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Politics : Foreign Policy Discussion Thread -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: zonder who wrote (4314)2/18/2003 9:01:21 AM
From: lorne  Respond to of 15992
 
Hill of Beans
French Kiss-Off
Christopher Caldwell

Americans have tended to ignore simmering European discontent with the Bush foreign policy over the last few months. We have continued to do so even after a State of the Union address that ticked certain Euros off mightily and a Colin Powell presentation at the UN that impressed them not at all. My priorities last weekend, for instance, were not the shifting positions of European statesmen but the progress (and the racket) that a bunch of repairmen were making on the floor above me. My reckoning was that the outcome of plumbing work is always more touch-and-go than the outcome of intra-alliance bickering. The Europeans complain and then fall into line. It’s a law of nature. To crib from the old joke book, the European Union is America’s "geostrategic rival of the future"—and always will be.

But there were a couple of events over the weekend that indicate this Eurosis is of a much more virulent strain than the type we’ve had to deal with any time since WWII—at least the strain of it that has struck Germany and France. On Saturday, Donald Rumsfeld was appearing at a press conference with his German counterpart, Peter Struck, when a journalist sandbagged the pair of them with a question. He asked Rumsfeld for his reaction to a new "Franco-German plan" to resolve the Iraq crisis that was due to be announced in the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel this week. Rumsfeld said that the existence of such a plan was a new one on him, and turned the question over to Struck. Struck didn’t deny that there was such a plan. He merely said he wasn’t terribly keen to talk about it at just that moment. The plan, does, in fact, exist, and its details emerged over the weekend. Its main feature is a massive UN occupying force—so massive that it would seem to require the resignation of Saddam Hussein as a precondition for being put into effect. Which seems to bring us back to Square One. But the unworkability of the plan did not make it any more palatable to Rumsfeld.

A few weeks ago, Rumsfeld famously dismissed the French and the Germans as "old Europe"—merely two biggish countries in a federation that will soon include twenty-five. More recently, he has included Germany on a list of three countries—the others are Cuba and Libya—that are unwilling to help in the war effort at all. A battle continues to rage for the sympathies of Europe’s other twenty-three members. France and Germany have been routed. The United States has always had Britain at its side. But the letter of solidarity written by Blair and seven other statesmen was a slap in the face to the Franco-German alliance. In the French papers, these countries were referred to as the "Gang of Eight." But that didn’t seem to be scaring anybody, because the eight-country letter was followed by another breaking of ranks. A bunch of Eastern European countries calling themselves the "Vilnius Ten" issued a similar communique. That doesn’t leave many countries left to march to the Franco-German drummer, and as of this writing, they seem to have picked up exactly one: Belgium. Even the Dutch, wedged between the two countries, have not got on board. Their new center-right government did not sign the Blair letter, but only because they are newly elected and still in the process of forming a government. (One French strategist I saw in Washington recently called the Paris-Berlin alliance the "Axis of Irrelevance.")

New Europe may be running roughshod over Paris and Berlin just now, but this doesn’t mean French president Jacques Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder are out of cards to play. Along with Belgium, they have been obstructing NATO’s movement of materiel into the Iraq region, so much so that NATO secretary-general Lord Robertson has been scrambling to find ways to resolve what looks like a major crisis. And last week, the Netherlands reportedly took the extraordinary step of shipping Patriot missiles to Turkey country-to-country, circumventing usual NATO procedures. This appeared to U.S. officials to be a sign that the French and German opposition might be about to move from the rhetorical level to the concrete one.

It is important to remember when looking at situations like this that the Germans and French are not doing what they’re doing simply in order to be pains in the ass. They sincerely believe that rushing into war in Iraq is a bad idea. But that doesn’t mean they’re opposed to us for identical reasons. The French have long looked at "Europe"—i.e. the inchoate European Union—as their vehicle to regain their lost great-power status. With the only other great continental power in the EU, Germany, frozen out of geostrategic ambitions by its history and the rest of Europe small and fragmented, France has always stood a fair chance of being the heart and brains of the EU.

