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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (76292)2/21/2003 2:26:58 PM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
there hasn't really been a definitive treatment of the end of that war published yet,


Please read the interview with William Kristol. He was COS for the VP at the time, and I believe he is historically accurate in this piece. If nothing else, it reflects the feelings at that time of what has come to be called the Neocons--A really bad name, by the way, they certainly are not "New Conservatives."

I wish they had printed the entire Snowcroft interview. He looked like he was "sweating bullets" as he defended the decision not to stop Saddam's genocide. I remember the media covering the Kurds at the Turkish border, but none of the misery of the Shiites to the south. You, of course, were getting your nose rubbed in it at the time.



To: tekboy who wrote (76292)2/21/2003 7:42:35 PM
From: Win Smith  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
There was this funny thing I read recently about the end of the Gulf War that was quite at odds with received wisdom. Have you ever heard anything like this? The Pollack interview seemed to paint it all as confusion. From Judith Miller's "God Has Ninety-Nine Names", p. 119-120:

Contrary to many published accounts, Riyadh-Washington ties were strained after the war. For one thing, King Fahd had been stunned by America’s decision to end the war before Saddam Hussein was destroyed. According to Knowledgeable Saudi and American officials, Riyadh, had done its best to keep the conflict going. First, senior Saudi officials had urged the Americans to continue the aerial bombing of Iraq’s retreating army for two or three more days. When that failed, the recommended that the allies bomb republican Guard divisions on the outskirts of Baghdad. When this request, too, was denied, the Saudis deliberately slowed down the translation of Iraq’s acceptance of the terms of surrender, which President Bush insisted that King Fahd approve before it was signed. When the translation was done, an administration official told me, Saudi officials ordered their linguists to translate it again.

Fahd was still determined to topple the ungrateful Saddam, in whom Riyadh had given more than $25 billion in aid during Iraq’s war with Iran. For Fahd, the fight had become personal: After the war Saddam sent an assassination squad to the kingdom to try to kill him. But Saudi Arabia, also keen to retain US favor, maintained diplomatic silence when American officials blamed the war’s sudden end on Riyadh’s concern about the possible disintegration of Iraq, in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s death or sudden departure.