To: elpolvo who wrote (201 ) 3/3/2003 5:05:56 PM From: HG Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 239 Dear stonehearted el - <<<i identify with the stone>>> You give a new meaning to the term stone-age. <g> <<<we're on opposite parts of the wave (crest vs. trough)>>> Not really. Only a little tweaking is required and we can hold hands and ride the waves together.... <g>. I can't identify with the stone. But i interpret its words in human terms, which is the only thing i can do since i do not know for *sure* what the stone *really* means. And i agree with my interpretation of his stone-speech, which is exactly what 'identifying with the stone' means to you.... I wuz tocking bout humanity. Collectively, we're little-miss-know-it-alls, aren't we ? The batmobile is pretty interesting. Here is another paragraph from the article to arrest your interest... To the extent that I could look and behave like a wasp or a bat without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences would not be anything like the experiences of those animals. On the other hand, it is doubtful that any meaning can be attached to the supposition that I should possess the internal neurophysiological constitution of a bat. Even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a bat, nothing in my present constitution enables me to imagine what the experiences of such a future stage of myself thus metamorphosed would be like. The best evidence would come from the experiences of bats, if we only knew what they were like. So if extrapolation from our own case is involved in the idea of what it is like to be a bat, the extrapolation must be incompletable. We cannot form more than a schematic conception of what it is like. For example, we may ascribe general types of experience on the basis of the animal’s structure and behavior. Thus we describe bat sonar as a form of three-dimensional forward perception; we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, and lust, and that they have other, more familiar types of perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences also have in each case a specific subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive. And if there is conscious life elsewhere in the universe, it is likely that some of it will not be describable even in the most general experiential terms available to us.6 (The problem is not confined to exotic cases, however, for it exists between one person and another. The subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him. This does not prevent us each from believing that the other's experience has such a subjective character. -stoneface