday's antiwar rallies was a reminder of the extent to which U.S. cable news, in particular, seems to be reporting about a different planet than the one covered by foreign media.

What would someone watching cable news have seen? On Saturday, news anchors on Fox described the demonstrators in New York as "the usual protesters" or "serial protesters." CNN wasn't quite so dismissive, but on Sunday morning the headline on the network's Web site read "Antiwar rallies delight Iraq," and the accompanying picture showed marchers in Baghdad, not London or New York.

This wasn't at all the way the rest of the world's media reported Saturday's events, but it wasn't out of character. For months both major U.S. cable news networks have acted as if the decision to invade Iraq has already been made, and have in effect seen it as their job to prepare the American public for the coming war.

So it's not surprising that the target audience is a bit blurry about the distinction between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda. Surveys show that a majority of Americans think that some or all of the Sept. 11 hijackers were Iraqi, while many believe that Saddam Hussein was involved in Sept. 11, a claim even the Bush administration has never made. And since many Americans think that the need for a war against Saddam is obvious, they think that Europeans who won't go along are cowards.

Europeans, who don't see the same things on TV, are far more inclined to wonder why Iraq — rather than North Korea, or for that matter Al Qaeda — has become the focus of U.S. policy. That's why so many of them question American motives, suspecting that it's all about oil or that the administration is simply picking on a convenient enemy it knows it can defeat. They don't see opposition to an Iraq war as cowardice; they see it as courage, a matter of standing up to the bullying Bush administration.

There are two possible explanations for the great trans-Atlantic media divide. One is that European media have a pervasive anti-American bias that leads them to distort the news, even in countries like the U.K. where the leaders of both major parties are pro-Bush and support an attack on Iraq. The other is that some U.S. media outlets — operating in an environment in which anyone who questions the administration's foreign policy is accused of being unpatriotic — have taken it as their assignment to sell the war, not to present a mix of information that might call the justification for war into question.

So which is it? I've reported, you decide.


nytimes.com



To: JohnM who wrote (75024)6/7/2005 12:56:58 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
WATERGATE DAYS
___________________________

by Seymour M. Hersh
Issue of 2005-06-13 and 20
newyorker.com

It was late in the evening on May 16, 1973, and I was in the Washington bureau of the Times, immersed in yet another story about Watergate. The paper had been overwhelmed by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s reporting for the Washington Post the previous year, and I was trying to catch up. The subject this time was Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon’s national-security adviser. I had called Kissinger to get his comment on a report, which the Times was planning to run, that he had been involved in wiretapping reporters, fellow Administration officials, and even his own aides on the National Security Council. At first, he had indignantly denied the story. When I told him that I had information from sources in the Justice Department that he had personally forwarded the wiretap requests to the F.B.I., he was silent, and then said that he might have to resign. The implicit message was that this would be bad for the country, and that the Times would be blamed. A few minutes later, the columnist James Reston, who was a friend of Kissinger’s, padded up to my desk and asked, gently, if I understood that “Henry” was serious about resigning. I did understand, but Watergate was more important than Kissinger.

Alexander Haig, Kissinger’s sometimes loyal deputy, had called a few times during the day to beat back the story. At around seven o’clock, there was a final call. “You’re Jewish, aren’t you, Seymour?” In all our previous conversations, I’d been “Sy.” I said yes. “Let me ask you one question, then,” Haig said. “Do you honestly believe that Henry Kissinger, a Jewish refugee from Germany who lost thirteen members of his family to the Nazis, could engage in such police-state tactics as wiretapping his own aides? If there is any doubt, you owe it to yourself, your beliefs, and your nation to give us one day to prove that your story is wrong.” That was Watergate, circa 1973. The Times printed the story the next day, and Kissinger did not resign.

