You might find this interesting then. Written by a friend of mine, Stuart Slade:
"The following essay describes the mechanisms by which international relations work as seen by the US administration. It is not a description of US policy; its a description of the world view on which US policy is based.
US international policy is based on the mechanistic concept of “Realism”. This is a conceptual term and, like most such usages, doesn’t quite mean what it does in the normal world. In this context, “realism” is used to describe a situation of continuous conflict in which the countries of the world are constantly struggling to establish an international hierarchy, to improve their own positions in that hierarchy and to reduce the positions of others. “Realism” sees the world political arena as being a zero-sum game in which a win for one player necessarily means that another must suffer a loss. Under the concept of “Realism” this immediately draws a distinction between political and economic interactions. Economic interactions are not a zero-sum game; it is quite possible, indeed usual, for an economic interaction to benefit both parties involved. Political interactions do not do this; even if a political agreement appears to benefit both parties, there will be an unseen third party or parties whose interests are harmed. This basic conceptual position leads to an early manifestation of US policy; a firm belief that trade agreements are more productive and desirable than political agreements.
It should be noted that while “realism” dominates US political thinking, it is not the only theoretical construct that attempts to model political processes between nations. There are others that work from different precepts and envisage different mechanisms. In many countries, different political parties or groups will espouse different models and promote different policies as a result. The US is not one of these; both Democrat and Republican parties use the “Realism” model as the basis for their foreign policy. This orientation is reflected by the organizations that surround the government and its bureaucracy; the use of the “Realism” model is so widespread that Americans in general do not even think about it. It just is. This leads to a problem when dealing with political entities that do not espouse the “Realism” model. For example, some models propose a situation in which participation in international agreements is desirable as an end in itself since such agreements bring about an ordered international environment. In these models, a bad agreement is better than no agreement since a bad agreement at least creates an environment where good agreements will be accepted. To a country following a “Realism” model, this is absurd since any international agreement will have winners and losers and losing is bad. Therefore each agreement must be taken on its individual merits, it cannot be considered as part of a larger whole.
The domination of “Realism” in the US political system saw a very public manifestation in President Bush’s famous “you are either with us or against us” comment on the war on terrorism. This was much criticized as an example of US arrogance yet the truth is quite different. In terms of the “Realism” paradigm, it’s a simple statement of fact. The War on Terrorism is a zero-sum game, there will have winners and losers; there will be no neutrals. Thus those who do not support the US position will be enhancing the possibility that the US will be a loser in that interaction – and that puts them into the enemy camp.
Another aspect of “Realism” is the perception that there can only be a single dominant power in a political world, the Hegemon. If there are two or more Hegemons, one will eventually be displaced by the other. This process may be violent or peaceful but it will happen. How it will happen is an interesting question. Although “Realism” is the dominant philosophy in the US political entity, it is not a monolithic whole. The “Realism” philosophy is divided into two sub-groups designated “Minimal-Realism” and “Maximal-Realism”. While both these hold to the same overall tenets of “Realism” (the constant struggle to establish and maintain a hierarchy and the zero-sum nature of political interactions), they have very different perceptions on how these interactions are carried out.
“Minimal-Realism” is sometimes known as “Castling” after an old children’s game. It envisages the world political environment as a sandy mound with the varying nations struggling to establish themselves at the top of that mound. The various parties form a mass at varying levels determined by their strength, abilities and skill. Eventually, one member of the mass secures enough of an advantage to rise to the top and secure the summit; to become “King of the Castle”. According to “Minimal-Realism” the inevitable result of this achievement is for the lesser powers, lower down the slopes of the sand castle to form a coalition that is specifically designed to bring down the entity that has just seized the summit. We can see reflections of this belief in some comments made about the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Sometimes we see the assertion that a nation that acquires or uses nuclear weapons will immediately see the rest of the world uniting against it. This is an implicit acceptance of the “Minimal-Realism” model of relations; the possession of nuclear weapons automatically moves the possessor to a higher position on the san castle so those underneath form a coalition to pull them down.
From the US point of view, acceptance of “Minimal-Realism” has two direct implications. On one level (where the US is not the Hegemon or where the position of Hegemon is disputed) the US should be taking a lead in forming and directing coalitions to take the existing or rival Hegemon down. However, once in the position of being the undisputed Hegemon, it should be spending its efforts on watching for the formation of hostile coalitions and ensuring that they do not move from the formative to the active stage. Implicit in this assumption is that the US should not make its Hegemonic position obvious or exploit that position in overt ways. In fact, the US should not act as a Hegemon at all but continue to act as a leader of a coalition to bring down a selected target. In this perception, overt displays of power are not only undesirable but are counter-productive and detrimental to US interests. Another consequence of this construct is that the US should take part in international organizations, not because they are worthwhile or useful but to conceal its Hegemonic position and to ensure that by dominating such organizations they serve rather than oppose US interests. By now, it should be reasonably obvious that the primary stronghold of “Minimal-Realism” in the US body politic is the Democrat Party.
