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To: T L Comiskey who wrote (13777)3/2/2003 10:50:37 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Revealed: US Dirty Tricks to Win Vote on Iraq War

Secret document details American plan to bug phones and emails of key Security Council members

by Martin Bright, Ed Vulliamy in New York and Peter Beaumont

Published on Sunday, March 2, 2003 by the Observer/UK

The United States is conducting a secret 'dirty tricks' campaign against UN Security Council delegations in New York as part of its battle to win votes in favor of war against Iraq.

Details of the aggressive surveillance operation, which involves interception of the home and office telephones and the emails of UN delegates in New York, are revealed in a document leaked to The Observer.

The disclosures were made in a memorandum written by a top official at the National Security Agency - the US body which intercepts communications around the world - and circulated to both senior agents in his organization and to a friendly foreign intelligence agency asking for its input.

The memo describes orders to staff at the agency, whose work is clouded in secrecy, to step up its surveillance operations 'particularly directed at... UN Security Council Members (minus US and GBR, of course)' to provide up-to-the-minute intelligence for Bush officials on the voting intentions of UN members regarding the issue of Iraq.

The leaked memorandum makes clear that the target of the heightened surveillance efforts are the delegations from Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Pakistan at the UN headquarters in New York - the so-called 'Middle Six' delegations whose votes are being fought over by the pro-war party, led by the US and Britain, and the party arguing for more time for UN inspections, led by France, China and Russia.

The memo is directed at senior NSA officials and advises them that the agency is 'mounting a surge' aimed at gleaning information not only on how delegations on the Security Council will vote on any second resolution on Iraq, but also 'policies', 'negotiating positions', 'alliances' and 'dependencies' - the 'whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favorable to US goals or to head off surprises'.

Dated 31 January 2003, the memo was circulated four days after the UN's chief weapons inspector Hans Blix produced his interim report on Iraqi compliance with UN resolution 1441.

It was sent by Frank Koza, chief of staff in the 'Regional Targets' section of the NSA, which spies on countries that are viewed as strategically important for United States interests.

Koza specifies that the information will be used for the US's 'QRC' - Quick Response Capability - 'against' the key delegations.

Suggesting the levels of surveillance of both the office and home phones of UN delegation members, Koza also asks regional managers to make sure that their staff also 'pay attention to existing non-UN Security Council Member UN-related and domestic comms [office and home telephones] for anything useful related to Security Council deliberations'.

Koza also addresses himself to the foreign agency, saying: 'We'd appreciate your support in getting the word to your analysts who might have similar more indirect access to valuable information from accesses in your product lines [i.e., intelligence sources].' Koza makes clear it is an informal request at this juncture, but adds: 'I suspect that you'll be hearing more along these lines in formal channels.'

Disclosure of the US operation comes in the week that Blix will make what many expect to be his final report to the Security Council.

It also comes amid increasingly threatening noises from the US towards undecided countries on the Security Council who have been warned of the unpleasant economic consequences of standing up to the US.

Sources in Washington familiar with the operation said last week that there had been a division among Bush administration officials over whether to pursue such a high-intensity surveillance campaign with some warning of the serious consequences of discovery.

The existence of the surveillance operation, understood to have been requested by President Bush's National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, is deeply embarrassing to the Americans in the middle of their efforts to win over the undecided delegations.

The language and content of the memo were judged to be authentic by three former intelligence operatives shown it by The Observer. We were also able to establish that Frank Koza does work for the NSA and could confirm his senior post in the Regional Targets section of the organization

The NSA main switchboard put The Observer through to extension 6727 at the agency which was answered by an assistant, who confirmed it was Koza's office. However, when The Observer asked to talk to Koza about the surveillance of diplomatic missions at the United Nations, it was then told 'You have reached the wrong number'.

On protesting that the assistant had just said this was Koza's extension, the assistant repeated that it was an erroneous extension, and hung up.

While many diplomats at the UN assume they are being bugged, the memo reveals for the first time the scope and scale of US communications intercepts targeted against the New York-based missions.

The disclosure comes at a time when diplomats from the countries have been complaining about the outright 'hostility' of US tactics in recent days to persuade then to fall in line, including threats to economic and aid packages.

