To: tekboy who wrote (76156 ) 2/20/2003 11:07:20 PM From: aladin Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 Tek, I went back and looked at some articles about the 'Bushies' plans and came up with the enclosed. In short looking between the two - it paints Bush as wanting a more flexible approach than simply annhilating an entire nation if we are attacked and a significant reduction in targetting in Russia. By contrast it looks like Clinton was more of a cold warrior actually increasing the number of targets. Or is he somehow responsible for the policy shifts in 1997 ? :-) Or are you arguing that MAD is still relevent? John In February 2001, Bush ordered a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to determine what the minimal size of the US nuclear deterrent could be and still successfully meet US requirements to deter a nuclear attack from America's most likely enemies. Nations viewed as potential threats under the NPR included North Korea, Communist China, and a number of other rogue states including most notably Iran now on the verge of obtaining nuclear weapons. This Nuclear Posture Review was finally disclosed to the public after much delay in January. The Nuclear Posture Review states that the US will transition from the current nuclear triad of land, sea and air-based nuclear weapons to a "New Triad" consisting of "non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, defenses, and responsive infrastructure." The Nuclear Posture Review stated that the US would henceforth replace the current "Threat Based Force" with a "Capabilities Based Force." In other words, the US will no longer seek to field a force capable of matching the vast Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, but instead will only deploy a force sufficient to counter potential threats from rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction as well as the ballistic missiles needed to deliver them. According to the Nuclear Posture Review, the US has abandoned its emphasis on deterring nuclear attack (Mutual Assured Destruction) that has kept the nuclear peace for nearly sixty years and will resort to more "flexible" measures to counter a wider "spectrum of contingencies." This strategy change was inaugurated by President Bush and some of his top advisors who wanted to reflect their new post-9-11 outlook that Russia is not only not a threat, but is actually a strategic partner and a new ally in the war against terrorism to be welcomed into NATO's highest decision-making councils. In other words, this vast planned reduction in US nuclear might is politically motivated and is not being implemented for any military rationale, which in this case was invented to serve and justify the political directives of the President. One wonders if this may be yet another case of the "peace dividend" being implemented prematurely, requiring yet another costly buildup of our military forces if Russia retains the bulk of her strategic arsenal as she may well do and re-emerges as a major threat. ***