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Politics : Let's Start The War And Get It Over With -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/8/2003 8:37:46 AM
From: Vitas  Respond to of 808
 
Text of U.N. Addresses By Powell, Straw, Douri

Following are the addresses to the Security Council on March 7, 2003, by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Mohammed Al-Douri, Iraq's permanent representative to the United Nations. Provided by the Associated Press and Federal News Service (www.fns.com).

POWELL: In his report this morning, Dr. Blix remarked on the paucity of information on Iraq's programs since 1998. We've all been working hard to fill that gap. But Iraq is the one who could fill that gap if it was truly complying with 1441. It would be inundating the inspectors with new information, not holding it back begrudgingly.

The draft we reviewed today in preparation for this meeting was 167 pages long. If Iraq were genuinely committed to disarmament, Dr. Blix's document would not be 167 pages of issues and questions, it would be thousands upon thousands of pages of answers about anthrax, about VX, about sarin, about unmanned aerial vehicles. It would set out in detail all of Iraq's prohibited programs. Then and only then could the inspectors really do the credible job they need to do of verification, destruction and monitoring.

We've been down this road before. March 1998, Saddam Hussein was also faced with the threat of military action. He responded with promises--promises to provide inspectors at that time with immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

The then chief inspector reported to this council a new spirit of cooperation, along with his hope that the inspectors could move very quickly to verify Iraq's disarmament. We know what happened to that hope. There was no progress and disarmament. And nine months later, the inspectors found it necessary to withdraw.

I regret that not much has changed. Iraq's current behavior, like the behavior chronicled in Dr. Blix's document, reveals its strategic decision to continue to delay, to deceive, to try to throw us off the trail, make it more difficult, to hope that the will of the international community will be fractured, that we will go off in different directions, that we will get bored with the task, that we will remove the pressure, we will remove the force. And we know what has happened when that has been done in the past.

We know that the Iraqis still are not volunteering information. Then when they do, what they are giving is often partial and misleading. We know that when confronted with facts, the Iraqis still are changing their story to explain those facts, but not enough to give us the truth.

So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the leadership in Baghdad? I think our judgment has to be clearly not. And this is now the reality we, the council, must deal with.

Security Council membership carries heavy responsibility, responsibility to the community of nations to take the hard decisions on tough issues, such as the one we are facing today. Last November, this council stepped up to it responsibilities. We must not walk away. We must not find ourselves here this coming November with the pressure removed and with Iraq once again marching down the merry path to weapons of mass destruction, threatening the region, threatening the world.

If we fail to meet our responsibilities, the credibility of this council and its ability to deal with all the critical challenges we face will suffer. As we sit here, let us not forget the horrors still going on in Iraq with a spare moment to remember the suffering Iraqi people whose treasure is spent on these kinds of programs and not for their own benefit, people who are being beaten, brutalized and robbed by Saddam and his regime.

Colleagues, now is the time for the council to send a clear message to Saddam that we have not been taken in by his transparent tactics. Nobody wants war, but it is clear that the limited progress we have seen, the process changes we have seen, the slight substantive changes we have seen come from the presence of a large military force, nations who are willing to put their young men and women in harm's way in order to rid the world of these dangerous weapons.

It doesn't come simply from resolutions, it doesn't come simply from inspectors. It comes from the will of this council, the unified political will of this council and the willingness to use force if it comes to that, to make sure that we achieve the disarmament of Iraq.

Now is the time for the council to tell Saddam that the clock has not been stopped by his stratagems and his machinations. We believe that the resolution that has been put forward for action by this council is appropriate. And in the very near future, we should bring it before this council for a vote.

The clock continues to tick, and the consequences of Saddam Hussein continued refusal to disarm will be very, very real.

Thank you.

* * *

STRAW: Mr. President, I'd like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency, by wishing you well at a very important moment, and also to echo and underline the thanks which you so generously gave to Vice Chancellor Joschka Fischer and Ambassador Gunter Pleuger for the excellent way in which they chaired the Security Council during the month of February.

I would also like to thank Dr. ElBaradei and Dr. Blix for their reports, and to place on record my government's appreciation for their work and the work in very difficult circumstances of all the staff of the IAEA and of UNMOVIC.

Mr. President, I've listened with very great care to what my colleagues speaking before me have said. We are all agreed that Iraq must be fully disarmed of weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraq's failure to cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with the inspectors has to be dealt with.

As we negotiated 1441, the evidence was there for all of us to see that Iraq had been and remained in material breach. And we, all 15 members, voted to give the Iraqi regime a final opportunity to comply with its obligations. And the first question, therefore, before this council is: Has Iraq taken this final opportunity to disarm?

And I've been very struck, listened with care to all the speeches, and of course people have different points of view, but nobody, not one minister before this council, in my hearing, has said that Iraq is now fully, actively and immediately in compliance with 1441. They have not so far taken this final opportunity.

If anybody in this chamber, or outside, has any doubt about that conclusion, then I do commend to members this so-called "cluster report," the Outstanding Issues Concerning Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Program, which as a member of the commission behind UNMOVIC, I've already had the privilege of reading, and I have read, Dr. Blix knows, all 167 pages of that report in every particular. It's a very painstaking piece of work. I thank Dr. Blix for publishing it. But it's also a chilling read about the failure of Iraq to comply with successive resolutions of this council over each day of the past 12 years.

And there's not been active cooperation in the areas which matter. UNMOVIC, because of that, have not been able to resolve any substantive issues outstanding from 1998. As we all know, a point to which I shall return shortly, Iraq refused to admit inspectors for three years after Resolution 1284 was passed, only agreeing to them under the threat of enforcement action and in an attempt to frustrate 1441. And Iraq has dragged its feet on as many elements of procedural and substantive cooperation as possible.

Could I, Mr. President, just draw attention to just one aspect, which is often overlooked? Dr. Blix referred to the fact that Iraq has recently informed us that following the adoption of a presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to weapons of mass destruction, further legislation on this subject is to be enacted. No one should be taken in by this as a concession. Iraq was ordered -- I have the instruction here from this council -- on the 2nd of October 1991 to enact legislation which, in conformity with international law, shall do precisely what they are now saying they intend to do. And what is more, what they have so far done does not cover the operations of the state, only private individuals and mixed companies. So 12 years on, 12 years after the world saw that Iraq had developed, under the world's noses, weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, nuclear systems, biological systems, chemical systems, Iraq is still refusing to pass a law saying that such activity by members of state government authorities is illegal. This is not something for which they needed to search. It's not something for which they needed the assistance of inspectors or ground-penetrating radar. It's something they could and should have done back in October 1991, and notwithstanding all the pressure, they are still refusing to do.

And then we come on to the issue of interviews. As Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei have reported, Iraq has done everything possible to prevent unrestricted, unrecorded interviews. There have now been 12 private interviews between UNSCOM (sic) and the IAEA, against -- UNMOVIC and the IAEA, against an UNSCOM list of 3,500 people previously associated with weapons of mass destruction programs.

And we know for a fact that all of these 12 and all prospective interviewees have been threatened and intimidated by the Iraqi regime beforehand and told that their exchanges were being recorded. If they weren't being recorded by bugs and tape recorders the interviewees were told to take into the meetings, they were told that they were going to be recorded in any event by bugs placed in the walls of the recording halls.

And I understand that scientists most likely to have the most incriminating evidence have been locked away by the Iraqi security services. There have been interviews in the safe havens outside Iraq; not one. And the restrictions placed on the interviewees is itself the most incriminating evidence that Saddam has something to hide.

