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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Win Smith who wrote (77416)	2/25/2003 12:22:46 PM
From: Karen Lawrence	Respond to of 281500

Buying War Allies and 'Friends' with Foreign Aid. We have enough problems of our own here at home, and those dollars should be returned to taxpayers or spent on legitimate constitutional activities. Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) With an American invasion of Iraq imminent, nations in the region are increasingly worried about the political, social, and economic consequences of a second Gulf war. Not surprisingly, Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, and Turkey are demanding more money from the U.S. to offset the costs, economic and otherwise, of such a war. Other Middle East countries are sure to follow. Yet the more foreign aid we send to the Middle East, the more hopelessly entangled we become in the intractable conflicts that define it. Worse yet, the practice of buying friends casts very serious doubt on the lofty claims that we are promoting democracy. If our plans for Iraq will bring peace and stability to the region, why do we have to buy off the Middle East governments that stand to benefit? The truth is that those governments, even our ostensible allies, have very serious doubts about the wisdom of our proposed invasion of Iraq. Money- lots of it- makes them more amenable to our cause. Turkey in particular has shown incredible gall in demanding billions for its cooperation with our war efforts. Turkey shares a border with northern Iraq, and its air bases could serve as an important staging area for American forces. Yet Turkey is demanding a whopping $30 billion in exchange for its support of the war and use of its airfields. Unfortunately, the administration appears ready to accept this blackmail if a slightly lower dollar amount can be negotiated. This blatant shakedown gives new meaning to the term "ally." In World War II, our allies were just that- nations willing to share the costs and risks, even the lives of their soldiers- to fight a war against common enemies. Today, our phony allies are bought and paid for with billions of your tax dollars, but prove less than trustworthy when trouble arises. Turkey wants more than our money, however. It also wants to control the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. The Kurds in both Iraq and Turkey desire an independent Kurdish state, which the Turkish government fiercely resists. Turkish officials want an agreement that will allow thousands of their soldiers to advance into Kurdish northern Iraq on the heels of American forces. This would be a shameful insult to the Kurdish people, who at least have been consistent foes of Saddam Hussein. The billions we will give Turkey are just the tip of the iceberg. The foreign aid feeding frenzy will only intensify as America expands its role as world policeman. Already it is routine for some nations to send negotiating teams to Washington during the appropriations process, intent on securing the foreign aid loot to which they feel so entitled. Just as hordes of domestic lobbyists roam the halls of Congress seeking federal money for every conceivable special interest, we should expect foreign lobbyists to increasingly look for money from American taxpayers. In the new era of American empire, foreign aid spending serves as the carrot. Iraq will get the stick, at least at first. Once we occupy it, of course, we will spend billions there as well. Foreign aid is not only unconstitutional, but also exceedingly unwise. It creates the worst kind of entangling alliances that President Washington warned about. It doesn’t buy us any real allies, but instead encourages false friendships, dependency, and a sense of entitlement among the recipients. It also causes resentment among nations that receive none, or less than they feel they deserve. Above all, however, it is simply unconscionable to tax American citizens and send their money overseas. We have enough problems of our own here at home, and those dollars should be returned to taxpayers or spent on legitimate constitutional activities. house.gov

To: Win Smith who wrote (77416)	2/25/2003 5:38:24 PM
From: frankw1900	Respond to of 281500

Yes. That's one of the things that's interesting. The final paragraph isn't in sync with other parts of the story. I posted it for more for the facts than his conclusions. MIdway throught he story there's this: The regime fights two huge imponderables. Its own structure by definition is extremely vulnerable. And absolutely nobody, inside or outside Iraq, can estimate how substantial is the gap between the official, nationalist, patriotic rhetoric and the feelings of the Iraqi population. There are wild rumors in Baghdad that Saddam is secretly negotiating oil for his survival. For many Iraqis, and for quite some time now, Saddam is not a Saladin fighting against American imperialism: he remains an American agent. And Americans are widely perceived not as "liberators" but as an occupation force. There's intense speculation that the regime will eventually fall, but what will be the price to pay? I think the third sentence is sort of true but I don't think it's stretching to believe the regime is mostly feared and hated by nearly everyone as it was in other stalinist type places. My guess, again looking at the example of stalinist regimes, is that the population believes the regime lies about nearly everything. So belief by some that Hussein is really a US agent doesn't surprise me. I think many Iraqis may be ambivalent in their feelings towrds the US, given the sorry history of the last 10 - 12 years. Is the Stalingrad possiblility likely or is it part of the Iraq psyops? I don't know, of course, but the widespread revolts after Gulf War 1 suggests that keeping the civilian population under control once the US is attacking will be very dificult. There certainly do not exist enough security personnel to control the population of a major city if they rise up. Folk tend to forget that Baghdad is majority Shiite and the most Saddam can expect from them is non-interference. (God only knows what he might try to do some of the large Shiite neighbourhoods). I thnk his conclusion is most likely too pessimistic just as other folk are too optimistic about the outcome of a US invasion. It's absolutely impossible for anyone who hasn't been to Iraq even to imagine the tremendous frustration, anger, humiliation and terminal desperation caused by 12 years of sanctions Very likely such feelings exist but how do they compare with the feelings about thirty years of brutal oppression? Indeed the next sentence nails the US difficulty, When the United States stops bombing, and if the security apparatus disintegrates, the decomposition of the regime will be beyond brutal. Iraqis are convinced chaos is inevitable. This has been discussed in every scenario of the war I've read. Again the uprisings at the end of the Gulf War suggest the security apparatus will be destroyed by local folk. Can the US get in fast enough to keep enough order that there won't be chaos? It obviously intends to. Even with the fall of the regime, there will be violent popular opposition to an invasion. Few may heed a call to arms to defend the regime. But many would not hesitate to force the invader out. I don't know how he can know this. I've read Carl's thoughts on the subject but it strikes me that this depends on US behaviour once it's there. It's likely Iraqis will be wary of the US but won't necessarily be over eager to start shooting at it right away. It's more likely I think they'd try to divine it's intentions first - taking on a monster military machine after thirty years of brutal oppression strikes me as something an ordinary person would approach with reluctance - it may not be necessary. How it plays out long term depends, I think, on how smart the US military is in the first few months after the invasion. And that depends on the US government policy. Most of the sensible scenarios I've read seem to be very strong on infra structure rebuilding and necessarily somewhat vague on the political reorganization of the place. I think the vagueness is inevitable because they have to see first how things shake out. Nonetheless, a well known general policy regarding Iraq's future political state would be very helpful, if it's the right one. If it's Saddam-Lite then the US deserves all the grief it will get. My own thought about it goes along the lines of the model of aid after a civil war. I don't think this is unreasonable because that's indeed the real process Iraq has been suffering the last thirty years. The African and Cambodian examples are worth looking at. (African because of the tribal aspect and Cambodia because of the Vietnamese invasion). The absolutely essential requirement for successful outcome is security and reasonable governance while the reorganization is done. I posted a lot of stuff about this approximately a year ago. If the lame SI search engine gets me to it tonight, I'll repost it.