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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: sandeep who wrote (366128)	3/4/2003 3:59:02 PM
From: dvdw©	Read Replies (3) \| Respond to of 769670

Terrorists In Philippines Say They Are Being Funded By Iraq... As reported by the Washington Post. Saddams money is behind all the America haters, got your check yet...boob.

To: sandeep who wrote (366128)	3/4/2003 4:02:40 PM
From: Thomas A Watson	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 769670

You choose to ignore your misuse of words and complete mistatement of facts. trust Firm reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing. It's not what you state. You state benefit of the doubt. Your last ten years proffer is retarded.

To: sandeep who wrote (366128)	3/4/2003 5:11:33 PM
From: Neocon	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 769670

Have some evidence, my treat..... From PBS's Frontline: Sabah Khodada was a captain in the Iraqi army from 1982 to 1992. He worked at what he describes as a highly secret terrorist training camp at Salman Pak (see Khodada's hand-drawn map of the camp), an area south of Baghdad. In this translated interview, conducted in association with The New York Times on Oct. 14, 2001, Khodada describes what went on at Salman Pak, including details on training hijackers. He emigrated to the U.S. in May 2001. (Editor's Note: Although U.S. officials acknowledge terrorists were trained at Salman Pak, they say it is unlikely that these activities were related to the Sept. 11 attacks. It should also be noted that the two defectors interviewed for this report have been brought to FRONTLINE's attention by members of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a dissident organization seeking to overthrow Saddam Hussein.) After your service in the army, you worked for a secret part of the Iraqi government? Some of it is not very secretive. But there's another part, which has a lot to do with international terrorism and this kind of operation -- this is very secretive. Maybe you could tell me what this section is called, and who runs it. And what did it do? It's called the Division of Special Operations. ... This whole camp where their training is run by the Iraqi [security service]... The government organization [that] basically possesses or have control of the camp is the Iraqi intelligence. But different training people who come, they are headed or sent by different people in the Iraqi government. You say that this is a secret camp. But what was it like? Was it something you drove by and could see on the highway? Did you need special clearance to go there? How would you describe this place, this location? If you're driving on those farm roads, you could probably see the edges of the camp, but you wouldn't realize this is a special camp. The camp is huge. And the locations for the training are far from anybody can see them from the outside. But even when we have visitors, even at the level of a minister, or even higher than a minister in the Iraqi government, they will have to drive around the camp or be driven in the camp inside very specific type of a vehicle. They will sit on the back seat, for example, of this vehicle and they would have ... in addition to the shaded windows, they will have to pull down curtains and they snap those curtains on the bottom, to make sure nobody can see anything outside this vehicle while they're driven around. This is even government officials [who] are not allowed to see this kind of training? Yes. At the very highest level, they cannot see this training. What kind of training went on, and who was being trained? Training is majorly on terrorism. They would be trained on assassinations, kidnapping, hijacking of airplanes, hijacking of buses, public buses, hijacking of trains and all other kinds of operations related to terrorism. The people being trained were Iraqis in one group, and non-Iraqis, or foreign nationals, in another? Non-Iraqis were trained separately from us. There were strict orders not to meet with them and not to talk to them. And even when they conduct their training, their training has to occur at times different from the times when we conduct the Iraqis our own training. So you were training Iraqis, Saddam's fedayeen, members of the militia in Iraq. And someone else, other groups, were training the non-Iraqis? They were special trainers or teachers from the Iraqi intelligence and al-Mukhabarat. And those same trainers or teachers will train the fedayeen, the Iraqi fedayeen, and also the same group of those teachers will train the non-Iraqis, foreigners who are in the camp. Personally, my profession is not this kind of training. My profession is to train people on infantry, typical infantry training, such as training on machine guns, pistols, hand grenades, rocket launchers on the shoulder and this kind of training. The special training that I'm talking about, such as the kidnapping and so, is conducted by those trainers who are not from the army; they are from ... al-Mukhabarat.And there was a person who is very famous. They call him Al-Shaba. [ph]. This is Arabic word means "The Ghost," who was responsible for all the training, and those trainers or the teachers. Why was he called the Ghost? I don't know exactly why he's being called the Ghost. I came there and his name was the Ghost. But I know that he has conducted several terrorist operations in Lebanon and in other countries all over the world. And I know that he told us that he's been requested to be arrested by the Interpol. This is probably why he called himself the Ghost. And the foreign nationals, the Arabs who are there, but who are not Iraqis -- what were they like? Were they Egyptians, Saudis? Do you know where they came from? They look like they're mostly from the Gulf, sometimes from areas close to Yemen, from their dark skin and short bodies. And they also are Muslims. ... Were they religious? I don't know exactly because I saw them seldom very [briefly]. But some of them has beards, long