The Al-Samoud 2 episode further confirms Iraq's familiar tactics. Iraq under-declared the number of missile engines it illegally imported. It declared 131 engines but imported 380. Iraq also falsely declared that the missile had a maximum range of 150 kilometers, when it was designed to fly -- it is not an accident -- it was designed to fly considerably in excess of that.

And we know that Iraq's agreement to the destruction process, necessary as it is, is a calculation that it can satisfy the council with a partial response in one, only, of the 29 categories of unresolved disarmament questions.

I have to say, Mr. President, and with all respect to good colleagues, that it defies experience that to continue inspections with no firm end date, as I believe has been suggested in the French, German and Russian memorandum, will achieve complete disarmament, unless -- unless -- as the memorandum acknowledges, Iraq's full and active cooperation is immediately forthcoming.

And the memorandum is not even a formula for containment, given Iraq's proven ability to exploit the existing sanctions regime to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. We knew nothing about the missile engines, we knew nothing about the rest of this, imported under our noses in breach of the sanctions regime, until we passed 1441.

And to find a peaceful solution to the current crisis, Mr. President, the council must not retreat from the demands it set out clearly in 1441. What we need is an irreversible and strategic decision by Iraq to disarm, a strategic decision by Iraq to yield to the inspectors all of its weapons of mass destruction and all relevant information which it could and should have provided at any time in the last 12 years, a strategic decision like that taken by South Africa when it decided freely to abandon its secret nuclear program.

Mr. President, I greatly welcome the progress which the inspectors have today reported. My honest wish, and that of my government, has all along been to achieve the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, if humanly possible, by peaceful means. But to achieve that, we have to recognize that the progress which has been reported represents only the tip of a very large iceberg of huge unfinished business required of Iraq.

And just as I welcome the progress which we have heard, I say to the council that there are very serious lessons for us from what has been reported. Let us consider what has changed. Why has there been this sudden bout of activity when there was no progress at all for weeks before that, where for months and for years before that, Saddam Hussein was rearming under our noses? Now, it isn't our policy which has changed. It's not international law which has changed. There has been, from the beginning, the clearest instructions to Saddam to disarm. No. What has changed is one thing and one thing only: the pressure on the regime.

Dr. Blix said in his opening remarks that this -- what's changed may well be due to strong outside pressure. That's absolutely right. In his remarks, Dominique de Villepin said that -- and described a lot of diplomatic pressure by the non-aligned movement, by the European Union, by the Arab League and by many others. And I greatly welcome all of that diplomatic pressure. Dominique went on to say, "and the United States and United Kingdom forces lend support to that pressure" With respect to my good friend, I think it's the other way around. (Laughter.) I really do. What has happened? All that pressure was there for every day of 12 years. In Dr. Blix's carefully chosen words, the "strong outside pressure" is -- and let us be blunt about this -- the presence of over 200,000 United States and United Kingdom young men and young women willing to put their lives on the line for the sake of this body, the United Nations.

And Dominique also said the choice before us was disarmament by peace or disarmament by war. Dominique, that's a false choice. I wish that it were that easy, because we wouldn't be having to have this discussion. We could all put up our hands for disarmament by peace and go home.

The paradox we face is that the only way we are going to achieve disarmament by peace of a rogue regime which all of us know has been in defiance of this council for the past 12 years, the only way we can achieve their disarmament of their weapons of mass destruction, which this council has said poses a threat to international peace and security, is by backing our diplomacy with the credible threat of force. I wish we lived in a different world, where this was not necessary, but sadly, we live in that world.

And the choice -- the choice, Dominique, is not ours as to how this disarmament takes place. The choice is Saddam Hussein's. It's his choice. It's his choice. Would that it were ours, because it would be so easy. But sadly, it is not.

And there is only one possible sensible conclusion that we can draw. We have to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein. We have to put this man to the test. He's shown this week he doesn't need more time to comply. He can act with astonishing speed when he chooses to. What's more, he knows exactly what has to be done. He knows this because he's the originator of all this, of the information. The Iraqis don't need a Dr. Hans Blix and all his staff to produce 167 pages of forensic questions. They have the answer book already. Look how fast they acted to produce 13,000 pages of a declaration, albeit much of that was irrelevant. Mr. President, it may take time to fabricate further falsehoods, but the truth takes only seconds to tell.

And I just want to make this clear, on this issue of automaticity, which again my good friend Dominique raised. This is -- there's nothing ever been automatic about the threat of force or the use of force. It has always been conditional. It would be utterly irresponsible and in defiance of our solemn duties to this council for us to walk into a situation where force was used automatically. And although there's been that canard around -- that some of us were in the business of using force automatically -- the truth is that it's not being used automatically, it should not be used automatically, it will not be used automatically. And nothing to which my government has ever put its name ever suggests that that would be the case.

What we seek is compliance by Saddam Hussein of 1441.

And I make this point. We are not suggesting, we're not suggesting that in a matter of days Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei would be able to complete all their work, they'd be able to verify the disarmament of Iraq. No one is suggesting that.

But what we are suggesting is that it is perfectly possible, perfectly possible, achievable and necessary for Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime to bring themselves into compliance so that instead of us all, either by our words or by our silence, as we have today admitted that Saddam is not in full compliance, that he has not taken the further opportunity and the final opportunity, we can say the reverse and we can celebrate the achievement of the fine ideals of the United Nations and of one of the central points of the work program of the U.N., that we back, if necessary, our diplomacy by the credible threat of force.

And we remain, as founding members of this United Nations and as permanent members of this Security Council, committed to exploring every reasonable option for a peaceful outcome and every prospect of a council consensus.

And in the light of that, and in the light of what I have said, I should tell the council that I'm asking on behalf of the cosponsors of our draft resolution -- the Kingdom of Spain, the government of the United States, and the government of the United Kingdom -- I'm asking the secretariat to circulate an amendment which we are tabling which will specify a further period beyond the adoption of a resolution for Iraq to take the final opportunity to disarm and to bring themselves into compliance.

But, Mr. President, the council must send Iraq the clear message that we will resolve this crisis on the United Nations' terms, the terms which the council established four months ago, when we unanimously adopted Resolution 1441.

Thank you very much indeed. (Applause.)

* * *

DOURI (through interpreter): Thank you, Mr. President. In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate, my delegation would like to extend its congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council this month. We are confident that your African wisdom will be the best guarantor for the success of its work this month.

I should also like to thank Germany for its presidency of the Security Council last month, and for all the efforts made towards the success of its deliberations.

I should like to thank both Doctors Blix and ElBaradei for their efforts and for their briefings. Let me stress our pledge on continuing proactive cooperation with them.

Mr. President, Iraq proceeds from a deep sense of responsibility, from a clarity of vision in regard of the nature of the very difficult international circumstances that are an inauspicious omen not only for Iraq and its people, but for the entire region and the world, which includes this organization, the United Nations organization. The entire world, with the exception of a handful of states, remain desirous to see the United Nations continuing to fulfill the tasks entrusted it, in keeping international peace and security.

Mr. President, it seems that the possibility of a war of aggression being launched on Iraq has become imminent, regardless of what the Security Council decides, and regardless of the international position, both official and public, strongly rejecting aggression and war, and demanding a peaceful solution.

The French-German-Russian-Chinese position clearly expresses the fact that there is no need for a second resolution to be adopted in the Security Council. It demands that the work of the inspectors continue and that enough time is given them to complete their tasks by peaceful means.

