WSJ(3/5) Column: The US Misread Turkey's Mood From The Start
04 Mar 20:18
From The Wall Street Journal
By Ismail Cem
(Editor's Note: Mr. Cem, former foreign minister of Turkey, is chairman of
the New Turkey Party.)
ANKARA -- Resentment in both parties, a mutual feeling of incapacity, an
unwarranted tension between two traditional allies. The U.S. and Turkey . . .
what went wrong?
As a Turkish citizen who is one of the 95% that does not agree with the
arguments for an imminent military operation against Iraq, or for Turkish
military contribution to this endeavor, my interpretation is different from
that of my government.
---
In retrospect, it seems that the present confusion was first triggered by the
unintentional but misleading impression that the Majority Leader Tayyip Erdogan
gave in his meeting with President Bush. Turkish government officials gave the
same positive impression to visiting U.S. officials Paul Wolfowitz and Marc
Grossman. As a result, Washington believed that Turkey had given an assurance
of unconditional participation in a military operation. In fact, that's more or
less what U.S. officials -- and CNN -- reported, following the visit by Messrs.
Wolfowitz and Grossman. Objectively, they were correct in their reading, and
they developed their plans for Iraq accordingly. But the Turkish political and
popular reality was at odds with the impression that the Americans took with
them.
Second point: The U.S. administration took Turkey for granted. And the
Turkish government took its own people and parliament for granted. Both
Washington and Ankara undervalued the Turkish people's concerns and
sensitivities. Besides, in political and academic circles here, there is a
strong belief in the need for a new, explicit U.N. resolution in order to
initiate a war. If all ongoing disarmament activities derive their legitimacy
from a U.N. resolution, this logic goes, then a war legitimized by the
noncompliance of Iraq must be based on a U.N. resolution as well. There is
strong criticism of the U.S., which is seen as conferring its approval on the
U.N. only when the latter does Washington's bidding. This gives the U.S., and
especially its president, an image generally interpreted as that of a bully.
As for the average Turkish citizen, overlooked by his government, war on Iraq
connotes nothing but economic problems, insecurity and terrorism. It is widely
accepted that the more Turkey is involved in Iraq, the greater will be her
losses, both human and material. This is understandable. The last Gulf War had
a devastating impact on Turkey. The economic and human strife provided the
terrorist-secessionist groups in Turkey with fertile ground, and the growing
terrorism was largely due to the activities of militants who had crossed the
borders as refugees fleeing Iraq. Billions of dollars were lost in revenues, or
used up in extra military spending to fight terrorism. For the Turkish people,
the present day is like watching a scary old film again. Plus, in their
consciences, they do not see a justification for an act that would cause death
and misery to a neighboring people. Scenes from the 1991 war are present in
their memories, and on TV scenes rerun for the occasion.
Third point: The Turkish government has over-emphasized the economic aid that
the U.S. was to provide in compensation for Turkey's losses. And Washington did
not help by implicitly, even openly, blaming Turkey for "horse-trading." This
provoked an anti-Turkish media campaign in the U.S., with satirical banners and
cartoons portraying Turkey as an ugly belly-dancer trying to charm President
Bush for his money. These, of course, took their due place in the Turkish
media. The Turkish people, who traditionally considered the U.S. as a friend,
realized that American public opinion could easily turn hostile if Turkey
deviates from U.S. demands. The new U.S. attitude hurt deeply. It probably
caused as much damage as all other factors put together.
All of these culminated in a negative parliamentary vote, to the surprise of
almost everyone. But why should it have surprised? After all, Turkish
legislators, like their American counterparts, listen to their conscience, and
are sensitive to their constituencies.
As to what should be done, the policy that I had advocated as chairman of an
opposition party, two months ago, might still be relevant: In foreign policy,
the worst damage you can cause for your interlocutor is to mislead him.
Particularly in military matters, one should promise less, not more, than what
one regards as feasible. Turkey should have made it clear -- and should still
make it clear -- that in the absence of an explicit, new U.N. resolution its
contribution would be limited to humanitarian assistance and to the existing
and highly effective "Northern Watch." This already provides a Turkish airbase
for U.S. and U.K. warplanes to guard the northern no-fly zone and to intervene
when necessary. In case of a new U.N. resolution, Turkey could provide broadly
the same framework of assistance as in the 1991 war: Overflight and bases to
U.S. planes for indiscriminate use all over Iraq.
If the Turkish administration had drawn these lines right from the beginning,
without the unintentional misleading that it caused, Turkish-American relations
would have been much less problematic today. Obviously, we do not want others,
especially our neighbors, to possess weapons of mass destruction; but we do not
believe in waging war as its remedy, at least in the present circumstances.
---
Last point: I do not know whether the Turkish government will test the
parliamentary will once more. Another negative response would bring about
political turmoil. A positive response would mean Turkey's deeper involvement
in Iraq, with all the pitfalls and dangers this carries along.
The U.S. and Turkey have a vast geography of common concerns and common
interests, from the Balkans to the Middle East, from NATO -- where our mutual
stances are crucial for the alliance -- to Central Asia, where Turkey has
centuries-old affinities and present close ties, to Afghanistan and the fight
against international terrorism. Iraq is not the only subject. To continue to
disarm Iraq without recourse to war is in Turkey's benefit. It is, I believe,
in the best interests of the U.S. as well.
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
03-04-03 2018ET |