beards, which is an indication of being a religious Muslim. ... How long were you at this base, at this secret location? Approximately six months. What was your job? Administrational things, such as providing food, leave of absence permissions, general training. Ammunition ... providing them with ammunition when needed. How did you meet the Ghost? And what did he say? I meet him several times a day. We usually meet in the morning when they go to training. We meet in the afternoon or the noontime when they come back from training. And several times, we'll meet at the evening to drink tea. And he will come, him and other teachers who always with him. They always talk about their operations proudly. For example, they were telling us about how they were able to penetrate the American forces during the 1990 Gulf War, where they went inside the Saudi Arabia territory, and they were able to bring exact coordinates of the Dharan airbase where it was hit by the Scud missiles and many Americans were killed. He is an Iraqi, the Ghost? Yes. Did he explain what kind of training they were giving to the people who were there, especially to the non-Iraqis? He tried not to talk about training as much as possible. I even, out of curiosity, asked him about those Arabs. Sometime he told me, "Don't ask about them. This is something we're not supposed to talk about." So the Ghost said, "I can't talk to you about these Arabs who are training, or what we're training them in." Yes. So did you find out what kind of training was going on? I don't necessarily know what kind of training they do, but they were trained exactly at the same locations, and they were trained by the same teachers who were training ... [the fighters for] Saddam. Training includes hijacking and kidnapping of airplanes, trains, public buses, and planting explosives in cities, sabotaging villages, sabotaging houses, assassinations. And the training also included how to prepare for suicidal operations. For example, they will train them how to belt themselves around with explosives, and jump in a place and explode themselves out as part of the suicidal training. I think the trainings of the Arabs was much harsher, and much stricter, than the training of the Iraqis. Why? Because we know that Arabs, non-Iraqis who come to train in these kind of camps, are going to be sent to very dangerous and important operations outside Iraq; not inside Iraq. And they will be conducting very specific operations and dangerous operations in their own cities, or in their own countries, or other countries all over the world. Those Arabs are real volunteers. They come in small numbers, and they come with the intention to do some real suicidal operations. ... There are other types of training, such as physical training, which we are all familiar with. But there's another kind of special training, which is called "self-confidence training." ... For example, a bunch of the fedayeen will be taken in a helicopter. They will fly them away to an unknown area, and they will be asked to jump out of the plane without knowing if there is underneath them a desert or a house or there's water. But they're supposed to jump. So, they will jump. Another type of self-confidence training would be, for example, they will pull the pin of a hand grenade, and they will throw the hand grenade from one to another until the last one will throw it in the air and it will explode in the air. Another type of self-confidence training would be, they will put a hand grenade in a pipe, and they will pull the pin and throw it in the pipe, and stand near the pipe saluting the hand grenade until it explodes. Other type of self-confidence training would be holding a rocket launcher, which is an Army GB-7, and holding it vertically, then shooting the rocket vertically, which is very unusual, but the backfire of this hand grenade will hit the ground next to you. And if you don't have self-confidence, you cannot do it. This is another kind of self-confidence training. And they trained people to hijack airplanes? Yes. For what purpose? ... It has been said openly in the media and even to us, from the highest command, that the purpose of establishing Saddam's fighters is to attack American targets and American interests. This is known. There's no doubt about it. All this training is directed towards attacking American targets, and American interests. The training does not only include hijacking of planes and sabotage. ... Some other people were trained to do parachuting. Some other areas were training on how to penetrate enemy lines and get information from behind enemy lines. But it's all for the general concept of hitting and attacking American targets and American interests. Who controlled this operation? In terms of training, they will train in this special camp. But after this training, they will go in small groups. These small groups are directly connected with Saddam, or to Saddam's son. For example, the Iraqi fighters, they will be spread all over the country. Occasionally those individual groups, very small groups, will be called for. They might encounter different kind of special training beyond this training on specific things. I'll give you an example. They were calling for some of these groups to train intensively to learn English language, Persian language, Hebrew language, to be sent out to different places of the world to conduct such kind of ... different kind of operations. I suspect that the higher level of training, or the additional training they encounter, has a lot to do with what happened. And there's a lot of similarity with what happened with New York and Washington on September 11. That was your reaction on September 11 -- that some of these people might be involved? I assure you, this operation was conducted by people who were trained by Saddam. And I'm going to keep assuring the world this is what happened. Osama bin Laden has no such capabilities. Why? Because this kind of attacks must be, and has to be, organized by a capable state, such as Iraq; a