“Maximal-Realism” sometimes known as “Bandwagoning” sees the world as working in an entirely different way. It sees the Hegemonic power as occupying the summit of the international order effectively unchallenged. The other powers, recognizing the futility of challenging the Hegemon make accommodations with it; they bend to its needs and make the noises that the Hegemon will find acceptable. However, eventually a challenge to the Hegemon’s position is mounted. This may happen because the Hegemon has started to give the impression that its power is slipping either in real terms or in terms of ability and/or desire to use that power, it may happen because the challenger has grown more confident in its own power or has achieved supremacy in a given aspect of power politics. Whatever happens, the challenge is made. From the point of view of the Hegemon, there are now four possible outcomes, it can win-well, it can win-badly, it can lose-well or it can lose-badly. Winning-well means that the challenger is beaten promptly and effectively and ceases to be a challenge; losing-badly means that the Hegemon loses so seriously that its position as Hegemon is disastrously compromised. Winning-badly and losing-well are intermediate stages whose impact can be highly variable; it can be better for the Hegemon to lose-well than to win-badly. The effect of a challenge to the Hegemon’s position obviously depends on the results; a resounding defeat for the Challenger will ensure the position of the Hegemon and cause additional nations to seek accommodations and favor with that power. On the other hand, any decline in the Hegemonic power will cause the less-committed of its supporters to reconsider their positions and open the way to seeking accommodation with the challenger. If the Hegemon suffers enough defeats and its international prestige is sufficiently badly dented, more of its allies will join the bandwagon, transfer their allegiance to the challenger and the Hegemon will be toppled.
From the US point of view, “Maximal-Realism” also has some interesting implications. One is that the US is only secure in its position as Hegemon as long as it overtly and openly exerts that power to defend its interests and those of the nations that owe allegiance to it. Anything that dilutes the US’s ability to mastermind its own affairs or weakens its ability to act in its own interests is seriously detrimental to US interests. Another is that the US has to be watchful for the rise of potential challengers and cut these down before they become serious risks. “Maximal-Realism” is the political equivalent of the quote “to those that hath, more shall be given”. It is the successful exercise of power that is important for it brings with it greater security and sets the bar higher for any subsequent challenger. Another point (and a very important one) is that the initiative lies with the Challenger, not the Hegemon. The Challenger can select the time and place of any confrontation to match its own objectives and capabilities. The Hegemon has to respond for failing to do so will sacrifice prestige and start the bandwagoning process. Vietnam was a classic example; critics of American involvement there always point to the total lack of strategic importance of the place. In “Maximal-Realism” terms, this misses the point completely. Vietnam was not challenged because it was strategically important; it was strategically important because it was challenged. The US lost-badly in Vietnam and the result was its displacement from the Hegemonic position in the middle and late 1970s with the assumption of the position of Hegemon by the USSR. That result was only changed by the US challenge of the 1980s that displaced the USSR. As should now be obvious, the stronghold of “Maximal-Realism” in the US is the Republican Party.
Much of shifts and changes in US policy can be understood in terms of the conflict between “Maximal-Realism” and “Minimal-Realism” schools of thought as can the Democrat fascination with international orders and treaties and the Republican suspicion of these. The problem that the Democrats face is that a reading of history strongly points to the predominance of the “Maximal-Realism” over the “Minimal-Realism” approach.
One example is the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. At the start of this process, Germany was a flat-broke and militarily insignificant player on the European scene. It took only a few years for it to rise to a point where it was a European hegemon. This was achieved by a series of small victories and limited advances that simultaneously enhanced its own power and diluted that of the existing Hegemon. Now, if “Minimal-Realism” was to prove correct, we should have seen a coalition of European powers arising to confront Germany. In fact, we don’t. What we do see is the smaller countries of Europe adopting many of the outward characteristics of Nazi Germany and the foundation of fascist parties in most of the European countries. In short, those countries were bandwagoning with Nazi Germany in exactly the manner predicted by “Maximal-Realism”. A look at the Cold War gives exactly the same impression. In the 1950s, the US was militarily and economically predominant; the USSR had few allies and was largely isolated. It only broke out of that isolation when Kennedy allowed the US to be humiliated in Berlin and Cuba and McNamara allowed the immense US strategic superiority to wither on the vine. The 1960s were marked by a steady rise of USSR power relative to that of the USA and, with the defeat of the US in Vietnam, the US was strategically routed and lost the hegemon position to the USSR. The steady shift of other nations from a US-leaning allegiance to seek accommodations with the USSR (the most notable being the “Ostpolitik” of West Germany) goes hand-in-hand with that shift of power – whereas if “Minimal-Realism” was correct, we should have seen the growth of a coalition against the USSR. The US challenge of the 1980s culminating in the destruction of the USSR replaced the USA as the world Hegemon, a position that it still holds.
This also explains the focus on Iraq at this time. Iraq as the first challenge to the US hegemony after the end of the Cold War. That challenge was defeated fast and bloody (the number of nations taking part in the coalition to defeat Iraq reflecting the strength of US hegemony). However, Iraq still continues to challenge the US Hegemony and has not been eliminated as a challenger. That is about to be corrected. However, much of the US hegemonal strength was lost by the weak and ineffectual actions of the Clinton administration (classical “Minimal-Realists” ) and we are paying for that now with other challengers beginning to emerge (the UN and the EU). Iraq remains the leading threat however, not least because of its links within the Moslem world. The bombings of the US embassies in Africa and the attack on the USS Cole all represented challenges to US hegemony. They were successful challenges because no effective response was made to them. As a result, the prestige of the challengers rose, that of the US fell and the challengers were emboldened to further action – the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon. The destruction of Afghanistan and the elimination of six al Qaeda leaders in an SUV were both responses that restored the situation somewhat. The elimination of Iraq as a challenger is equally important in restoring the damage done during the Clinton era. In contrast, North Korea is not a problem; they do not mount an effective challenge to the US simply because no nation in its right mind wants to be associated with them. They lack credibility as a challenger so they don’t count. Yet.
“Maximal-Realism” is a proven and demonstrated truth of international relations and it carries with it an important lesson. The rule of “Maximal-Realism” is when the hegemon says “jump” the correct response is not “how high” but “may we come down now please”. It was once suggested that this would cause us to “lose world sympathy”. From the “Maximal-Realism” this is a good thing in its own right. We don’t want you to love us, we want you to be frightened of incurring our displeasure." |