The position of the Arab countries was also clear, particularly the one taken by the last Arab summit, which unanimously expressed the rejection of an attack against Iraq as constituting a threat to Arab national security. The summit called on a peaceful resolution of the Iraqi crisis within international legitimacy. The summit reaffirmed the responsibility of the Security Council to preserve the independence, security and territorial integrity of Iraq. The summit also stated that time has come to lift the sanctions imposed on Iraq.

The latest summit of the Non-aligned Movement, a movement of 114 countries, held in Kuala Lumpur, condemned military action and the threat of the use of military action, considering such action as aggression and a flagrant violation of the principle of non- interference.

The heads of states and governments, and the representatives of 57 Islamic countries, who just met recently at the Al-Doha summit, also declared their absolute rejection of any aggression on Iraq, considering it a threat to the security of any Islamic state.

Furthermore, I should like to express my appreciation for the efforts being made by all churches in stressing the importance of peace, as well as the efforts in particular made by His Holiness, the pope, in underscoring peace and denouncing war, considering such war void from any moral or legitimate foundation.

On behalf of the people of Iraq, I should like to salute all the peoples in the world, and in particular the people of the United States of America and the British people, the people of Spain, who took to the streets in their millions in demonstrations expressing their attachment to peace and their rejection of war.

Mr. President, the U.S. administration, with Britain, have in the past, and continue to attempt to trump up facts and evidence pointing to Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. However, they have come short in convincing the international community. The inspectors have proved that there are no such weapons and that such allegations are false.

Secretary Powell spoke of a lack of a strategic and political decision in Iraq confirming a commitment to the resolutions of international legitimacy and a commitment to ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. Let me affirm that Iraq's strategic decision to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction was indeed taken in 1991. UNSCOM worked for eight years. Iraq handed over many of those weapons to UNSCOM for destruction in the period from 1991 to 1994. Indeed, UNSCOM did undertake the destruction of those weapons; that, in addition to the weapons unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991. These include all proscribed material in the biological area. This, Mr. President, is the central fact of the matter. Since then, nothing has been unearthed to contradict that central fact.

Any weapons that are proscribed will be found in either of those two categories: declared, or unilaterally destroyed. All the declaration that Iraq was repeatedly asked to present connected with details and verification of unilateral destruction, and nothing else. I repeat: nothing else. It is for the accusers to prove otherwise if they have any evidence in hand.

Let me also point to what Secretary Powell stated, arguing regarding Iraq's VX program. The fact of the matter is that Iraq had no weapons -- no VX weapons to declare. No VX agents remained to be declared by Iraq. Iraq never produced stable VX and never weaponized VX.

No one has any evidence whatsoever to prove the contrary.

Mr. Powell ought not to jump into such hasty conclusions as he has in the past concerning aluminum tubes and the claims on importing uranium. We heard directly from Mr. ElBaradei today to the exact opposite.

Regarding statements on Iraq's cooperation that I heard this morning from many distinguished members of the council, allow me just to point out what was stated by Dr. Blix, not today; however, what he stated two days ago in a press conference. In that press conference, he stated that Iraq is cooperating proactively. I would underline the word "proactively." He stated that a real disarmament is taking place on the ground -- real disarmament. He stated that the efforts exerted by Iraq and the inspectors represent steps towards actual verification -- verification -- of Iraq's unilateral destruction of its previous proscribed programs.

When asked if Iraq represents a threat now, he replied that all agree that Iraq possesses very limited military capacities in comparison with 1991 and that Iraq is being monitored and very closely guarded by the inspectors.

On the issue of interviews, Dr. Blix stated that his experts have clarified that those interviews are yielding important and beneficial results regarding data. He pointed out, in this regard, the importance of Iraq's submission of names of participants in destroying proscribed programs, an issue that surely will facilitate verification of such destruction. He added that he does not agree with those who say that Resolution 1441 is a disarmament resolution and not an inspection resolution.

Mr. President, the U.S.-U.K. statements, in addition with some others today, show a state of confusion, because officials in the United States and the U.K. and those standing on their side are unable to provide any evidence proving the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

They have also not been able to mask their own private agenda in the region and the world.

So it all started with the issue of Iraq possessing and developing weapons of mass destruction. Then they demanded that Iraq accept the return of inspectors. Then they moved on to proactive cooperation with the inspectors. Then they demanded the submission of evidence, proof that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction. Then, at the last meeting, they concentrated on the need to destroy the Al Samoud 2 missiles. Then talk moved on to the alleged link that Iraq is destroying on the one hand and manufacturing on the other. Then talk began of an alleged link with terrorism and regime change. And finally, here we are, hearing about Iraq being a threat to U.S. national security, stated by President Bush, having previously heard that Iraq is a threat to its neighbors.

This is an attempt to mix the issues. It is an attempt to mask the real agenda of the United States of America and the United Kingdom in Iraq. It's a very simple agenda. The objective is the complete takeover of Iraq's oil, domination of the entire Arab region, politically and economically. It is the implementation of what is being called the neo-Sykes-Picot on the Middle East, the redrawing of the region one more time.

Mr. President, when Iraq accepted Security Council resolutions, it was and continues to look for justice from this esteemed council. However, the tabling of the draft resolution and its latest amendment do not relate to disarmament. The aim is to drag the Security Council to detrimental consequences, not only for Iraq, but for the very credibility of this international organization where we're meeting today.

I should like at this point to express Iraq's gratitude to all those opposing the draft. Let me reiterate to them that Iraq will not waver in its continuing proactive and rapid cooperation with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. We call on this august Security Council to shoulder these historical responsibilities, especially today's responsibility in thwarting aggression against Iraq. Let the Security Council not allow in any way for a new crime to be committed in its name, which will in its impact, will by far surpass any crimes in the past century.

Let me add, Mr. President, that war against Iraq will not unearth any weapons of mass destruction, but it will reap destruction for a very simple reason: there are no such weapons, except in the imagination of some. And therefore, all those who abetted in the commission of that crime without a direct interest will be sorry indeed.

I thank you, sir.

Updated March 7, 2003 4:34 p.m. EST

online.wsj.com



To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/8/2003 8:40:40 AM
From: Vitas  Respond to of 808
 
Full Text of U.N. Addresses By Chief Weapons Inspectors

Following is the full text of remarks given to the U.N. Security Council March 7, 2003, by United Nations chief weapons inspector Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei. Provided by the Associated Press.

HANS BLIX: Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, for nearly three years, I've been coming to the Security Council presenting the quarterly reports of UNMOVIC. They have described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq.

The 12th quarterly report is the first that describes three months of inspection. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalized 10 days ago, and a number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today's statement will supplement the circulated report on these points to bring the council up to date.

Inspections in Iraq resumed on the 27th of November, 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties, and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.

Some practical matters which were not settled by the talks Dr. ElBaradei and I had with Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in Resolution 1441 have been resolved at meetings which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome.

This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional, no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.

American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures, and we would expect soon to be able to add night-vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close-area surveillance through drones provided by Germany.

We are grateful not only to the countries which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also the states, most recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.

Mr. President, Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programs. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq's declaration of the 7th of December did not bring new documentary evidence.

I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results.

When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for, it is, above all, credible accounts that is needed, or the proscribed items if they exist.

Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons who may have relevant knowledge and experience may be another way of obtaining evidence. UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its records, and they are among the people whom we seek to interview.