state where they can provide high level of training, and they can provide high level of intelligence to do such training. How could Osama bin Laden -- who's hiding in the middle of nowhere in Afghanistan in small caves and valleys -- train people and gather information and send people to do such high-level operation? We all know this is a high-level operation. This cannot be done by a person who does not even own a plane in Afghanistan, who cannot offer such training in Afghanistan. This is definitely done by a mastermind like Saddam. ... And the camp has a 707 that they train on? Yes, there's a real whole 707 plane, a whole real plane, standing in the middle of the training area in this camp. And they train people on how to get access to the cabin, to the crew? Yes. And how to take over the plane using weapons? How? They will get trained on how to get weapons inside the plane. If there is a security weakness that they know of, they will prefer to get weapons. But I am sure that, before the attack of September 11, those people made a very thorough study. And they learned that getting weapons into the plane might not be a very good idea. But in this camp, I saw them getting trained on this kind of situations where security will not allow you to get weapons into the plane -- then what you need to do is to use all available methods and very advanced terrorizing method. These methods are used to terrorize the passengers and the crew of the plane. They are even trained how to use utensils for food, like forks and knives provided in the plane. ... They are trained how to plant horror within the passengers by doing such actions. Even pens and pencils can be used for that purpose they were trained. They can do it, and they can overcome any plane because they are very well physically trained, and they are very strong, and they can do it. They can overtake a plane in a very efficient manner. ... Recently, here in Washington, you met with the FBI. Yes. Did you tell them all of this? Yes. What was their reaction? Did they say they already knew about this, or did they act like this was all new to them? No, they do not know about it. But I told them everything I know, hoping that they can make it useful to them. I did that to protect the peace, not only for America; the peace in America and the peace of the world. People must know such training and such preparation for terror is happening in Iraq. Otherwise, it's going to happen again and again. And it's up to those people, meaning the FBI, to take action about it. ... Where is the camp located near? You could describe where it's geographically located. Yes. It's southeast of Baghdad, about 25 kilometers from outside of Baghdad ... . I think the American government should have pictures of this camp from the air. I know for a fact that on January 1995, the United Nations came and took pictures of this camp. But they don't know -- neither the United Nations nor the American government -- what's going on inside this camp. But they can see the 707, or the train? On a Friday, which is equivalent to Sunday here, it's a holiday, was on January 1995. They came and the United Nations inspectors visited us. They went all the way inside the camp. They saw the plane, they saw the train, and they didn't care anything about it, because the story was, they told ... his commanders told the United Nation, "This is a camp to train police, anti-riots police." Anti-riot police? Yes. And it really was a terrorist training camp? Yes. I can hear someone saying to me, "This is one person claiming that this happened. How are we going to check?" How do we prove or, if you will, test what you have to say? ... If you want to make sure about it, go back to pictures of your government, aerial pictures of your government, and go back all the documents that showed this camp is existing. And go back to my friend who is in Turkey, who could also tell you the same thing that I'm telling you now. Addition to that, maybe you can find archives of Iraqi TV, showing on the Iraqi TV Saddam's fighters ... putting bombs belted on their bodies, wearing masks. Maybe you should be able to get these archives and see something what's shown openly on Iraqi TV. The training of Saddam's militia was shown on Iraqi TV? They will show some of their training. For example, they will show clips of their jumping from the helicopters. But there was also parades, military parades, and they will show off Saddam wearing this explosive around themselves with their masks on. ... I even heard it on Arabic BBC when they were saying, when they were describing them, not as Saddam's fighters -- they describe them as "the terrorists of Saddam" -- wearing explosives and looking like crocodiles, black crocodiles. I'm very surprised that you, in America, don't know about these things. To you, then, the likely suspect here is the government of Iraq and Saddam in all this terrorism. And yet we're looking the wrong way? I assure you, and I'm going to keep assuring you, that all these things are obvious. I don't know why you don't see it. When we were in Iraq, Saddam said all the time, even during the Gulf War, "We will take our revenge at the proper time." He kept telling the people, "Get ready for our revenge." We saw people getting trained to hijack airplanes, to put explosives. How could anybody not think this is not done by Saddam? Even the grouping, those groups were divided into five to six people in the group. How about the training on planes? Some of these groups were taken and trained to drive airplanes at the School of Aviation, northern of Baghdad ... .Everything coincides with what's happening. In addition to that, we heard in the news about meeting some of those hijackers with the Iraqi intelligence people in Prague, and even getting money to get trained on flying airplanes in the United States from the Iraqi intelligence. [Did you hear that some of those training at the camp were working for] Osama bin Laden? Nobody came and told us, "This is Al Qaeda people," but I know there were some