To: Thomas M. who wrote (10500 ) 2/19/2003 6:04:27 PM From: Lazarus_Long Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 25898 In 1952, the West rejected an offer by Stalin to unify the two Germanies by a national election. johndclare.net OK. But I really think it's necessary to know what else was attached to that. Or do you believe Stalin was a nice guy that had the best interests of mankind at heart? Yes? Oh. You probably do. Sorry. This might have had something to do with it:By 1948, Russia controlled Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Churchill was first to refer to this as an Iron Curtain that divided Europe. The Allies were angered that the free elections promised by Stalin at the Yalta Conference were not held and adopted a new foreign policy of containment to keep communism to the areas where it was already in affect. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 stated that America would help any non-communist country to resist communist pressure. The Marshall Plan involved sending large amounts of American money to help non-communist countries to recover from World War II. meme.essortment.com And this:1952 10.3.52 The government of the USSR hands a note to the governments of France, Great Britain and the USA containing new Soviet proposals for the settlement of the German question. In order to prevent the rearmament of the Federal Republic within the EDC the Soviet Union first appeals to responsibility under the four-power agreement and cites the demilitarization measures agreed at Potsdam. The western powers react coolly and in return call for free elections for the whole of Germany, an issue not mentioned in the "Stalin note". But on 9 April Moscow concedes even this possibility. Further notes are exchanged, generating intense public debate in the Federal Republic. Along with the western powers the federal government regards the Soviet proposals as a simple manoeuvre to block the integration of the Federal Republic into the western world. The opposite view, held by prominent politicians and journalists, is that refusal to rearm and enter military alliances may represent the last chance of achieving reunification. Accordingly they demand that the seriousness of the Soviet proposals be tested by means of negotiations. 25.3.52 The reply sent by the western powers to the USSR makes free elections under UN supervision a precondition of negotiations over a peace treaty. 9.4.52 In a further note to the western powers the USSR continues to insist that Germany remain free from alliances but agress to allow free elections in Germany an condition that they are supervised not by the UN but by the Four Powers. The Council of Ministers in the GDR issues an "Ordinance an measures at the demarcation line between the German Democratic Republic and the west German zones of occupation. " The Ministry for State Security is made responsible for the control and intensified surveillance of the borders of the GDR in order to prevent "a further incursion of saboteurs, spies, terrorists and parasites" into the GDR; later an a 5 km-wide area of no-man's land is established along the demarcation line. dhm.de Now you guys being such fans of the UN would surely agree that UN supervison is a great idea, right? You'll probably like this better:On the same grounds, we can understand why the political leadership has often failed to pursue apparent opportunities to reduce the threat of superpower confrontation, and thus to enhance national security. One early example was in 1952, when the Kremlin put forth a proposal for reunification and neutralization of Germany, with no conditions on economic policies and with guarantees for "the rights of man and basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction, and assembly" and the free activity of democratic parties and organizations. In reply, the U.S. and its allies objected that the West did not recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier between Germany and Poland, and insisted that a reunified Germany be free to join NATO, a demand that the Russians could hardly accept a few years after Germany alone had virtually destroyed the Soviet Union. The Western reply also referred, more plausibly, to lack of clarity about free elections; but instead of seeking further clarification, the proposal was rejected with quite unreasonable demands. Commenting at the time, James Warburg, one of the few to have argued that the opportunity should be pursued, notes that neither the text of the March 10 Kremlin proposal "nor even the fact of its arrival was disclosed by Washington until after the Western reply had been sent on March 25." He suggests that the delay may have been related to the Administration desire "to present its case for the Mutual Security Act of 1952 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, without having that committee's deliberations prejudiced by knowledge of the Soviet proposal"; the Act called for about $7.5 billion for Western rearmament, and was "based upon the assumption that an All-German settlement could not possibly be achieved."24 zmag.org Maybe there was an opportunity thrown away. OTOH, the West did want West Germany in NATO. (Although now that doesn't look like such a good idea.) But maybe you should explain to PartyTime that political chicanery isn't desirable. He was justifying it on the part of the French a day or two ago. Bit this is most telling of all, I think: After a second East German proposal for talks on a possible unification of the two Germanys failed because of the FRG's demand s for free elections in the GDR, the Soviet Union put forth a new proposal to the Western Allies in March 1952. The Soviet Union would agree to German unification if the Oder-Neisse border were recognized as final and if a unified Germany were to remain n eutral. If the proposal were accepted, Allied troops would leave Germany within one year, and the country would obtain its full sovereignty. Although the offer was directed to the Western Allies, its content was aimed directly at the West German public and aroused lively discussion about the country's future. Adenauer was convinced, however, that even if the Soviet proposal were serious, a n acceptance of the plan would mean Germany's exclusion from the community of Western democracies and an uncertain future. Together with the Western Allies, which did not wish to act without his consent, Adenauer continued to demand free elections supervi sed by the United Nations (UN) in all of Germany as a precondition for negotiations. The Soviet Union declined and abandoned its proposal. Adenauer was harshly criticized by the opposition for not having seized this opportunity for unification. As his imp ressive victory in the Bundestag elections of 1953 clearly demonstrated, however, Adenauer had acted according to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of West Germans (see table 4, Appendix). Adenauer's decision to turn down the Soviet proposal was convincing evidence that the FRG intended to remain firmly anchored in the Western defense community. 1upinfo.com