In the last month, Iraq has provided us with names of many persons who may be irrelevant sources of information, in particular persons who took part in various places of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons and proscribed missiles in 1991.

This provision of names prompts two reflections. The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.

The second reflection is that, with relevant witnesses available, it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations which allow us to be confident that the testimony given is given without outside influence.

While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials, local minders or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly.

Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, seven of these during the last week.

As I noted on the 14th of February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks, in particular that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist.

Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed-processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found.

Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.

Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programs for remotely piloted vehicles. A number of sites have been inspected with data being collected to assess their range and other capabilities of the various models found, and inspections are continuing in this area.

There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of weapons of mass destruction.

During inspections of declared our undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground-penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.

I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I'm not talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high-quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.

On 14 February, I reported to the council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there were still relatively little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in the report before you. As of today, there is more.

While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council. The calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed, and has started the process of destruction under our supervision.

The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament, indeed the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks; lethal weapons are being destroyed.

However, I must add that the report I have today tells me that no destruction work has continued today. I hope this is a temporary break.

Until today, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including four training missiles, two combat warheads, one launcher and five engines, have been destroyed under UNMOVIC's supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 program.

Two reconstituted casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.

The legality of the Al-Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile.

More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq already has declared, and some will require further study and discussion.

There is a significant Iraqi effort under way to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated.

To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs, comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments are also found. Samples have been taken.

The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400-type bombs were produced.

In this, as in other matters, the inspection work is moving on and may yield results.

Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax said to be dumped at the site, the results will still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must of course be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.

With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify VX precursors stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

Iraq has also recently informed us that following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work relating to weapons of mass destruction, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. This appears to be in response to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.

Mr. President, what are we to make of these activities?

One can hardly avoid the impression that after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there's been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome. But the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.

Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated, quote, "immediately, unconditionally and actively," unquote, with UNMOVIC, as is required under Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1441. The answers can be seen from the factor descriptions that I have provided.

However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following: The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. It has not, however, so far persisted in this or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.

It is obvious that while the numerous initiatives which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing, open disarmament issues can be seen as active or even proactive, these initiatives three to four months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute immediate cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are, nevertheless, welcome. And UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.

Mr. President, members of the council may relate most of what I have said to Resolution 1441, but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions of the Security Council. The quarterly report before you is submitted in accordance with Resolution 1284, which not only created UNMOVIC but also continues to guide much of our work.

Under the time lines set by that resolution, the results of some of this work is reported to the council before the end of this month.

Let me be more specific. Resolution 1284 instructs UNMOVIC to, I quote, "address unresolved disarmament issues," unquote, and to identify, quote, "key remaining disarmament tasks," unquote. And the latter are to be submitted for approval by the council in the context of a work program. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work program this month as required.

UNMOVIC, UNSCOM and the Amorin Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues which were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points, but analyzed the data behind it and data and document post-1998 up to the present time to compile its own list of unresolved disarmament issues, or rather clustered issues.

It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection activities. And it is also from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify the key remaining disarmament tasks. As noted in the report before you, this list of clustered issues is ready.

UNMOVIC is only required to submit the work program with the key remaining (inaudible) to the council. As I understand, several council members are interested in the working document with a complete cluster of disarmament issues. And we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the council on request.

In this working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which members usually refer to.

Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against a successful resolution of issues.

I should note that the working document contains much information and discussion about the issues which existed at the end of 1998, including information which has come to light after '98. It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of paucity of information.

Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programs have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programs and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document does contain suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled.

Mr. President, let me conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work program which Resolution 1284 requires us to submit this month.

It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks. It will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the council has asked us to implement.

It will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the program; for instance, for aerial surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, et cetera.

How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can -- cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament, and at any rate verification of it, cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by continued outside pressure, it will still take some time to verify sites and items, analyze documents, interview relevant persons and draw conclusions. It will not take years, nor weeks, but months.

Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programs.

Thank you, Mr. President.

SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): I thank Dr. Blix for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. Baradei, you have the floor.

ELBARADEI: Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, my report to the council today is an update on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions.

When I reported last to the council on 14 February, I explained that the agency's inspection activities has moved well beyond the reconnaissance phase -- that is, reestablishing our knowledge base regarding Iraq nuclear capabilities -- into the investigative phase, which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant to disarmament: whether Iraq has revived, or attempted to revive, its defunct nuclear weapons program over the last four years.

At the outset, let me state on general observation, namely that during the past four years at the majority of Iraqi sites industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late "80s, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade, and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment.

At only a few inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and manufacturing have the facilities been improved and new personnel been taken on.

This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapon program.

The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites, including 21 that have not been inspected before. In addition, the agency experts have taken part in many joint UNMOVIC-IAEA inspections.

Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The three operational air samplers have collected from key locations in Iraq weekly air particulate samples that are being sent to laboratories for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and material sample analysis have been received from the relevant laboratories.

Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2,000 kilometers over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons factories, truck parks, and manufacturing facilities and residential areas.

Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel, at times with individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced inspections, and on other occasions in prearranged meetings with key scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's past nuclear program.

The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews, even when the conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA-preferred modalities, with a view to gaining as much information as possible, information that could be cross-checked for validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our assessment of areas under investigation.

As you may recall, when we first began to request private, unescorted interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews and keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, upon our insistence, individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without escort and without a taped record. The IAEA has conducted two such private interviews in the last 10 days, and hope that its ability to conduct private interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside Iraq.

I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities for conducting interviews to ensure that they are conducted freely and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the best way to ensure that interviews are free, and we intend, therefore, to request such interviews shortly.

We are also asking other states to enable us to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those states.

Mr. President, in the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminum tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnets-production capabilities, and its reported attempt to import uranium.

I will touch briefly on the progress made on each of these issues.

Since my last update to the council, the primary technical focus of IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of centrifuge. For that purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of international centrifuge manufacturing experts.

With regard to the aluminum tubes, the IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq's attempt to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminum tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that these aluminum tubes were sold for rocket production. Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81-millimeter tubes for any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets.

The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these rockets was well-documented. Iraq has provided copies of design documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and supporting data and samples.

A thorough analysis of this information, together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted purchase and intended usage of the 81-millimeter aluminum tubes, as well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerance.

Drawing on this information, the IAEA has learned that the original tolerance for the 81-millimeter tubes were set prior to 1987 and were based on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets in Iraq's possession.

Initial attempts to reverse-engineer the rockets met with little success. Tolerance were adjusted during the following years as part of ongoing efforts to revitalize a project and improve operational efficiency. The project language for a long period during this time and became the subject of several committees which resulted in the specification and tolerance changes on each occasion.

Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq efforts to import these aluminum tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuge, and moreover that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable redesign needed to use them in a revived centrifuge program.

However, this issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated.

With respect to reports about Iraq efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment program, I should note that since 1998 Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of 12 different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones.

Through visit to research and production sites, review of engineering drawings and analysis of sample magnets, the IAEA expert familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for centrifuge magnetic bearings.

In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet occurred, and Iraqi documentations and interviews of Iraqi personnel indicate that this contract will not be executed.

However, they have concluded that the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of view.

In addition, the training and experience acquired by Iraq in pre-1991 period make it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will continue, therefore, to monitor and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for enrichment centrifuges.

With regard to uranium acquisition, the IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was centered on documents provided by a number of states that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001. The IAEA has discussed these reports with the governments of Iraq and Israel, both of which have denied that any such activity took place.