Saudis, there were some Afghanis. There were some other people from other countries getting trained. They didn't tell us they were part of Al Qaeda; there's no such thing. ... In this camp, we know that those are Saudis, or Arabs are getting trained. Nobody will talk about Al Qaeda or any other organization. They're just people. Yes. Who clearly wanted to ... or were interested in doing terror, becoming terrorists? This camp is specialized in exporting terrorism to the whole world. ... In the conversations that you had with the Ghost and with others, was it clear that they were involved in international terrorism -- that that's what the object here was, to send people out to do missions? They all say it. On January 1, 1996, we all met with Saddam personally. And he told us we have to take revenge from America. Our duty is to attack and hit American targets in the Gulf, in the Arab world, and all over the world. He said that openly. When you volunteer to become Saddam's fighter ... they will tell you the purpose of your volunteer[ing] is to attack American targets and American interests, not only in Iraq, not only in the Gulf, [but] all over the world, including Europe and America. That's how Saddam was able to attract those Arabs and Muslims who came to train, because that's exactly what they want to do. I just wanted to understand that in the camp itself, when you were sitting down with the trainers and they were describing what they were doing, did they say they were getting people ready for missions in Europe, in the United States? Those people who are in the camp ... do the training, and the rest will be conducted by the higher command. For example, after you finish the training, there will be groups of five to six people, sometimes four people, but most likely between five to six people, not exceeding six. Maximum number will be six people. Or they would be able, for example, to call for a specific group for a specific purpose to Baghdad. And nobody knows what this group is going to do. They will go to Baghdad. They will be briefed on what they're going to do, or trained about something specific. They will be sent, and we don't know where they go, and they come back to us. That's how it works. It's not like the trainers in the camp know what's going on. The operations are headed directly from the top. But when someone would hear about an incident, like there was an attack on the U.S. military in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia in 1995, or the Khobar barracks was blown up in Saudi Arabia, you didn't hear anyone say, "We took part in that," or, "That was one of ours," during this period of time. They don't talk specifics. The only specific thing they talked about in front of me is ... location coordinates during the Gulf War. But I hear them talking about operations in Saudi Arabia, operations other places, in Lebanon. But I never hear the details from them. Any evidence of biological or chemical warfare training? This type of training, if it happened, it occurred outside our camp... Can you explain what's on this map that you drew? The surrounding area around this camp is an area for fitness training. This is a Boeing 707, where they trained how to hijack it. And also they were trained how to resist or stop hijacking operation. Next to it, there's a double-decker bus in which they could do the same thing -- training, hijacking. And this is next to it, there is a village, built houses like a model of a village. They will train how to plant TNT and explosives. And very next to it, there's a single house, where they're trained how to enter it, or sabotage it or explode it. The railway track is where the train is. That's where they would have the same training for hijacking of a train. I would like to also tell you that this is a village where farmers would live. Those farmers, by the way, are employees by the Iraqi intelligence -- all of them. They look like normal families, but they are not as you think. They are employees of the Iraqi intelligence to put cover and protection to the base. ... What's the method that's taught, in terms of hijacking? It's not just taking on weapons, is it? Training will include the way they would sit in the plane, how they enter the plane, provided they got the right documents from the top levels of Iraqi Intelligence, such as passports. ... They will, for example, sit in two's, and they will assign who will sit to the right of the other guy, and who will sit to the other side. Two will sit in the front, two will sit in the back, and two will sit, for example, in the middle. They are trained to jump all at one time, and make a declaration that "We are going to take over the plane. And nobody [move], don't move, don't make any moves." They will probably use a pencil or a pen, or even sunglasses or prescription glasses. Somebody will hold the crew members of the plane from their chins upward tightly, and you will pull it on his neck. He will think you are going to slaughter him and kill him. Including in this training is terrorizing by making very, very loud noises and screaming all over the plane. That will take over the planned horror, and will terrorize the plane, including the crew. Why are you coming forward with this information? I'd like to tell the whole world, and American people, that I wish peace ... in this world. And I want to tell you that what you have seen is very little from what we have seen done to the Iraqi people by Saddam. If somebody use chemical weapons such as in Halabja on his own people, what do you think he would do to different parts of the world? I call for the world and the Iraqi people and every Muslim not to believe the propaganda by Saddam and bin Laden. Those are murderers, and they have nothing to do with Islam. Here in the United States, as a Muslim, I was never been harassed or treated badly, and nobody stopped me from my prayers, or stopped me from being a Muslim. So what Saddam is doing is exactly what's against Islam, against the world, and against peace of the world. pbs.org.

