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Politics : DON'T START THE WAR -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Thomas M. who wrote (10500)2/19/2003 4:30:11 PM
From: Thomas M.  Respond to of 25898
 
images.icnetwork.co.uk



To: Thomas M. who wrote (10500)2/19/2003 4:30:53 PM
From: jlallen  Respond to of 25898
 
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA

Hey, I got this swampland in Florida I'd like to sell....



To: Thomas M. who wrote (10500)2/19/2003 6:04:27 PM
From: Lazarus_Long  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 25898
 
In 1952, the West rejected an offer by Stalin to unify the two Germanies by a national election.
johndclare.net
OK. But I really think it's necessary to know what else was attached to that.

Or do you believe Stalin was a nice guy that had the best interests of mankind at heart? Yes?

Oh. You probably do.

Sorry.

This might have had something to do with it:
By 1948, Russia controlled Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Churchill was first to refer to this as an Iron Curtain that divided Europe. The Allies were angered that the free elections promised by Stalin at the Yalta Conference were not held and adopted a new foreign policy of containment to keep communism to the areas where it was already in affect. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 stated that America would help any non-communist country to resist communist pressure. The Marshall Plan involved sending large amounts of American money to help non-communist countries to recover from World War II.
meme.essortment.com

And this:
1952

10.3.52
The government of the USSR hands a note to the governments of France, Great Britain and the
USA containing new Soviet proposals for the settlement of the German question.
In order to prevent the rearmament of the Federal Republic within the EDC the Soviet Union first
appeals to responsibility under the four-power agreement and cites the demilitarization
measures agreed at Potsdam.
The western powers react coolly and in return call for free elections for the whole of Germany, an
issue not mentioned in the "Stalin note". But on 9 April Moscow concedes even this possibility.
Further notes are exchanged, generating intense public debate in the Federal Republic. Along
with the western powers the federal government regards the Soviet proposals as a simple
manoeuvre to block the integration of the Federal Republic into the western world. The opposite
view, held by prominent politicians and journalists, is that refusal to rearm and enter military
alliances may represent the last chance of achieving reunification. Accordingly they demand that
the seriousness of the Soviet proposals be tested by means of negotiations.

25.3.52
The reply sent by the western powers to the USSR makes free elections under UN supervision a
precondition of negotiations over a peace treaty.

9.4.52
In a further note to the western powers the USSR continues to insist that Germany remain free
from alliances but agress to allow free elections in Germany an condition that they are
supervised not by the UN but by the Four Powers.
The Council of Ministers in the GDR issues an "Ordinance an measures at the demarcation line
between the German Democratic Republic and the west German zones of occupation. "
The Ministry for State Security is made responsible for the control and intensified surveillance of
the borders of the GDR in order to prevent "a further incursion of saboteurs, spies, terrorists and
parasites" into the GDR; later an a 5 km-wide area of no-man's land is established along the
demarcation line.

dhm.de
Now you guys being such fans of the UN would surely agree that UN supervison is a great idea, right?

You'll probably like this better:
On the same grounds, we can understand why the political leadership has often failed to pursue apparent opportunities to reduce the threat of superpower confrontation, and thus to enhance national security. One early example was in 1952, when the Kremlin put forth a proposal for reunification and neutralization of Germany, with no conditions on economic policies and with guarantees for "the rights of man and basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction, and assembly" and the free activity of democratic parties and organizations. In reply, the U.S. and its allies objected that the West did not recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier between Germany and Poland, and insisted that a reunified Germany be free to join NATO, a demand that the Russians could hardly accept a few years after Germany alone had virtually destroyed the Soviet Union. The Western reply also referred, more plausibly, to lack of clarity about free elections; but instead of seeking further clarification, the proposal was rejected with quite unreasonable demands. Commenting at the time, James Warburg, one of the few to have argued that the opportunity should be pursued, notes that neither the text of the March 10 Kremlin proposal "nor even the fact of its arrival was disclosed by Washington until after the Western reply had been sent on March 25." He suggests that the delay may have been related to the Administration desire "to present its case for the Mutual Security Act of 1952 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, without having that committee's deliberations prejudiced by knowledge of the Soviet proposal"; the Act called for about $7.5 billion for Western rearmament, and was "based upon the assumption that an All-German settlement could not possibly be achieved."24
zmag.org
Maybe there was an opportunity thrown away. OTOH, the West did want West Germany in NATO. (Although now that doesn't look like such a good idea.)
But maybe you should explain to PartyTime that political chicanery isn't desirable. He was justifying it on the part of the French a day or two ago.

Bit this is most telling of all, I think:

After a second East German proposal for talks on a possible
unification of the two Germanys failed because of the FRG's demand
s for free elections in the GDR, the Soviet Union put forth a new
proposal to the Western Allies in March 1952. The Soviet Union
would agree to German unification if the Oder-Neisse border were
recognized as final and if a unified Germany were to remain n eutral.
If the proposal were accepted, Allied troops would leave Germany
within one year, and the country would obtain its full sovereignty.

Although the offer was directed to the Western Allies, its content
was aimed directly at the West German public and aroused lively
discussion about the country's future. Adenauer was convinced,
however, that even if the Soviet proposal were serious, a n
acceptance of the plan would mean Germany's exclusion from the
community of Western democracies and an uncertain future.
Together with the Western Allies, which did not wish to act without
his consent, Adenauer continued to demand free elections supervi
sed by the United Nations (UN) in all of Germany as a precondition
for negotiations. The Soviet Union declined and abandoned its
proposal.
Adenauer was harshly criticized by the opposition for not
having seized this opportunity for unification. As his imp ressive
victory in the Bundestag elections of 1953 clearly demonstrated,
however, Adenauer had acted according to the wishes of the
overwhelming majority of West Germans (see table 4, Appendix).

Adenauer's decision to turn down the Soviet proposal was
convincing evidence that the FRG intended to remain firmly anchored
in the Western defense community.

1upinfo.com