The operation appears to have been spotted by rival organizations in Europe. 'The Americans are being very purposeful about this,' said a source at a European intelligence agency when asked about the US surveillance efforts.

© Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003

commondreams.org



To: T L Comiskey who wrote (13777)3/2/2003 10:58:30 AM
From: T L Comiskey  Respond to of 89467
 
A not so...Fine kettle of fish

Steep price tag expected for victory in N. Korea War would be 'military's nightmare,' expert says
By Paul Wiseman
USA TODAY

SEOUL, South Korea -- The United States and South Korea would almost certainly win any war on the Korean peninsula, but the cost of victory could be appalling.

If North Korea attacked first or its war machine wasn't seriously damaged by a U.S. strike aimed at destroying its nuclear weapons program, in the first two or three weeks of fighting that nation could use its awesome firepower to leave more than 1 million people dead or wounded. Most would be South Korean troops and civilians, but thousands of U.S. troops stationed here would also likely die, the U.S. military estimates.

South Korean defenses could be pummeled for several hours by as many as 500,000 artillery rounds per hour from North Korean positions just 30 miles from Seoul. Tens of thousands of North Korean commandos, many disguised as civilians or South Korean troops, would probably sneak south in midget submarines or drop in by parachute. North Korea's 500 to 600 Scud missiles, many carrying chemical weapons, could pound targets across South Korea, and longer-range missiles could hit civilian and U.S. military targets as far as Japan, possibly even the western USA.

''They certainly have the ability to deliver a devastating first blow, especially if there is no lead-in time for us,'' says Joseph Bermudez, author of a detailed book called The Armed Forces of North Korea. ''They could make a significant penetration into South Korea, no doubt about it.''

The threat of so much death and devastation means the United States would face a terrifying choice if it can't find a diplomatic solution to the standoff over North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions: whether or not to launch a preventive strike against suspected North Korean nuclear facilities and risk another Korean War.

The threat is one reason the South Koreans -- who have the most to lose -- are reluctant to go along with the Bush administration and take a tougher line toward the North. The North Koreans have said any preventive strike would mean all-out war and have warned that they could launch one themselves if they felt threatened.

Nonetheless, President Bush has not ruled out military options in dealing with North Korea and the crisis over its nuclear programs.

Interviews with U.S. military officials here, North Korean defectors and defense analysts suggest a war with North Korea would be more difficult and bloodier than a war with Iraq. ''North Korea is far more capable than Iraq,'' says Charles Heyman, editor of Jane's World Armies, a directory of forces worldwide. ''The Iraqi forces have been hollowed out by years of sanctions and the Kuwait war.''

Weaknesses, strengths

Even so, there's a wide consensus that combined U.S. and South Korean forces would win, perhaps after initial setbacks. North Korea doesn't have the fuel, spare parts or air power to win a sustained war against forces as imposing as the United States and South Korea, which itself has a 560,000-strong army. Thousands of well-armed, well-trained U.S. and South Korean troops guard the border. North Korea's tanks and aircraft are obsolete.

In addition, precision missiles are already targeting North Korean positions, land mines and razor wire are blocking the invasion route across the North-South border, South Korean ships are patrolling coastal waters, and U-2 spy planes are keeping close watch on North Korea's military.

Nevertheless, U.S. Army Maj. Gregory Pickell, assessing the prospects for war on the Korean peninsula, concluded in 2000 that ''Korea is the military's nightmare.'' He warned that U.S. forces were unprepared for a Korean conflict.

For the past half-century, as South Korea transformed itself into a First World economy and developed a democratic political system, North Korea built its war machine. North Korean society is designed for war, little else. Fifty years after an armistice stopped the shooting -- but did not technically end the Korean War -- its military doctrine still calls for the overthrow of the South Korean government and the imposition of a communist system across the Korean peninsula. North Korea spends about 30% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on its armed forces under its ''military-first'' policy, even as a third of its people go hungry every year.

The United States spends an amount equal to about 4% of annual GDP on its Defense Department.