To: sandeep who wrote (366128)	3/4/2003 5:21:31 PM
From: Neocon	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 769670

Here is some more: Something from the public television news program Frontline: Khadir Hamza is an American-trained nuclear physicist who headed the Iraqi nuclear weapons program before defecting to the West in 1994. In this interview, conducted in October 2001, Hamza discusses the possibility that Iraq may develop a nuclear weapon in the near future, and whether Saddam has connections to Osama bin Laden and the Sept. 11 terrorists. In an earlier FRONTLINE interview, he detailed Iraq's efforts to build a nuclear weapon and to hide its weapons development from U.N. inspectors. Hamza is the author of Saddam's Bombmaker (Scribner, 2000), a memoir recounting his experiences working in Saddam's inner circle. What's your opinion of whether Saddam Hussein has a connection with bin Laden? What I think is there is somehow a change in the level of the type of operation bin Laden has been carrying [out]. What we are looking at initially is more or less just attempts to blow some buildings, just normal use of explosives for a terrorist. What we have in the September 11 operation, [is a] tightly controlled, very sophisticated operation; the type an Iraqi intelligence agency, well versed in the technology [could pull off]. ... So my thinking is a guy sitting in a cave in Afghanistan is not the guy who will do an operation of this caliber. It has to have in combination with it a guy with the sophistication and know-how on how to carry these things. ... Iraq [also] has a history of training terrorists, harboring them, and taking good care of them, by the way. A terrorist is well cared for with Saddam. So he has a good reputation in that type of community, if you like. What do you think about the possibility of Iraq sharing anthrax with bin Laden's people, whoever the terrorists are in the United States that are now using them? What's the possibility of that? I think [the possibility is] high. I think very high. ... I don't believe for a minute that Al Qaeda has the support, in Afghanistan or anywhere else, do to this sophisticated kind of weapon. But why share such technology with someone else? If you're going to do it, you do it yourself. Why put yourself in danger? We are speculating. There are two ways to do it. Saddam would prefer to do it directly, if he can guarantee the deniability angle. ... He will not want things to be traced directly back to him, because he knows the repercussions will be just too strong. So what he will do is he will try to achieve some deniability, at least to create suspicion that he may be, he may be not, but not give direct evidence that this came from Iraq. My expectation is that he did part in Iraq and had somebody do the complementary parts somewhere else. If it's traced to that source, he's out. He's not involved directly in it. There might be leads and suspicious but no direct evidence. But again, this is speculation. It could be he made a certain amount of spores and sent them abroad directly, if he could do in a way that could not be traced back to him. So if you believe it's quite possible that he would share such anthrax, and possibly other biological, with another group? What would the goal [be]? What does Saddam Hussein get out of this? Destabilize the U.S., at least create a problem for the U.S. Very difficult to destabilize the U.S. -- it's impossible -- but create problems for the U.S., major ones, if possible. Make it busy with its own problems, get it out of the region. ... The natural question is, why? Why does he want to have a relationship with other groups that he has not total control over? They could get him in trouble. One might say that, politically, Iraq has been doing well. The French and the Germans seem to be helping them in the United Nations in some of the debates. Why take a chance? Saddam believes that security starts abroad. Always he thinks that way. Think outside. ... If somebody is endangering you, go after him one way or the other. And Saddam is vengeful. Remember, he tried to kill former President Bush even after he left office. It's his nature. And, I think, it's an impression he wants to leave, "Don't do me a bad turn; I never forget it." I think Saddam's given up on lifting the sanctions. The U.S. will never lift the sanctions on Iraq, no matter what the French say or the Russians. ... So the best policy for him, knowing him and the way he operates, is to attack. He cannot get the type of loyalty that people will blow themselves up for him. This is not the type of regime he runs. He doesn't have that kind of people. ... Very few Iraqis will go inside Iran and blow up on suicide missions. But ... a guy like bin Laden would be an excellent complement to the operation he wants. They supply him with the foot soldiers ready to blow themselves up. He could train those foot soldiers, support them with his operations, ongoing, including the arm of the military industry, which is very sophisticated, and know-how for acquiring technology, knowing where to go and where to get things. And his intelligence operatives, which can do very tight operations, extremely tight. ... There's a story out in the London Times recently, where an Egyptian reporter asked one of the bin Laden folk that have been arrested in Egypt about if Al Qaeda has nuclear weapons, and the response was yes, that Al Qaeda, as well as the Islamic Jihad, have obtained nukes through several countries. What do you make of that report? I don't believe it, unless they buy it or steal it from somebody. I doubt they are capable of putting together a nuclear weapon, even given the nuclear material. Look at Iraq. We had teams of thousands working at it, and we still haven't got it together in the form to make it into a weapon. Now, a weapon, for Al Qaeda, is another story also. For Al Qaeda, they need a transportable one. ... They need a suitcase type of bomb. This is the only thing that makes sense to them. We are talking high technology here. Not Pakistan, not India, nor Iraq can do this. But the Soviets would. And they supposedly reported that they're missing 40 some-odd suitcase nuclear weapons. We tried the Soviets. We tried to get something out of them, the former Soviet republics. It is very hard to really know your way around and get something safely out. So I would doubt it. ... A buyer is at a severe disadvantage there. There are so many sting operations running around, you don't know, even your friend might be part of it. ... In the end, nobody, as far as I know, even got nuclear material