For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with Niger and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries including Niger in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the government of Niger and to compare the form, format, contents and signature of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.

Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded with the concurrence of outside experts that these documents which formed the basis for the report of recent uranium transaction between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence if it emerges relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials.

Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear program have arisen from Iraq's procurement efforts reported by a number of states. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure commodities and products, including magnets and aluminum tubes, have been conducted in contravention of the sanctions controlled specified under Security Council Resolution 661 and other relevant resolutions.

The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation, and further verification will be forthcoming. In fact, an IAEA team of technical experts is currently in Iraq, composed of custom investigators and computer forensics specialists, to conduct a -- which is conducting a series of investigations so inspection of trading companies and commercial organizations aimed at understanding Iraq's pattern of procurement.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I am able to report today that in the area of nuclear weapons, the most lethal weapons of mass destruction, inspection in Iraq are moving forward.

Since the resumption of inspection a little over three months ago, and particularly during the three weeks since my last ordered report to the council, the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any effort to revive its past nuclear program during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt.

At this stage, the following can be stated:

One, there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.

Second, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.

Three, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuge out of the aluminum tubes in question.

Fourth, although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet-production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in centrifuge enrichment program.

As I stated above, the IAEA will naturally continue further to scrutinize and investigate all of the above issues.

After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq.

We intend to continue our inspection activities, making use of all additional rights granted to us by Resolution 1441 and all additional tools that might be available to us, including reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies.

We also hope to continue to receive from states actionable information relevant to our mandate.

I should note that in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its cooperation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I do hope that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of its cooperation.

The detailed knowledge of Iraq capabilities that IAEA experts have accumulated since 1991, combined with the extended rights provided by Resolution 1441, the active commitment by all states to help us fulfill our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi cooperation should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related capabilities.

However, however credible this assessment may be, we will endeavor, in view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification process, and particularly in the light of Iraq past record of cooperation, to evaluate Iraq capabilities on a continuous basis as part of our long-term monitoring and verification program in order to provide the international community with ongoing and real-time assurances.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Updated March 7, 2003 4:28 p.m. EST

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To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/8/2003 8:42:30 AM
From: Vitas  Respond to of 808
 
COMMENTARY

Let Us Inspect

By MOHAMED ELBARADEI

For the past three months, a cadre of highly trained inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency has been on a focused mission: to verify, through intrusive inspection, the existence or absence of a nuclear-weapons program in Iraq.

These inspections have recently been characterized by some as a "mission impossible" -- a task too challenging to warrant continued pursuit. This, in my view, is a mischaracterization. I cannot speak for UNMOVIC -- the United Nations organization tasked with chemical, biological and missile inspections in Iraq. However, the facts on the nuclear side speak for themselves: After three months back in Baghdad, nuclear-weapons inspections are making marked progress.

The inspector's role is not that of a cloak-and-dagger detective, but neither are inspectors the passive "observers" that some have suggested. The IAEA's nuclear-weapons inspectors are physicists, chemists and engineers with decades of experience in nuclear-weapons research and development, nuclear-material safeguards and intrusive international inspection.

A high percentage of the current IAEA team had experience in Iraq during 1991-98. This was a period when the IAEA successfully seized nuclear-related documents based on information provided by defectors, convinced Iraq to provide volumes of additional information describing its existing nuclear-weapons program, destroyed or neutralized Iraqi facilities and equipment related to nuclear-weapons production and confiscated and removed from Iraq its nuclear weapons-usable material.

In the past three months, they have conducted over 200 inspections at more than 140 locations, entering without prior notice into Iraqi industrial facilities, munitions factories, military establishments, private residences and presidential palaces. They have followed up inspection leads provided by other states, confiscated nuclear-related Iraqi documents for further scrutiny, interviewed scientists and engineers known to have played a key role in Iraq's past nuclear-weapons program and lowered themselves by rope into abandoned underground-reactor chambers.

Taking advantage of the "signature" of radioactive materials, they have conducted radiation surveys over thousands of kilometers of Iraqi roads and collected samples of soil, air, water and vegetation and particulate matter from key locations in Iraq for laboratory analysis.

In short, the nuclear inspectors in Iraq have been far from idle, and their efforts far from futile. The IAEA's inspectors have systematically examined the contents and operations of all Iraqi buildings and facilities that were identified through satellite surveillance as having been modified or newly constructed since December 1998, when inspections were brought to a halt. They have determined the whereabouts and functionality of Iraq's known "dual-use" equipment -- that is, equipment that has legitimate industrial uses, such as precision machining, but that could also be used for the high-precision manufacture of components relevant to a nuclear-weapons program.

While the task is by no means complete, the inspection results achieved to date are worthy of careful consideration. In my update to the U.N. Security Council today, I will present the latest inspection results in detail. These will cover issues such as whether Iraq has used aluminum tubes and high-strength magnets as part of efforts to enrich uranium, Iraq's indigenous capability for flow-forming aluminum cylinders and the reported attempts by Iraq to import uranium from Niger.

A key facet of these inspections has been the degree of cooperation on the part of Iraq. Throughout the past three months, Iraqi authorities have provided access to all facilities without conditions and without delay and have made documents available in response to inspectors' requests.

However, the level of cooperation was initially "passive." Thus in our reports to the Security Council and meetings with Iraqi officials, we emphasized the need for a shift to more "proactive" support on the part of Iraq -- that is, making every effort to assist inspectors by voluntarily making available documentation, people and physical evidence that could help to fill in the remaining gaps in our understanding.

This urging, backed by the threat of the use of force, ultimately led to improvement. In recent weeks, Iraq has agreed to the use of overhead surveillance flights by American, French, Russian and German aircraft in support of the inspecting organizations and, as requested, committed to encouraging its citizens to accept interviews in private in Iraq. It has also provided lists of additional Iraqi personnel who might be relevant to verification issues. This kind of cooperation should speed up the verification process and generate additional credibility for the assurances that result.

Nuclear-weapons inspections in Iraq are making marked progress. To date, we have found no substantiated evidence of the revival in Iraq of a nuclear-weapons program -- the most lethal of the weapons of mass destruction. No verification program can provide absolute guarantees that every facility or piece of equipment has been seen. There is always some degree of risk -- and for that reason we need to continue to maintain a monitoring and verification presence in Iraq well into the future.

For the present, we intend to continue our program of intrusive inspection, making use of all the authority granted to us by the Security Council and all the information provided by other states. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, and provided that the level of cooperation by Iraq accelerates and support by other states continues, the IAEA should be able in the near future to provide the Security Council with credible assurances regarding the presence or absence of a nuclear-weapons program in Iraq.

Mr. ElBaradei is the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and head of nuclear inspections in Iraq.

Updated March 7, 2003 12:13 a.m. EST

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To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/8/2003 8:44:09 AM
From: Vitas  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 808
 
France's Leaders Weigh Risks
Of Vetoing New U.N. Resolution

By CHARLES FLEMING
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

PARIS -- France, by implicitly threatening to veto a new United Nations resolution clearing the way for armed intervention in Iraq, is playing a game of chicken with the U.S.

Eager to avoid military action against Iraq -- arguing war would exacerbate rather than quell Middle East-based terrorism -- French leaders are equally aware that the use of a veto could seriously damage relations with the U.S.

