Karen. That's an interesting article. Should be posted.
atimes.com
What is the US really up against?
By Pepe Escobar
CAIRO - Whatever the spin, whatever the rhetoric about "liberation", whatever the wishful thinking of a Japan rising in the Middle East, whatever the battle plan one subscribes to, this will be a war essentially against the Iraqi people. It won't be a war in the first place. It will be a one-sided massacre. Iraq has no air force. Iraq has no navy. Iraq has no satellite network to coordinate military action. But Iraqi Trade Minister Mohammed Mahdi Saleh is the latest in a flurry of regime officials to swear that the country is preparing as if war could happen tomorrow. Let's try to find out how.
In Iraq, the Ba'ath Party controls the army and the clans control the Ba'ath. Iraqi historian and sociologist Faleh Jaber, a researcher at the University of London, notes that in the 1960s the Iraqi armed forces consisted of a regular army plus the Republican Guard. When the Ba'ath Party regained power in 1968, it upgraded the Republican Guard: the army still had the responsibility to defend the country, but the guard's responsibility became to defend the regime. When Saddam Hussein took power in 1979, there was not a single army official in the Revolutionary Command Council. Another Iraqi historian, Majid Khuduri, says that Ba'ath was the first regime to subordinate the army to civil authority.
The young Saddam Hussein, heavily influenced by his maternal uncle, was a big fan of Adolf Hitler's system. Then he became a huge fan of Josef Stalin. Jaber says that Saddam's system follows these influences, but with original features: "Like the German model, the Ba'ath system in Iraq has four supporting bases: a totalitarian ideology, a single party, control of the economy [so-called socialist], and control of the media and the army." Ilios Yannakakis, a Greek historian based in Paris and a Middle East specialist, arguably has the best definition of the Ba'ath Party: "The social and socialist branch of fascism."
Unlike the Nazi model, the Ba'ath model is all about tribes and clans supporting the state. Since the early years it has been a sort of state tribalism, limited to the ruling elite's tribe, the Albu Nasir. The core of this tribe is the very important al-Beijat clan. The fact that Iraq literally floats over a sea of oil enabled the Ba'ath Party initially to invest heavily in public services and many forms of social protection. Jamal Salman, professor of economics at the University of Baghdad, confirmed to this correspondent last year that the Iraqi middle class became prosperous in the 1970s not because of Western-style capitalism, but thanks to state contracts and jobs. In the 1970s, tribal groups ruled: what Jaber calls "class-clan" controls of the party, the army, the bureaucracy and business. Ba'ath operates a complex balancing act as it applies its recipe of merging army control with tribal solidarity. It describes itself as an Arab socialist party - and that is something certainly at odds with tribal solidarity.
Many surviving victims of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war also confirmed to this correspondent how the social fabric of the country was destroyed because of that disastrous conflict. The state lost control over many important tribes. Iraq was left with a US$50 billion debt. At the end of the 1980s, Iraq had a million-strong army. For the war generation, it was impossible to go back to the good life of the 1970s. Jaber is clear: the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, happened as an attempt to re-establish internal stability. But Iraq has been mired in a logic of war for too long.
The defeat in the Gulf War - which is still known inside Iraq as the "Mother of all Battles" - caused a profound structural adjustment. The state was terribly weakened - as well as the security services. The army was reduced to a third of its original size. There were rebellions in Kurdistan and in the Shi'ite south. The United States - illegally, without United Nations approval - imposed no-fly zones. Professor Salman in Baghdad stresses some of the terrible consequences of two totally useless wars: the Iraqi economy, based on oil wealth, collapsed; market forces began to emerge; and the middle class - a very important base for the Ba'ath Party - was smashed by hyperinflation.
Jaber says that Saddam's regime managed to survive the 1990s by meticulously applying a five-point strategy: imposition of order in the main tribe; reorganization of the army; co-option of tribes around the country so that they could replace party organizations; more ammunition to the ideological arsenal; and new forms of economic control.