out. ... The problem for us was the enrichment capability was downgraded by the inspectors after the war ... so the intention became to also getting some nuclear material directly. That turned out to be not easy. Bomb-grade uranium or plutonium turned out not to be [easily available]... You hear it is all over the place, when you go there. ... But actually getting your hands on this stuff turns out to be very hard. And we lost millions in deposits to black marketeers who came to us with offers to sell us this and that, and they took the money on the run, and we never saw them again. It's not as easy as it looks. But it's possible. It is possible. But ... I don't believe bin Laden has the capability to take bomb-grade material and make a nuclear weapon out of it, and I don't believe he really stole a bomb, an actual working nuclear bomb. I don't think it is that simple or that easy, despite what I hear. ... In terms of the training of terrorists in camps -- what was taking place? Who was involved? And why the Iraqis? Why were they doing it? The training and the terrorism angle would be the only option left for a country that lost a war. ... Outright wars are out now, with the sanctions and the huge losses, and Iraq demoralized and almost destroyed. Terrorism is always for the weak. It's not an option for a major power. It's never been. Always, when you get weaker, you go to terrorism. ... So terrorist camps come natural in Iraq. What was happening that you remember seeing yourself at Salman Pak [site of an alleged terrorist camp]? For me, the major training was not Salman Pak ... I believe the major training centers are elsewhere, including Deltaje [ph] I have a ranch [near] there ... and that's a major training camp. ... Some of the guys being trained in that camp would come over and talk to us ... . These guys are getting prepared to do some terrorist attacks on neighboring states, or anywhere else, actually. ... They were trained to go into Kuwait and acquire a target, or Saudi Arabia and acquire a target, and come back; [go to] Iran, acquire targets and come back. Now, it looks to me like ... the part I saw is the tip of the iceberg of what's going on in other camps, where all kinds of training is going on in these kind of operations. It is typical commando or terrorist-type of training where you are told where to go, given a map, live from the land. Was it only Iraqi soldiers? No, actually they were not Iraqis. One of them, he said he's Palestinian, but he could be from anywhere. He could be an Egyptian. He could be from anywhere, the one we knew. And there are others of all kinds come and go. What is the nuclear capability, at this point, of Iraq? I believe Iraq now has fully functional design, and complete manufacturing capability for the parts, or parts of the nuclear equipment. The only thing in Iraq remains [to acquire] is the nuclear core. ... German intelligence, which I believe made a very good assessment ... is [that] Iraq should be able to acquire complete this part by 2005, and have three nuclear weapons. It might not be three, though; it might be one or two. [When] I left Iraq, Iraq had the design for a [nuclear] device, not a weapon. They had not hardened the design, and miniaturized it enough to make it a weapon -- a hardy enough weapon for transport, say, a missile. But there was a lot of work going into hardening this design. "Hardening" meaning...? Meaning making it able to withstand a trip. Checking parts against all kinds of shocks and movements and stuff like that. Making it tighter. Making it hardier. Useful on a missile? Useful on a missile. That was a target. The design we had even then could withstand an airplane trip. ... So the whole effort was directed to hardening and miniaturizing. I believe Iraq has it now. You think they have one or two now? No. You think they're growing, or have the possibility within the next couple of years... Yes. ... ... of actually building this? Yes. How successful or unsuccessful was the United Nations in eradicating the nuclear and the biological threat that Iraq presents here? The United Nations inspectors had a very misguided opinion about what is disarmament. ... They thought if you have something, I take it away from you, and you are disarmed. Despite the knowledge you have, the expertise you gained through the years, your contacts that could repurchase parts for you and put the thing back together. They discounted all this. If you have a piece of equipment, they take it away, and you are disarmed. This is simplistic. They are not naïve; I talked to them. I talked to many of the inspectors. We had some kind of give and take in this. But they were restricted. ... For example, on the nuclear ... the critical parts, that Iraq could not replace easily, we did not tell about -- for example, the molds that you make explosives with, the machines that you make explosives with. Nobody is going to sell you these anymore. Very difficult. So Iraq did not give these up. Not a single explosive was given to the inspectors for the nuclear weapon program. Not a single mold, not a single machine. "Given?" I thought they were found. A little bit found, but not explosives. Iraq claimed that these were destroyed in the war. Other parts were given, or were found and given to inspectors. Not everything the inspectors found, by the way, was given to them. They might find something and it disappears on them. And that happened several times. Anyway, suppose even they were given? The expertise is there. Iraq kept a very essential part of the program. The computer-controlled lathe machines and machining device ... these are critical in making the high technology part. In biology, what do you need in biology? Aside from some few equipment, you need to import mostly fermenters, dryers and stuff like that. All these could be re-manufactured in Iraq. And this is what the inspectors took away. You don't need a high-grade growth media to do biological agents. What you need is a growth media, and a growth media can be done in Iraq. It wouldn't be the high-grade Western standard or your standard growth media. The germs that grow wouldn't be up to standards here, but they would be workable. ... Why the special interest in biological weapons? Biological are much less easily detectable than any other. You could have a plastic bag of anthrax in your pocket and take it, if it is well sealed, or doubly sealed, and take it anywhere without being detected. Chemical is harder. There are always traces of chemicals, which would be a give-away. Nuclear, you have the radiation problem. And I don't believe