Because of France's position within the European Union, a rift between it and the U.S. over Iraq would likely complicate trans-Atlantic relations. Europe and the U.S. would still work together on many fronts and continue to enjoy a healthy commercial relationship. But a French Security Council veto, added to the long list of issues on which the Bush administration hasn't seen eye-to-eye with Europe over the past two years, would further sour an already difficult relationship.

It remains unclear whether France will use its veto if there is a second vote on Iraq. But it is only by threatening to do so that France is likely to achieve its goal of winning the argument without having to actually use its veto, politicians and analysts say. France believes only such a threat could persuade the U.S., U.K. and Spain not to push for a vote on the resolution as it stands. President Bush Thursday night in a news conference on Iraq said he would ask the Security Council to vote on the new resolution whether or not he thought he had the votes needed to pass it.

Alternatively, this line of thinking goes, the notion that some permanent members of the Security Council would veto a resolution -- namely France, alone or possibly with Russia -- could help persuade other members of the council to follow. That would rob the U.S. of a majority and eliminate the need for a French veto.

"A [Security Council] veto is like a nuclear deterrent: If you have it, you have to state your readiness to use it, but if you do have to use it, you know you're in political trouble," said Francois Heisbourg, the head of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. Indeed, the last time France vetoed a U.S. resolution was during the Suez Canal crisis of 1956.

It's a risky strategy domestically as well. Jacques Barrot, an ally of President Jacques Chirac and chairman of the parliamentary delegation of the president's Popular Movement Union, or UMP, says a large majority of UMP deputies support President Chirac's analysis and his position on Iraq. But some are now worried about the fallout on France's long alliance with the U.S.

"Even among the deputies who support Jacques Chirac, there is concern that there shouldn't be a serious rift with the U.S. over this," he said.

A similar wariness is guiding French diplomacy. On Wednesday, France, Germany and Russia struck a tough stance against the U.S. by saying they would block any resolution clearing the way for an attack on Iraq. "We will not allow a resolution to pass that authorizes resorting to force," said French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin. Although the statement sounded tough, it remained consistent with the line adopted early on by Mr. de Villepin and his boss, President Chirac, of not ruling out military force as a last resort if Saddam Hussein refuses to disarm peacefully. Mr. de Villepin's remarks also reflected the care that French leaders have systematically taken in sidestepping any direct mention of a Security Council veto but of merely alluding to the threat.

The showdown centers on a draft resolution, filed by the U.S., the U.K. and Spain, declaring that Iraq has not disarmed. Approval of that resolution would open the way for an attack on Iraq, those three nations say. If and when the U.S. and its allies call for a vote on the resolution -- which could be any time after Friday's presentation by the U.N.'s chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix -- they would require backing by at least six other members of the Security Council to get it passed. They would also have to persuade France, Russia and China (as permanent members of the Council) not to veto the measure. Thursday, China indicated it may throw its support behind the French-led camp.

Of the current 15 Security Council members, France, Germany, Russia, China and Syria have all said that U.N. weapons inspectors should be given more time to force Iraq's disarmament. The U.S., U.K., Spain and Bulgaria argue for rapid military action. And both sides are vying for the votes of the other six nonpermanent members -- Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan.

Meanwhile, a key question is whether France would stick to its position if its allies -- particularly Russia and Germany -- were to shift theirs.

Germany has taken the most extreme position of any of the Western opponents of war in Iraq, with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder ruling out the use of military force in any situation. However, officials in Berlin suggest Germany could be seeking to moderate that hard-line position.

Last month, Germany signed a European Union statement on Iraq that didn't rule out the use of force. Officials in Mr. Schroeder's office say that vote could pave the way for Germany to abstain on a second resolution, rather than being forced to vote against it. "The recent events are not coincidence," a German official said. "There has been a subtle shift," he added.

Moscow's opposition to U.S. plans in Iraq has taken the Bush administration by surprise. Last month, top U.S. administration officials said they still hoped to persuade Russia to support a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Even if Russia refused, Washington was confident Moscow would not use its veto in the U.N. Security Council.

However, analysts say Moscow would quickly cave in to U.S. desires on Iraq if there are signs that France or Germany are deserting their positions. "They can't come out and support a war before it starts," said Steven O'Sullivan, strategist at United Financial Group brokerage in Moscow. "But once it starts, they will have a different view."

-- Ian Johnson and Alan Cullison contributed to this article.

Write to Charles Fleming at charles.fleming@wsj.com

Updated March 7, 2003

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To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/8/2003 8:50:13 AM
From: Vitas  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 808
 
Americans Believe Bush Will Do the Right Thing on Iraq

A WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE NEWS ROUNDUP

While Americans are far from enthusiastic over an attack on Iraq, they are much more supportive of war than are citizens of the United Kingdom and Canada, according to the findings of the latest Harris Poll.

Some 40% of Americans say the U.S. should attack Iraq within the next month unless Saddam Hussein's regime proves it does not have nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. But only about 20% of those in Canada and the U.K. favor such a timetable, and most say war should be waged only if the United Nations approves an attack.

GIRDING FOR WAR

• See an interactive map1 of the Mideast detailing U.S. military preparations for a possible war with Iraq.

• For continuing coverage, see War With Iraq.2




People in all three countries overwhelmingly believe Iraq has or is producing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Only 20% of Americans believe U.N. inspectors would be able to find the weapons after a year of searching. Canadians are more optimistic, but still just 31% believe the weapons could be found.

Nearly a third of Americans say there is a close link between Mr. Hussein and al Qaeda. U.K. and Canadian citizens are far less convinced, but more than half still say there is probably some connection.

Most Americans believe that President Bush will make the right decision on Iraq. But barely a third of Canadians believe the president will make the right choice, and only 29% of those in Britain do.

Here are the results of the latest poll:

CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WILL MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION
"How much confidence do you have that President Bush and his administration will make the right decisions regarding the use, or nonuse, of the U.S. military to attack Iraq?"
Base: All Adults

U.S. G.B. Canada
% % %
Very/Somewhat confident (NET) 58 29 34
I'm very confident 35 10 12
I'm somewhat confident 23 19 22
Not at all confident/Not very confident (NET) 39 69 63
I'm not very confident 18 33 29
I'm not at all confident 21 36 34
Don't know 4 2 3

***
BELIEVE IRAQ HAS OR IS MAKING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
"Do you believe that Iraq has, or is making, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons?"
Base: All Adults

U.S. G.B. Canada
% % %
Believe Iraq has, or is making, such weapons 80 73 69
Do not believe Iraq has, or is making, such weapons 4 6 9
Don't know 16 21 23

***
BELIEVE U.N. INSPECTORS WILL FIND WEAPONS IF HAVE A YEAR TO LOOK
"If Iraq has nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, do you believe that the U.N. weapons inspectors will be able to find them if they have a year to look for them?"
Base: All Adults

U.S. G.B. Canada
% % %
Will be able to find such weapons 20 29 31
Will not be able to find such weapons 60 49 47
Don't know 20 21 22

***
WHAT SHOULD U.S. AND ALLIES DO?
"Which one of the following comes closest to your view of what the United States and its allies should do?"
Base: All Adults

U.S. G.B. Canada
% % %
Attack Iraq only after the U.N. weapons inspectors have had plenty of time to look, and there is strong evidence that Iraq still has or is making nuclear, chemical or biological weapons 33 46 47
Attack Iraq in the next month or so unless Iraq proves it does not have nuclear, chemical or biological weapons 40 22 20
Only attack if Iraq attacks another country 13 22 19
Not attack Iraq under any circumstances 4 6 8
Don't know 10 4 6