Now that chance looks like it is not going to pan out, for several reasons: first, Europe has grown too big for France to run; second, France is so dependent (for domestic political reasons) on milking European institutions for agricultural and other subsidies that it has grown unpopular within the EU; and third, Germany has decided it wants a bigger role.

This last reason is why Germany and France have been driven together in a kind of shotgun wedding over the past few weeks. Gerhard Schroeder’s breaking with Bush’s Iraq policy was insincere in the sense that he has no vision of his own about Iraq; but it was also sincere, in that he (and his voters) have long been looking for some pretext to break from their dependence on the United States and affirm themselves a "normal country" again. In brief, Schroeder’s unwillingness to go to war in Iraq, although advanced under a pacifist pretext, is actually a nationalist move.

German nationalism, of course, however ultimately benign, scares the bejesus out of the world. That is why it needs France so badly. France is Germany’s designated driver. And that has led to a bizarre sidelight of the Iraq situation, in which the foreign policy for 140 million of Europe’s 400-some-odd is being directed by one of the stranger characters on the world scene: French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin.

Pretty much all I knew about de Villepin until recent days is that he wrote one of the most pompous books about la gloire de la France ever penned. It’s called The Cry of the Gargoyle, and it sold pretty well when it came out last spring. De Villepin is deeply, deeply French. Americans who assume this means he is a relativistic, intellectually constipated foreign minister in the mold of Warren Christopher do not know France. De Villepin is of a Napoleonic cast of mind, and if one were looking for an American secretary of state to whom he could be compared, it would not be Warren Christopher but Al Haig.

De Villepin is in hot water in France just now, because the mini-intervention in Ivory Coast is going badly and is getting bad reviews around the world. Ivory Coast is another topic I haven’t exactly earned a doctorate in, although I do know that the Gs are silent in "Laurent Gbagbo." But I’ll take the word of the French press that the so-called Marcoussis Accord—the strategy of helping the rebels wring concessions out of Gbagbo in exchange for a pair of vocalized consonants—was de Villepin’s idea. Now that this strategy has resulted in Ivorians appearing on international television carrying signs reading, "Help us, Mr. Bush! Chirac is a new Bin Laden!" it’s fairly open season on de Villepin in French newspapers and magazines.

An absolutely dazzling profile of de Villepin that appeared last week in the newsweekly L’Express gave a huge sampling of de Villepin’s "I’m in charge" Al Haigery. "This ambassador is an idiot!" he recently said in front of some of Chirac’s top advisers. "Who named him?" He described his predecessor Hubert Védrine (who, for all his anti-American truculence, is among the most brilliant European ministers of the past decade) as "no genius." He explains his cowboy approach to the Ivory Coast by saying, "It’s by taking the initiative that we have the best chance of succeeding... One must always take the risk of peace." But, I hear you ask, isn’t that what the United States is proposing to do in Iraq? Villepin has an answer to that, too. "Making two wars, one in Afghanistan, one in Iraq," he says, "is like having two women: it’s totally unmanageable!"
nypress.com



To: zonder who wrote (4314)2/18/2003 9:31:18 AM
From: E. T.  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 15992
 
You assume the Iraqis are going to put up a fight. Recall in the Gulf War Iraq was the aggressor fighting on another country's soil. In the present case, an oppressed, tortured and downtrodden people are how likely to stand up to defend a despotic regime and its murdering genocidal leader?



To: zonder who wrote (4314)2/18/2003 9:51:19 AM
From: E. T.  Respond to of 15992
 
... a growing sense of apprehension that the Iraqi army, including members of the elite Republican Guard, might desert in the event of a U.S.-led attack on the nation.

worldnetdaily.com

As I say, don't expect a big fight.