radiological weapons are effective anyway; we tried them. They don't create the terror that biological weapons can create. ... Did Saddam Hussein understand that? Did he understand that terror was his friend? Did he understand that, in some ways, as far as a weapon of choice, perhaps biological was the choice? If there is anything Saddam understands, it is terror. This is what he lives on. This is how he made himself into what he is now. This is how he came to power. ... Everything we did in the chemical weapon program, all the death caused, we could have done them with conventional. But dropping chemicals on the Iranians, they started fleeing. ... You might kill less with these, but the others are completely demoralized. You started for the first time seeing fleeing troops at the front. So terror is what actually was the major weapon we used in the chemical against the Iranians. To keep with the subject of terror, tell us about being shown the tape [of Saddam purging the government of those he viewed as "traitors" when he took power.] That tape was made [on] the "night of the long knives." Saddam, when he took power, he thought there was this... He believed it was a conspiracy to put him out of the loop, get him out of the system completely. So he needed more or less a coup. He took over and became president and arranged for this charade of the general secretary of the party claiming that these are the conspirators, agents of Syria, to topple the Iraqi government. You had the Revolutionary Council, which is made of nine members, voted by the majority. The minority of four, including Saddam, decided that the majority of five are the traitors, and put them under arrest. So five out of the nine Revolutionary Council were killed that night. The tape was made in several versions, I am told. I was shown one of the versions. ... People were called by name, they were asked to leave, somebody came and escorted them out, a couple of people, they were taken outside. In another version of the tape, there is a camera outside. They were lined up and shot. How? The question is, who shot them and why? And that's Saddam's baptism by blood. Saddam doesn't believe you are loyal unless you kill for him. Any other test is meaningless. ... So some ministers, some people who are now in the Cabinet, who are outside holding the guns that shot the others, other ministers, including his cousins. The main henchmen and controllers were his half-brothers and cousins. ... You see people being shot, and then somebody coming over, Barzan, especially, his oldest half-brother, and do the coup de grace. So you have this terrible bloodbath outside. Why were you shown this tape? Several reasons. [To show me] what could happen to me if I did something. I was in a critical [position]. I was doing one of the most crucial ... programs, and the largest. We learned in the U.S. a habit -- a bad one for Iraq -- of more or less being open, talking a lot, especially among our friends and inner circles. So they were telling me I'd better mend my ways, be a little bit more under control, or I'll be like one of these. ... SADDAM'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US Did you ever sit with Saddam Hussein talking about the goals of the program? No. He made a point of not doing that. ... Did you talk to him at all? Did you meet with him? Yes, we met, and talked, but not the goals. Did he talk about the United States? He talks all the time about the United States -- the United States did this, United States did that, United States with Israel. He talks all the time. ... Did he talk about intentions of what Iraq should do, as far as the United States? Or did he talk about the irritation with the inability to strike back at the United States? That would be out of character. Saddam doesn't declare his intentions that way. ... He would not do that openly. ... You know it from his associates; you know it from the orders you get it; you know it from what's going on actually. You don't know it on the declared policies. These are covert operations. They are designed to be that way. Not much is talked about, and it's actually dangerous to do so. And the intentions? Intentions [to] keep the U.S. busy, try to get it out of Iraq's backyard -- Gulf states and such -- get it out of Iraq's affairs, create a danger to the U.S., one way or the other. ... [Does Saddam believe the U.S. wants to get rid of him?] I don't think Saddam knows you want to get rid of him. I don't think Saddam believes you want to get rid of him. Why? Nothing is done together. There's no support for any movement that actually wants to topple Saddam. But Saddam knows you want to contain him. This, he is convinced. We keep him weak, but keep him in power. ... And the assumption is that the United States will not want to get rid of him because...? Because several factors. First, Iran. Even if relations look normal now with Iran, Iran is a danger to the Gulf states. An Islamic republic is not a vision the U.S. wants to be spread in the region. And the only real, actual, and proven definitely force against Iran -- beyond any doubt -- is Saddam. There is no other proven force that can understand Iran. So Saddam is convinced, and I believe many in the Iraqi opposition also are convinced, and they say it, that U.S. don't want to remove him, actually, but they don't want him to terrorize the region. They don't want him to have too much power over the region -- yes. SHOULD WE TAKE HIM OUT? But there's a debate now in Washington very strongly held in the Defense Department and elsewhere, that Iraq has to go, that this war against terrorism will not be won unless one targets Iraq and Saddam Hussein. What is your take on that debate and its reality? That's a very complex situation developing now. What you have now is ten years of no credibility to any U.S. policy to remove Saddam, despite the statements made on all levels by U.S. politicians. So any support for the Iraqi opposition in the region, serious support, eroded during all those years. Nobody wants to go into ... being in opposition, to go openly against Saddam and support whatever is going to topple him, and in the end, [be] left like the Iraqi opposition was left in the north and the Kurds were left -- to deal with Saddam on their own. Why would they? Because the U.S. is now proven in the region to be unreliable. ... In your opinion, what is the threat that Saddam Hussein poses at this point? Is it necessary to remove him from power? And if the United States loses this opportunity to go after him, what does the future hold? You are having for the first time