***
FAVOR/OPPOSE ATTACK IF BUSH BELIEVES HUSSEIN IS HIDING WEAPONS BUT INSPECTORS CANNOT FIND ANY AND U.N. DOES NOT VOTE TO APPROVE ATTACK
"Would you favor or oppose a military attack on Iraq if President Bush believes Saddam Hussein is hiding weapons of mass destruction but the U.N. weapons inspectors cannot find any, and the United Nations does not vote to approve an attack?"
Base: All Adults

U.S. G.B. Canada
% % %
Would favor attacking Iraq 45 27 22
Would oppose attacking Iraq 36 59 65
Don't know 19 14 13

***
IS THERE A LINK BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND AL QAEDA?
"Do you think there is a link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda?"
Base: All Adults

U.S. G.B. Canada
% % %
There is a close link 30 11 17
There is some link 48 50 48
There is no link 7 20 14
Don't know 15 20 20

***
HOW MUCH TIME SHOULD U.S. ALLOW BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO ATTACK?
"How much time do you think the U.S. should allow for the U.N. inspectors to look for nuclear, chemical or biological weapons before deciding whether or not we need to attack Iraq?"
Base: All Adults

U.S. G.B. Canada
% % %
Less than 1 month 27 13 11
1 month 15 15 13
2 – 3 months 13 17 17
4 – 6 months 14 15 18
7 – 9 months 3 3 4
10 – 12 months 8 16 16
More than 1 year 7 12 10
Don't know 12 9 12

***
DOES BUSH WANT TO ATTACK OR WOULD HE PREFER TO ACHIEVE HIS GOALS WITHOUT ATTACKING?
"Overall, do you feel that President Bush wants a military attack on Iraq or that he'd prefer to achieve his main goals without attacking Iraq?"
Base: All Adults

U.S. G.B. Canada
% % %
Wants a military attack 52 80 75
Would prefer to achieve goals without an attack 42 18 21
Don't know 6 2 4

* * *
Methodology: This poll was conducted online between February 19 and 27, 2003, among a nationwide cross section of 2,201 adults. Figures for age, sex, race, education, number of adults and number of voice/telephone lines in the household were weighted where necessary to align with population proportions. Harris Interactive estimates the results have a statistical precision of plus or minus three percentage points of compared to results if the entire adult population had been polled with complete accuracy.

URL for this article:
online.wsj.com

Updated March 6, 2003 3:03 p.m. EST



To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/9/2003 8:40:32 AM
From: Vitas  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 808
 
Springtime for Saddam

by John Leo

Europe's cowardice and appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s are similar to France and Germany's sad performance today. The '30s appeaser in chief--British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain--drew applause on all sides for capitulating at Munich and was said to deserve a Nobel Peace Prize, just as Jacques Chirac has been mentioned for the prize now. Then, as now, France had a weak leader unruffled by growing danger abroad and rising antisemitism at home.

Venerable journalist Alistair Cooke, who is old enough to remember the period, points out that in 1938, Hitler had been reneging on the First World War peace treaty for only two years, compared with Saddam Hussein's 12 years of defying the terms of the U.N.'s Gulf War cease-fire. Then, as now, the fearful argued that a murderous tyrant may have terrible new weapons, but, after all, he hasn't turned them on us yet. The arguments for doing nothing were eerily like Western Europe's today, even down to the insistence that the comatose League of Nations was the true savior of world peace. The league managed to do nothing about the Japanese seizure of Manchuria and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, approximately what the United Nations did when Syria seized Lebanon and China gobbled up Tibet.

"A majority of Britons would do anything, absolutely anything to get rid of Hitler--except fight him," Cooke said last month on BBC. Europeans were eager to talk but not to act. "The French especially urged, after each Hitler invasion, `negotiation, negotiation.' They negotiated so successfully as to have their whole country defeated and occupied."

Building backbone. From 1939 on--as in 2003--it was an American president and a British prime minister standing up on behalf of the many backbone-free Europeans. "Western Europe has almost gone the way of Weimar," Victor Davis Hanson wrote recently on National Review Online. "Amoral, disarmed, and socialist, it seeks ephemeral peace at all costs, never long-term security, much less justice."

Hanson points out other parallels, among them a U.S. anti-war movement featuring a coalition of hard-core old lefties and America First rightists and (a small point here) the return to the German vocabulary of the insult "cowboy," one of Hitler's favorite slurs. But not all parallels work. When Europe finally confronted Hitler, it was too late for anyone to think about denouncing it as a "rush to war."

Like the League of Nations, the U.N. today likes to fill the air with talk and content-free statements intended to placate all parties to any dispute. The aim is to keep the game going, not to solve anything. Hans Blix, the ultimate U.N. bureaucrat, is unusually good at this, issuing double-barreled statements that Iraq is both out of compliance and almost in compliance at the same time (the regime's track record "has not been good" although "they have been very active, I would say, and even proactive, in the last month or so").

The alleged proactivity consists of Saddam Hussein's striptease, throwing a few weapons overboard as pressure is applied, more as war comes closer. Blix, of course, was pleased and said he could use four more months of rummaging around the desert looking for weapons. Twelve years was apparently not a long enough time to expect compliance, though Iraq agreed to comply in 15 days back in 1991.

But there is no evidence and no reason to believe that another four months would accomplish anything. The two real reasons for more inspections: the hope that the United States will lose its resolve and the desire to make invasion difficult by pushing it back to the hot summer months.

There is no longer any point for the United States to play the U.N. game of delay and obstruction, or to pretend that it will place its safety in the hands of the Security Council. Bringing the United Nations along would have been useful. But the notion that the U.N.'s "moral" approval was somehow necessary is ludicrous, particularly since U.N. morality includes turning over its human-rights committee to Libya and repeatedly branding as racist the only Middle East democracy, Israel.

President Clinton got it right, verbally at least, in 1998. He said then that Iraq was "a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals." In urging strong action on Iraq, the Washington Post referred to Clinton's words as "perceptive but ultimately empty" because they led to no meaningful action. In the post-9/11 world, refusing to act is far more dangerous. Saddam has the ability and the hostility to churn out weapons for those who wish to inflict grave damage on the United States. It's time to do something about it.

usnews.com



To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/9/2003 8:50:13 AM
From: Vitas  Respond to of 808
 
Iraq Crisis May Limit Hopes for U.N.

By FELICITY BARRINGER


NITED NATIONS, March 8 — "Relevance" has become the buzzword of the Iraqi crisis. From the president on down, leading Bush administration officials have declared that if the United Nations, as it approaches the age of 58, cannot decide to make its authority felt on Iraq, it may as well resign itself to being a debating society, albeit one with a $1.45 billion annual budget.

Even ardent internationalists worry that the institution finds itself in a lose-lose situation — ridiculed as a puppet if American pressure forces a reluctant Security Council majority to support a war against Saddam Hussein, or reduced once more to a self-absorbed cipher if France, Russia and Germany lead the Security Council to thumb its nose at the world's superpower.

The Security Council's bitter split transfixes a wincing world.

But what has really imploded over the past decade are the hopes of those who believed that the United Nations would emerge from the ashes of the cold war as a mechanism for conflict control.

The current crisis, Edward C. Luck, a Columbia University professor of international and public affairs, believes, is the manifestation of a more fundamental struggle. "This is brutal because of that," he added. Referring to the feuding parties in the dispute, he said, "Everyone thinks they are setting a precedent for the future and aren't giving an inch."