To: zonder who wrote (4314)2/18/2003 10:57:55 AM
From: Alastair McIntosh  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 15992
 
zonder you do your best to discredit any source that does not support your view. Yet you say without question: 35,000 civilians dead. Your source for this statistic:

cnn.com

In June 1991, the U.S. estimated that more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers died, 300,000 were wounded, 150,000 deserted and 60,000 were taken prisoner. Many human rights groups claimed a much higher number of Iraqis were killed in action. According to Baghdad, civilian casualties numbered more than 35,000. However, since the war, some scholars have concluded that the number of Iraqi soldiers who were killed was significantly less than initially reported.


Should your sources not meet the same standards you employ to criticize others?



To: zonder who wrote (4314)2/18/2003 11:24:53 AM
From: Alastair McIntosh  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 15992
 
zonder, if you are truly interested on the health effects of exposure to depleted uranium you could read the report of the European Commission, Directorate General of the Environment.

europa.eu.int

This report is specifically about the Balkans and the concern about the 10 tonnes of DU ammunition fired in Kosovo.

You may discount this report as it was produced by European experts and probably does not meet the high standards of Iraqi publications. However they conclude:

1. On the basis of an assessment of the possible exposure from depleted uranium, taking all pathways of exposure into account, it is concluded that it could not result in a deterministic radiation detriment, except perhaps in the case of embedded DU shrapnel. The basic hypothesis of radiation protection implies that the stochastic risk exist even for low doses. However at low doses (below 100 mSv) no observable health effect compared to the base line incidence would be observed.

On the basis of available information, it is concluded that exposure to DU could not produce any detectable health effects under realistic assumptions of the dose that might be received. Moreover, in view of the fact that committed doses from incorporated DU build up over a lifetime and in view of the minimum latency period of cancer induction, such effects could not occur during the first few years after incorporation as a result of radiological exposure.

This conclusion applies in particular to leukaemia: while the latency period for leukaemia is shorter than for solid cancers, uranium accumulates very little in blood forming organs such as bone marrow. Following inhalation of insoluble uranium the calculated risk of leukaemia is orders of magnitude lower than the risk of lung cancer induction.

The possibility of a combined effect of exposure to toxic or carcinogenic chemicals and to radiation can not a priori be excluded but there is no evidence to support this hypothesis either. Under the considered scenarios, exposures to DU give low doses, comparable to natural background. Hence there is no reason to believe that chemicals may change the magnitude of the potential radiation effects.

2. Deposition of depleted uranium on vegetation presents a potential for incorporation through the food chain, but it is limited in time until rainfall. Direct ingestion of contaminated soil must be taken into consideration, in particular for children, as well as ingestion throughhand contamination. Direct ingestion of contaminated soil by cattle and sheep as a pathway to human ingestion could also be considered. Doses that may results both from direct
ingestion of soil and contamination of foodstuffs will be extremely low.

Possible contamination of drinking water must be considered since it is a possible pathway of exposure if very large amounts of DU are buried in soil, depending on the solubility of the uranium or the acidity and reducing properties of the environment, and the hydrological characteristics of the region. A generic assessment however yields nothing but very low doses resulting from drinking water.

Test firing or disposal of unused ammunition is being carried out in the sea. Due to the low corrosion rate and to the large volume of surrounding seawater, no detectable increase of uranium concentration in seawater or biota is expected.

3. The experts feel that no useful guidance can be given with regard to the need for monitoring individuals for incorporation of DU without knowing the specific exposure situation. In general it will be more appropriate to monitor the environment rather than individuals. Nevertheless individual monitoring may be useful for confirmatory purposes and to provide reassurance.

4. The experts also conclude that no guidance can be given on the need for intervention measures specific to a given situation. Intervention should be justified taking the specific situation into account. Straightforward general protective measures should be considered on the basis of a common-sense approach to justification for easily avoidable exposures. Where appropriate, specific protection against exposure to depleted uranium should be proposed by a radiation protection advisor with knowledge of the local situation.

5. The experts see no need to derogate depleted uranium from any provision of the BSS, nor to introduce stricter requirements in the BSS for specific uses of DU.