Access to high-level sources within the government was not so unusual at that point. (I had been given the wiretap information by a senior F.B.I. official, now deceased.) But in the beginning there was only Woodward and Bernstein. In the first months of the scandal, in mid-1972, they had pounded out story after story about the Watergate break-in with little competition from other newspapers, and little support from them, either. To the dismay of Abe Rosenthal, who was then the Times’ managing editor, the paper’s Washington bureau had at first relied on assurances from Kissinger that the Post’s story would not lead to the most senior officials in the White House. I had deliberately continued writing about Vietnam, staying as far away from Watergate as possible. I didn’t believe Kissinger for a moment—but I also thought that Woodward and Bernstein were too far ahead, and too conversant with White House officials whose names I didn’t even know. Then, just before Christmas, Clifton Daniel was named Washington bureau chief of the Times. He bought me a box of Brooks Brothers shirts and sweaters—he did not think I was up to the Times’ dress standard—and told me that I was henceforth assigned to Watergate.

A few weeks later, after one of my early stories, which dealt with hush-money payments to a Watergate burglar, appeared in the Times, Woodward and Bernstein got in touch with me and essentially welcomed me aboard. That spring, when we were all doing a lot of daily reporting on the coverup, I spent a long evening with the two of them, talking about where the scandal might lead.

The Nixon White House was unable to spin the story, or to control it. In part, this was because of the wealth of information, including documents, that reporters got from sources within the Administration. Many reporters also had sources on the various congressional investigating committees and in the Justice Department and other agencies. One day, newspapers would publish classified C.I.A. memoranda dealing with White House pressure on the agency to help with the coverup; another day, there would be the Senate Watergate committee’s internal assessment of the credibility of Nixon’s men. If the President and his subordinates were upset about a Times story alleging that Nixon had used ethnic and religious slurs, the paper was able to present the White House with a transcript of his comments.

Anonymous sources were essential to the Watergate story. Reporters were in frequent contact with members of Nixon’s Cabinet and with high-level investigative and intelligence officials. Some of the men who met with the President, and advised him, provided scathing details about his demeanor and his often ill-advised outbursts.

I knew little about Woodward and Bernstein’s sources, and nothing about Deep Throat, whose importance was first made known in their 1974 book, “All the President’s Men.” I knew W. Mark Felt, identified last week as the critical Post source, as a senior F.B.I. official who, like others in the demoralized bureau, was talking to the press. In fact, at the time I thought that Felt was a source for a colleague of mine at the Times on at least one story. Felt was a first-rate contact, but Woodward and Bernstein had many excellent sources. Their stories were as accurate as any group of newspaper articles could be. I also suspected that they were talking to many of the same people I was. On one occasion, I visited someone I assumed was a secret source of my own and found a handwritten note saying “Kilroy Was Here” affixed to the outside office door—a token from Woodward.

Many people in government were outraged by the sheer bulk and gravity of the corrupt activities they witnessed in the White House. Reporters were their allies and confidants. Those men, who dealt with the most sensitive national-security issues, had their worst fears confirmed by the revelation, in July, 1973, of the White House’s taping system, which recorded their meetings and conversations with the President. They wondered what else they didn’t know. Some feared that the government might fall, and some talked to reporters about their concern that the President, facing impeachment, might try to hold on to his office by defying the Constitution.

By May of 1973, the White House coverup was unravelling, and the stalking of Richard Nixon by the wider press corps had begun. Woodward and Bernstein had been more than vindicated. The Nixon Administration, mired in a losing war in Vietnam, was also losing the battle against the truth at home. Throughout the two-year crisis, Watergate was perceived as a domestic issue, but its impact on foreign policy was profound. As memoirs by both Nixon and Kissinger show, neither man understood why the White House could not do what it wanted, at home or in Vietnam. The reason it couldn’t is, one hopes, just as valid today: they were operating in a democracy in which they were accountable to a Constitution and to a citizenry that held its leaders to a high standard of morality and integrity. That is the legacy of Watergate.



To: JohnM who wrote (75024)6/7/2005 3:05:13 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
"In times of universal deceit, telling the truth will be a revolutionary act."

~George Orwell



To: JohnM who wrote (75024)6/7/2005 3:11:21 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Richard Reeves' Latest Column...

richardreeves.com

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