For the French, the United Nations is a kind of global legislature that offers a level playing field to superpowers, plain old powers and all the rest of the world.

The Bush administration's vision blends a real, if limited, internationalism with the reflexive conservative distrust of government, particularly one in which presumptuous foreigners try to constrain the United States. President Bush went to the United Nations to challenge the institution to reclaim its power by backing him in the campaign to enforce United Nations' mandates. Otherwise, it would be doomed to irrelevance, he said.

This willingness to define the institution by its role in the current crisis seems perverse or myopic to some. "The United Nations is much, much larger than the Iraqi crisis," Secretary General Kofi Annan said on Tuesday.

But many of the foreign ministers speaking around the horseshoe table on Friday still intimated that the institution's future power would rise or fall directly as a consequence of Iraq.

Many scholars and former United Nations officials see that kind of debate as irrelevant. They question whether the United Nations, as it is constituted, can have anything more than an ad-hoc role when armed conflict looms.

In 1950, the United Nations sanctioned the Korean War; there was no Security Council veto because the Soviet Union was boycotting the institution. Close to 40 years of superpower stalemate, punctuated by vetoes, followed.

Then came Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The cold war was almost over, and the United Nations was reinvigorated. The United States assembled an international coalition, the Security Council gave its approval, and a war of a few weeks threw Iraq back to its old borders.

Resolutions were passed mandating Iraq's disarmament. The United States may have been the dominant actor, but the United Nations was a featured player.

That was before Rwanda, where 800,000 people were massacred as the world watched. It was before Bosnia, where United Nations peacekeepers were helpless to prevent Serbs from killing their Muslim neighbors.

The arc of hope for United Nations' effectiveness in maintaining peace had its one real high moment in Iraq in 1991. The low point may be in Iraq in 2003.

But Mr. Luck says the first President Bush's approach to the United Nations was not really different than his son's. "George H. W. Bush said he was only going to stay with the Security Council as long as he knew he was going to win," he said.

Of course, conflict control is but a part of what the organization does.

As James Hoge, the editor of Foreign Affairs, said: "Except for a brief post-cold-war period, the United Nations has been a service agency its entire life. The experiment, the brief experiment of a decade and half, in which it was there to curtail war, or to confine going to war within some loosely defined international parameters set by the Security Council, has failed."

But the fact that it is so often missing in action when it comes to war puts its most prominent defenders on the defensive.

For James S. Sutterlin, a former United Nations executive and the author of "The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security," the question is not the institution's relevance, but its competence."The centrality of the Security Council was evident in its very failure," in Rwanda and Bosnia, he said. "There was the very serious problem that the central organization responsible for security couldn't do it."

For American conservatives, the past three months have been galvanizing. "The notion that the U.N. is really a problem," William Kristol, the editor of The Weekly Standard, said this week, "was a fringe notion until about three months ago. Now serious people, who are not unilateralists, are much more open to alternatives to the U.N."

nytimes.com



To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/10/2003 9:21:08 PM
From: Vitas  Respond to of 808
 
Saddam's just a Hitler with bigger mustache


It is absolutely eerie how closely the current Iraq situation parallels the rise of the Third Reich 70 years ago. I consider Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to be Hitler lite because he has the same virulent anti-Semitism, the same callous disregard for human life and the identical lust for power that Adolf possessed. The only difference between the two villains is the size of the moustache.
Back in the 1930s, millions of people the world over did not want to think about the evil Hitler was brewing up. France and Russia were the chief appeasers, as they are today. Josef Stalin ultimately signed a treaty with Hitler making it possible for him to use most of his forces to crush Europe, and France simply allowed Hitler to violate the Treaty of Versailles, even more than the 17 times Saddam has violated UN mandates. Britain went along with France in the '30s, but now it seems the United Kingdom has learned from its historical mistakes.

Then there's the Pope, who recently said any war against Iraq would be "immoral." Back in the '30s, Pius XII actually supported Hitler politically - at least in the beginning of his rise, when Pius was stationed in Germany. The Third Reich was considered a bulwark against communism, which the church greatly feared. Subsequently, Pius kept quiet about the atrocities of Hitler's regime because he knew that the Vatican itself could easily be vanquished by the Huns.

Today, Pope John Paul deplores the violence that comes with any war but is at a loss to explain how terrorism and the states that enable it should be dealt with. Remember, the Pope did not approve of the military action against the Taliban.

Peace, of course, should be the goal of all civilized people. Millions of Americans are against a war in Iraq, and millions were vehemently opposed to confronting Hitler. Back then, the anti-war movement was led by Charles Lindbergh and Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, who largely dismissed accusations of Nazi brutality and weapons production as propaganda. In 1939, SS Chief Heinrich Himmler was even on the cover of Time magazine. I have the issue. The article criticized Himmler and hinted at barbaric behavior, but there was no smoking gun.

The failure to confront the obvious evil of the Nazis early, of course, led to the deaths of more than 55 million in Europe. Millions of Jews were stunned when they were led by German guards to the gas chambers. How could human beings do this? Even after evidence of mass executions surfaced, many the world over refused to believe it. Liberating American soldiers were horrified at what they found. Most had no idea what they were really fighting.

Does anyone today believe Al Qaeda or Saddam would not slaughter Jews and, indeed, Americans if they had the power to do so? So what is the difference between a dictator like Saddam and Hitler?

It astounds me that 37% of Americans, according to the latest ABC News/Washington Post poll, do not support the removal of Saddam unless other countries sign on. Why allow a dictator who has weapons that would make Hitler salivate remain a threat to the world?

If France, Germany, China and Russia would support the U.S. against Saddam, he'd already be out of power. If France, Russia and Britain had marched into Germany in 1933, there would have been no World War II or Holocaust.

Nobody can predict the outcome and aftermath of any war. But we can learn from history. Evil has a way of killing people. The only way evil will be stopped is for just and courageous people to confront it.

Originally published on March 10, 2003

nydailynews.com



To: Vitas who wrote (671)3/10/2003 10:22:09 PM
From: Vitas  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 808
 
Blix 'hid smoking gun' from Britain and US

From James Bone in New York



BRITAIN and the United States will today press the chief UN weapons inspector to admit that he has found a “smoking gun” in Iraq. Such an admission could persuade swing voters on the Security Council to back the March 17 ultimatum.
The British and US ambassadors plan to demand that Hans Blix reveals more details of a huge undeclared Iraqi unmanned aircraft, the discovery of which he failed to mention in his oral report to Security Council foreign ministers on Friday. Its existence was only disclosed in a declassified 173-page document circulated by the inspectors at the end of the meeting — an apparent attempt by Dr Blix to hide the revelation to avoid triggering a war.

The discovery of the drone, which has a wingspan of 7.45 metres, will make it much easier for waverers on the Security Council to accept US and British arguments that Iraq has failed to meet UN demands that it disarm.

“It’s incredible,” a senior diplomat from a swing voter on the council said. “This report is going to have a clearly defined impact on the people who are wavering. It’s a biggie.”

An explicit report by Dr Blix of the discovery of an Iraqi violation would help the six swing voters — Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan — to explain a change of position to their publics.

Unlike the outlawed Al-Samoud 2 missile, which was declared as a purportedly legal weapon, the drone was not declared. It would be the first undeclared weapons programme found by the UN and is considered by British and US officials to be a “smoking gun”.

timesonline.co.uk