nuclear weapons coming -- not now -- in the future, near future probably. Even if it is not 2005, 2010 would be for sure. The estimate now -- 2005 Iraq will be nuclear. Say, 2010. We are talking about now the future of the region. Now, Saddam gets nuclear weapons, and he has already the full range of the chemical and most of the range of the biological probably. ... The expertise are there, all the scientists are there, and he has oil money, to a degree, not as much as before. So what you are getting is a highly weaponized state with a huge terror organ -- the government itself is a terror organ, and several organizations that could be satellites to it, including Al Qaeda. ... A nuclear bomb would turn Saddam into a huge figure in the region. Islamic fundamentalists and many of the Arab nationalists feel humiliated throughout this century -- the loss of Palestine, the occupation of Arab land by the West, the humiliation of the region throughout the century; they'll be vindicated with Saddam. Here is a man who can stand up to the West, who made it, who has it, who can do it. He will be a huge figure in the region. And the Arab "street," which we used to think is not very important ... September 11 is telling us, now, is very important, because 14 out of the 19 killer hijackers, 13 or 14, are Saudis, which are basically U.S. allies. So the Saudi street is not stable, is not happy, neither with the government nor with the alliance. So what we are ending with us a breeding ground of groups that would work outside the alliance structure and could support whichever extremist regime they think is attractive to them. So you seem to be saying that there's no choice. There is no choice. Absolutely no choice to removing Saddam. No alternative. Saddam has to be removed. Otherwise, what you'll have is the region going down the drain, eventually, with all kinds of extremist groups, possible skirmishes, small wars, all kinds of actions. When did this dawn on you? You were in the position of providing him what he needed to become this horror that you're now defining. When did this dawn on you? How did you think about it when you were still in Iraq? The danger became clear in the crash program in 1990, [link to unscom interview] when we were asked to make one nuclear weapon out of the French fuel. It makes no sense. We made a device, actually, minus the core, and we sat down and did calculations. We have one to two kilograms, and we needed eighteen, extracted to make the bomb. And we would have had a small -- probably two-to-four kiloton explosion at the time. ... But the idea was [that] he wanted it on a missile, and he was mad at us for not making it small enough. ... Now, we are talking about destroying Iraq and a madman who is taking everybody with him if he goes: a self-centered megalomaniac who is thinking only of himself. If he goes, nothing should remain after. That kind of thing we couldn't deal with -- I couldn't personally deal with -- so I started from then to start easing my way out and getting out of the country. ... What do we, the United States, not understand about this man and his capabilities? That he is vengeful, that he never forgets an enemy. That he will go to extreme measures to get back at whoever [he thinks has done him wrong.] That he's very devious, and that he is underestimated. You see, his loss and humiliation in the Gulf War made everybody interested in Saddam. He fumbled. That war he lost so badly. He had no control over his army. He has no control over most of the country. The Kurds left, and they're still out. The Shiites all left. They rebelled, and there was no control over that. He fumbled badly in that war. And so everybody looked down at Saddam as finished, as a bungler, as a guy who couldn't get his act together. And that's, I think, an impression, probably left in the mind of some Western leaders, probably in the U.S., too -- thinking that the guy is not up to the caliber that he can go against the U.S, [that ...] he is too busy with his own internal problems, with the sanctions put on him. He could be too weak to act, to come back out. But that's not true, as far as you're concerned. That's not true. How so? This is not his make-up. He doesn't work that way. Saddam is very vengeful, and Saddam believes in getting back and attacking. ... ... You know the capabilities of Iraq. If all of a sudden we find ourselves at war with Iraq, what should we expect? I don't think there will be serious danger, frankly. Of course, things have to change. If you want to protect yourself against bin Laden and Iraq and this, then you have to incorporate a large intelligence capability in that area -- incorporate the Arabs and Muslims, like the British did, now. There's a huge community of Arabs and Muslims within their intelligence structure. ... They incorporated the Iraqi expatriate community into their intelligence network. And they knew exactly who is going in and who is going out. They have a continual stream of intelligence about Iraq and what it's doing. ...They don't want the danger coming from Iraq to affect them internally. ... If [your capabilities] are augmented in that direction, I doubt if Iraq could do much damage to the U.S., much damage. ... So what do you assume is going to happen? What is your best guess? Now that you've been in the United States, you've seen how things work; you see the pressure being built [towards going after him]. I don't think anything will happen. ... I think the minimum will be done. And I don't think an overt action of a larger scale required to get rid of him will be adopted, for many reasons. The end result will be [to] do nothing. ... This has been the U.S. policy for the last ten years, and it will be now. ... If the United States for whatever reason decides that its war on terrorism should not include Saddam Hussein, his long-term goals, does he still feel that this war started ten years ago, supposedly finished ten years ago, is ongoing, whether we go at him or not? Is this war for Saddam Hussein continuing? Yes, it will be continuing to him as long as you keep on him the sanctions. Limit him and how much weapons he can make. Limit his military capability. Limit his ability to domineer the region. Limit his movements. Limit his power. You are his enemies. It makes no different whether they go after him or not. Not going after him will relieve him from trying to defend himself, but it would not get him out of the box he is in. Because he believe if he stays weak, he's dead. So he'll fight you one way or the other -- through terrorism, all kinds of weaponry he has. ... pbs.org.