If North Korea decided to attack, or felt provoked by U.S. action, its military plans call for a blitzkrieg-style attack across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea, according to South Korea's most recent Defense White Paper, published in 2000. The North would want to take advantage of superior manpower -- its 1 million-man army is the world's fourth-largest behind China, the USA and India -- to overwhelm South Korean and U.S. defenders before the Pentagon could bring in reinforcements or establish air superiority.

The North would first unleash a devastating barrage of artillery and rocket fire on U.S. and South Korean positions. Then its troops would pour across the border. U.S. and South Korean forces would use fighter jets and their own artillery and missiles against North Korean guns and rockets.

A largely South Korean ground force would try to stop the North Korean infantry assault in its tracks. There would almost certainly be a fierce infantry and tank battle north of Seoul, involving the 15,000 troops of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division. The defenders would need to withstand a North Korean assault for up to 15 days and then hold the line for two or three weeks more while U.S. and South Korean forces mobilized for a counterattack, according to GlobalSecurity.org, a research group devoted to defense issues.

U.S. war plans call for counterattacking into North Korea, destroying the North Korean military and deposing North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il. The plans require about 750,000 U.S. reinforcements.

The terrain along the DMZ would benefit the U.S. and South Korean defenders. Rice paddies north of Seoul would slow the North Korean advance. Elsewhere the terrain is mountainous, likely forcing the advancing North Korean troops into narrow corridors.

But the defenders probably wouldn't get much warning.

Over the past two decades, the percentage of North Korean troops deployed near the DMZ has risen to 70% from 40%.

The South Korean and U.S. defenders keep a checklist of 180 unusual North Korean military maneuvers that may be signs that an attack is coming. But U.S. officers expect they would get only a day or two's advance notice of an onslaught. Just evacuating the thousands of U.S. civilians in South Korea would take up to 21 days.

If U.S. leads strike

If a war began with a preventive strike by the Pentagon on North Korean nuclear sites, U.S. and South Korean forces would be controlling the timetable and would be better prepared. But even then, analysts say, the North would do everything it could to seize control of as much of the South as possible before U.S. reinforcements arrived. It would aim to:

* Kill as many U.S. troops as fast as possible in hopes of crushing the U.S. will to fight. A few years ago, a North Korean defector told a Seoul newspaper that Kim Jong Il ''believes that if (North Korea) creates more than 20,000 American casualties in the region, the U.S. would roll back and (North Korea) would win the war.''

* Lob missiles at U.S. bases in Japan in hopes of making the Japanese think twice about letting the U.S. military use its territory to wage war on the North. The North has about 100 No Dong missiles that can hit Japan. U.S. intelligence officers told Congress this month that North Korea has an untested Taepo Dong 2 missile capable of reaching the western USA.

* Use chemical weapons to raise casualties and force U.S. troops into cumbersome chemical suits. One estimate, cited by GlobalSecurity.org, says North Korea could kill 38% of Seoul's 12 million people by hitting the city with 50 missiles carrying nerve gas.

Meanwhile, North Korea's commandos would try to cause chaos behind South Korean lines. It has the world's largest contingent of special forces: more than 100,000 troops. One all-women unit is the ''Peony Brigade.''

The Pentagon would try to strike North Korean missile bases, airfields and artillery batteries. In fact, it already has many targeted. But finding other targets could be difficult. The North Koreans have hidden bases in rugged mountain terrain and have mastered the art of building hardened underground batteries, even airfields.

Then U.S. and South Korean forces would use their advantages:

* North Korea's air force is no match for the United States': 90% of North Korean combat aircraft are Soviet or Chinese designs dating to the 1950s and '60s, according to Bermudez's book.

* North Korea's economic problems have left it short of fuel and spare parts. Its pilots get five to 10 hours of flying time annually; U.S. pilots get 200 hours a year.

* Morale among North Korean troops could plunge quickly. An invasion would expose them to the realities of South Korea's prosperity -- a shock for soldiers who have been taught since birth that South Korea is an impoverished colony of the United States.

For all these reasons, most analysts believe a conventional war would in some ways look like the first Korean War: North Korea delivering a solid first blow before being pushed back.

Nonetheless, no one wants a repeat: In the 1950-53 conflict, 3 million people on both sides were killed, wounded or lost.