State tribalism at the top used to be based on an alliance of Sunni clans around the very important al-Beijat clan. The al-Beijat clan has 10 branches. The center of power was changing among all 10, so seven of them were thoroughly smashed. The predominant clan became the Albu-Ghafur, Saddam's sub-clan. The al-Majid clan was also in the ascendancy in the 1990s. Key members such as Hussein Kamel and Saddam Kamel - both married to daughters of Saddam - and Ali Hasan Al-Majid controlled the arms industry, the Jihaz al-Khas (Special Services) and the Defense Ministry. At the same time, Saddam's sons, Udai and Qusai, were also in the ascendancy. A conflict was inevitable. Hussein and Saddam Kamel went into exile in Jordan. But then, foolishly, they returned to Baghdad and Saddam ordered them to be shot along with their families.
In the late 1990s, Saddam finally cemented his power based on his sub-clan, the Albu-Ghafur, and he chose Qusai to be his successor. A Republican Guard talking to Asia Times Online last year confirmed that this caused a tremendous rift between Saddam and his wife. They were said not to have been sleeping in the same bed, or room for that matter, for years. Udai, Mama's favorite, was a playboy. But Qusai was the brainy one. Saddam ordered Qusai to reorganize the intelligence services and internal security. He was named supervisor of the "Army of the Mother of All Battles" - which later became the Republican Army. Since 2000 he has been interim president and in 2001 he was given regional control of the Ba'ath Party.
The two strongmen of the regime are now Qusai and Kamal Mustapha, a paternal cousin of Saddam who controls the Republican Guard, the de facto praetorian guards of the regime. It's all in the family: Kamal's brother, Jamal, is married to Saddam's youngest daughter. In fact, Iraq is now run by a triumvirate: Father (Saddam), Son (Qusai) and Holy Ghost (Kamal Mustapha).
And it's still all about state tribalism, plus social tribalism, but now combined with Iraqi patriotism - thus the frequent references to the glorious history of Mesopotamia - and of course Arab patriotism. As can easily be attested in Basra in the south of the country, Saudi Wahhabism has infiltrated the country, but it has been tolerated by the security services because it functions as a counterpower to militant Shi'ites.
But the ultimate tool of social control in the regime is in fact a contribution of the international community: sanctions and the "oil for food" program, or UN Resolution 986, adopted by Iraq in May 1996. People receive their meager state rations through certificates. Suspected dissidents, of course, never see such certificates. This is what Jaber calls the "politics of famine". As to the upper middle class, it continues to support the regime because of market deregulation. These are the smugglers who can be seen in Baghdad driving posh German cars with tinted windows, eating gourmet pizza in flash cafes and throwing parties in million-dollar houses next to Saddam's main presidential palace, near Saddam Tower.
So the regime survives thanks to a mix of tribalism, nationalism, patriotism and Sunnism. As many as 80 percent of senior army officers are related to Saddam's Albu-Ghafour sub-clan. So it is a cohesive army, at least as far as the Republican Guards are concerned.
The Iraqi army today has seen no improvement since 1990, except for air defense systems - which have been the targets of relentless strikes by US and British planes for months now. But the reduced military budget served a purpose: the regime was able to concentrate on reinforcing clan alliances. Today the Iraqi armed forces have four divisions: as many as eight regular regiments of the Republican Guard; another division from the Republican Guard; the regular army (four armored, three mechanized and five infantry regiments); and an array of tribal militias specialized in smashing civil rebellion. These militias will be key in the event of urban warfare once the US bombing starts.
This will be an extremely political war. Washington's obsession is regime change. So the main prize is Baghdad. Republican Guards will not chicken out, and there will be no coup d'etat: as we have seen, a big, extended family's survival is at stake. An entire division of the army - as many as four regiments - would be necessary for a coup, and with essential input from the president's own sub-clan. Out of the question. This means full-scale invasion and occupation of Iraq is inevitable.
The regime fights two huge imponderables. Its own structure by definition is extremely vulnerable. And absolutely nobody, inside or outside Iraq, can estimate how substantial is the gap between the official, nationalist, patriotic rhetoric and the feelings of the Iraqi population. There are wild rumors in Baghdad that Saddam is secretly negotiating oil for his survival. For many Iraqis, and for quite some time now, Saddam is not a Saladin fighting against American imperialism: he remains an American agent. And Americans are widely perceived not as "liberators" but as an occupation force. There's intense speculation that the regime will eventually fall, but what will be the price to pay?
The regime is taking no chances, and it has adopted a variety of tactics. The Ba'ath propaganda machine is reinforcing the notion that all members of the ruling elite face death, so there's only one way out: to fight for survival no matter what. The government is also playing the religious card by persuading Shi'ite spiritual leaders to issue fatwas against Shi'ite opponents of the regime.
The overall strategy of defense is concentrated in the cities, especially Baghdad, which could magnify the political nightmare in terms of Western and Arab public opinion as there will be high "collateral damage". And as the Central Command in Qatar will welcome those who want to follow the war by remote control, the regime will also play the media, although there are rumors in the Middle East that the Americans will bomb any satellite phone signal that is not registered with them.
Two key bridges over the Tigris in Baghdad were bombed by the Americans in 1991. According to the latest echoes from Baghdad, people suspect all six bridges will be bombed this time, so everybody will have to use boats or motorboats to get from one side to the other. The US forces will certainly divide the city to confine the defense to certain areas. This means that civilians will also be confined to their neighborhoods. Local Ba'ath Party members in each neighborhood are now mostly housed in schools. Their fundamental mission during the war will be to distribute stocks of water and alcohol - essential for heating and cooking. Order will be maintained by a party official in each and every street (that's how it already works anyway). People won't be allowed to leave their homes.
This could also mean that many wounded won't be able to go to hospital, and aid agencies will have a nightmare trying to distribute food. The regime says that rations that could last until June have already been distributed, and Iraqi TV every day alerts that they should not be resold because everyone will need them. And residents fear above all the hellish rain of fire already promised with glee by many a Pentagon official. Ordinary Iraqis, naturally fatalistic, expect to be the main targets, as they have been the targets of sanctions for the past 12 years.
US forces may not disable Iraq's command and control systems because the army-as-an-extended-family simply will not be relying on high tech. There will be suicide martyrs everywhere, according to the Ba'ath leadership, and civilians in some neighborhoods seem to be prepared to defend the city in house-to-house fighting. Indeed, Kalashnikovs have been distributed to certain sections of the population. It's unlikely that the Americans will know how to deal with the extremely complex tribal and clan structures already pre-positioned for a new redistribution of land, water, arms and prestige in case there's a new central power. Anyway, these clans are heavily armed already, and they will not help the United States during the war. They have nothing to gain by betraying Saddam: he can always survive and his revenge would be devastating. Iraqis, with a keen sense of history, remind anyone that Saddam has survived endless assassination attempts, coups, US presidents and a war against a 33-nation coalition.
Saddam is betting on a replay of the siege of Stalingrad. His key strategy is to maintain the control of the population for as long as possible. He might even be betting on a popular revolution against the invader.
And Saddam may escape alive. He has as many as nine doubles. Like Osama bin Laden, he could vanish into virtual reality - cynics with a wicked sense of humor even advance that this may be part of the whole deal.
One thing is certain. It's absolutely impossible for anyone who hasn't been to Iraq even to imagine the tremendous frustration, anger, humiliation and terminal desperation caused by 12 years of sanctions. When the United States stops bombing, and if the security apparatus disintegrates, the decomposition of the regime will be beyond brutal. Iraqis are convinced chaos is inevitable. Even with the fall of the regime, there will be violent popular opposition to an invasion. Few may heed a call to arms to defend the regime. But many would not hesitate to force the invader out. Especially because very few in Iraq seem to be convinced that the US wants to invest in a Marshall plan and mold the country into a "beacon of democracy", as well as prosperity, in the Middle East. The fact is, the whole country could be easily engulfed in a bloody mix of civil war and liberation struggle that no Douglas MacArthur and no occupation force will ever be able to control. |
